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**Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects**

# Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations

## Report of the Secretary-General

*Executive summary*

The present report contains the findings of the first in-depth and comprehensive managerial examination of the way in which the Organization plans, deploys, conducts and supports peacekeeping operations. It builds on the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.

The report, which has benefited from the input of external management consultants and former senior United Nations and Member States' officials with extensive exposure to United Nations peacekeeping, summarizes the weaknesses in the managerial foundations of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. It argues that the following core capacities require considerable strengthening: the Department's management practices and culture; its ability to translate legislative guidance into strategic plans for future peacekeeping operations, bearing in mind lessons learned and best practices from previous operations; the priority and effort it dedicates to developing the requisite policies and capacities required to enable peacekeeping operations to function efficiently and effectively; and internal coordination for the planning, conduct and support of specific peacekeeping operations.

The report contains an assessment of the implications of the Organization setting as an objective the ability to fully and effectively deploy peacekeeping operations within 30 to 90 days of a Security Council resolution establishing them, as suggested by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and endorsed by the General Assembly. It outlines three options available to achieve this objective: a "heavy strategic reserve" of equipment and matériel at the United Nations Logistics

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Base in Brindisi, Italy (which could entail an initial investment as high as $350 million); a "light strategic reserve" option, which would entail substantially lower up-front investments (some $30 million) but would rely on extensive "retainer" contracts for the "just-in-time" delivery of goods and services (with very large annual recurring costs, over $100 million per annum); and a "medium strategic reserve" option, which seeks to keep the initial investment costs and annual recurring costs at lower levels (approximately $170 million up-front investment and some $40 million annual recurring costs). The report recommends the "medium strategic reserve" option as the most economical and practical.

The report states that any of the options to meet the 30-to-90-day deployment time-frames will require the following: a one-time expenditure budget to enhance the strategic deployment stocks at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, as well as to cater for annual recurring costs; entry into prearranged contracts and letters of assist for key services; increased reliability of standby arrangements with Member States, especially for support units; and improved personnel surge capacity, particularly for staff in areas of administrative support. It also emphasizes that pre-commitment authority — to initiate spending to procure essential goods and services prior to the adoption of a resolution establishing an operation — can greatly enhance the ability of the Organization to meet the stated deployment objectives. These proposals would enable the United Nations to go a long way in ensuring that an effective civilian and civilian police monitoring structure could be established in parallel with a rapidly deployed military contingent. Nevertheless, the report plainly states that none of the options would guarantee 30-to-90-day deployment time-frames, as this can only be achieved by the provision of fully self-sustaining and completely self-sufficient troops provided by Member States with the means to do so.

The report mentions the progress achieved in the articulation of proposals for enhancing the standby arrangements system for military and civilian police personnel, including for the creation of a revolving list of "on call" officers, available for deployment at short notice. In this regard, it refers to the recent letter to Member States containing the profiles of the expertise required and the proposed mechanism for enhancing the standby arrangements system, as I undertook to formulate in my implementation report on the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.

It presents the outlines of a global strategy for civilian staffing of peacekeeping operations to address critical shortcomings in the current system. That strategy hinges on five critical elements: enhanced advance planning; expanded sources of recruitment; streamlined recruitment procedures; enhanced rapid deployment capabilities; and improved systems for career development and training.

The report argues that in order to strengthen the core capacities of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as well as to meet the challenges of rapid and effective deployment, adjustments will be required to the organizational structure of the Department and to its staffing levels.

It proposes the creation of a new position, "Director for Strategic Planning and Management", in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, with responsibilities for overseeing improvements to the Department's management infrastructure (including information management) as well as an

enhanced lessons learned and strategic planning capacity for future peacekeeping operations.

It also proposes an increase in the number of Assistant Secretaries-General in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, from two to three, with the addition of an Assistant Secretary-General for Military/Civilian Police Affairs and Mine Action, and recommends that the rank of the Civilian Police Adviser be upgraded in the light of the critical importance of civilian police to peacekeeping operations.

The report proposes a restructuring of the Office of Logistics, Management and Mine Action, by dividing the Field Administration and Logistics Division into two separate divisions (one for administrative support and the other for logistics support), reporting directly to the Assistant Secretary-General, whose title would be changed to the Assistant Secretary-General for Mission Support. The Office of Mission Support would have enhanced capacities for administrative planning and civilian training, as well as for contracts management, in the light of the considerable challenges presented by more ambitious rapid deployment standards.

The report also suggests that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations needs to be strengthened to bring to full completion the myriad of policies, standard operating procedures, systems and training programmes which are critical for efficient and effective performance in the field.

Additional resources for the department are also necessary so that it can be afforded the necessary time and flexibility required to interact with Member States more frequently, with greater transparency and in a more timely manner, particularly with the members of the Security Council, as well as troop, police and financial contributors.

The present report refers to the assessment of the management consultants that the overall strengthening required for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations could entail as many as an additional 150 posts (above the present authorized strength), but also adds that any additional resources to be sought would be justified in a subsequent report, on a post-by-post basis.

It proposes several measures for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to strengthen collaboration with other departments, agencies, funds and programmes that play a role in peacekeeping.

The report also recommends against delegating procurement and budgeting authority from the Department of Management to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, as had been contemplated, but proposes that the two Departments interact with one another with much greater frequency and depth.

The report clarifies the roles and responsibilities of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs. Physical co-location of the political affairs officers in both Departments is desirable to promote cohesion and cultural change.

The report underlines the need to strengthen the capacities of the Department of Management, the Office of Internal Oversight Services, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Office of Legal Affairs so that they can more effectively support United Nations peacekeeping operations.

It stresses the importance of increased collaboration between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Public Information. There is a need to significantly enhance the ability of peacekeeping public information components to deliver accurate, impartial, objective and timely information to the local populations of the countries in which the operations are deployed.

The report emphasizes that the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations need to work more closely together and dedicate greater attention to gender issues in various aspects of peacekeeping. It also argues for greater inclusion in all aspects of peacekeeping, from planning through to liquidation, of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the operational agencies, funds and programmes, and the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

Lastly, the report points out that the totality of the Organization's resources that are brought to bear on a particular country or region in conflict must be optimized. This requires enhanced analytical capacities, better executive-level decision-making systems, and the ability to devise coherent and comprehensive mid-to-long-term strategies. It proposes to strengthen the Executive Committee on Peace and Security by creating a small new multidisciplinary policy and analysis unit to support the Committee in its work. This proposal is an alternative to the one put forward previously for the creation of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat.

The report concludes by pointing out that the past more than 50 years of United Nations peacekeeping have clearly demonstrated that the instrument is not a temporary aberration. It is necessary to invest in the future, to leave behind the days of "gifted amateurism", so that the likelihood of peacekeeping success substantially increases.

Strengthening the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other parts of the Secretariat is not the only answer to the challenge. The decisions made by the Security Council and its willingness to do all that is required to make sure that operations do not fail are determining factors. So too is the political will of Member States to match the mandates with the human, material, financial and political support required to enable their full implementation. The partnership between the Security Council, troop contributors and the Secretariat must therefore be strengthened. This is what the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations has suggested and Member States have strongly supported, as evidenced in their continuing discussions on the Panel's report. The Secretariat remains ready to do its part.

Of course, the success and failure of peacekeeping depends on the parties to conflict themselves. The international community affords them the opportunity to choose peace over war, when it deploys its men and women to help implement an agreement. The parties' will to seize the opportunities before them cannot be replaced by a better logistics system, a more efficient Department of Peacekeeping Operations or even better mission leadership. But where the will to peace does exist, we should have the ability to respond swiftly, professionally and effectively. The proposals contained in the present report have been formulated in that spirit.

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# I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 54/81 B, 55/2 and 55/135, which contain the Assembly's response to four separate but inter-linked reports produced over the past 12 months on the strengthening of the capacity of the United Nations for peacekeeping: the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (A/54/839) of 20 March 2000; the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see A/55/305-S/2000/809) of 21 August 2000; my report on the implementation of the report of the Panel (A/55/502) of 20 October 2000; and the Special Committee's response to the Panel's report and the implementation plan contained in its report (A/C.4/55/6) of 4 December 2000.

2. The four reports mentioned above contain over 300 recommendations on ways and means of enhancing the United Nations capacities in the areas of conflict prevention, peace-building and peacekeeping. I am shortly submitting a separate report to the General Assembly and to the Security Council, dedicated entirely to conflict prevention. The Secretariat is in the process of elaborating a system-wide peace-building plan, as requested in my implementation report (see A/55/502, paras. 21-24), which will be submitted to me shortly. I intend to submit a more conceptual paper on peace-building to Member States by the end of 2001.

3. The peacekeeping-related issues covered in the present report would normally be presented in at least three separate reports, submitted for the General Assembly's consideration over an extended period of time. However, the majority of the issues are inextricably related and are thus presented in the present consolidated report. The specific reports and recommendations to which they refer have been cross-referenced in the text, wherever possible. For the sake of convenience, tables summarizing the status of implementation of key recommendations made by the Special Committee and commitments made by the Secretariat with reference to the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations are contained in annexes A, B and C.

4. The Secretariat is most grateful for the Special Committee's understanding and flexibility in receiving the present report less than six weeks in advance of its session. Recognizing that the Special Committee's time for advance consideration of and deliberation on the present report is quite limited, the Secretariat has attempted to keep it as short as possible, relative to the breadth and magnitude of the subject. This has required the Secretariat to focus the present report on what was perceived to be the Special Committee's highest priority reporting requirement, most notably the "comprehensive review" (see sect. II below) requested in the reports of the Special Committee over the past few years (see A/C.4/55/6, para. 34; A/54/839, para. 67; and A/54/87, para. 60). While the Secretariat has not previously been in a position to provide the Assembly with the findings of such a comprehensive review in a single document, it welcomes the opportunity to complete that task now.

# II. The "comprehensive review": background

5. In its report of 4 December 2000, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations reiterated its request for an "expeditious and comprehensive review of the management, structure, recruitment processes and interrelationships of all relevant elements within the Secretariat that play a role in peacekeeping operations", and added that this review would be "essential for the thorough consideration of the resource requirements for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and other departments involved in backstopping United Nations peacekeeping operations" (see A/C.4/55/6, para. 34).

6. In its previous report of 20 March 2000, the Committee requested that the comprehensive review "tak[e] into account the necessity to ensure the ability of the Secretariat to face the challenges of United Nations peacekeeping operations and to enhance rapid deployment capability". It emphasized that the review should focus, inter alia, on "the coordinated planning, deployment, management and support of United Nations peacekeeping operations, logistics and procurement, in the light of recent experience and the lessons derived from today's complex peacekeeping operations, with due regard to safety and security" (see A/54/839, para. 67).

7. The report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809) addressed many of the issues raised by the Special Committee. It critically analysed the Department of Peacekeeping Operations'

approach to the planning, deployment and support of peacekeeping operations, as well as the way in which the Department interrelates with other parts of the Secretariat and United Nations system. The Panel recommended numerous ways to strengthen these areas, including changes to the Department's structure and the institution of a "task team" style of management (e.g., Integrated Mission Task Forces). The report also suggested that the overall standard of performance be significantly elevated.

8. The Panel concluded that many of the problems encountered by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations stemmed from a severe shortage of staff. It provided numerous examples to illustrate the magnitude of the problem (see A/55/305-S/2000/809, paras. 172-196). The Panel thus concluded that "based on this cursory review alone and bearing in mind that the total support cost for DPKO and related Headquarters peacekeeping support offices does not even exceed $50 million per annum, the Panel is convinced that additional resources for the Department and the others which support it would be an essential investment to ensure that the over $2 billion the Member States will spend on peacekeeping operations in 2001 will be well spent" (see A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 191).

9. The Panel added that "the specific allocation of resources should be determined according to a professional and objective review of requirements, but gross levels should reflect historical experience of peacekeeping" (see A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 194). The Panel conjectured that a historical review could suggest a near doubling of the resources allocated for Headquarters support to peacekeeping, in the light of the current level of activity, with roughly $70 million representing the baseline resource level and up to an additional $24 million accounting for a "surge" in activity (see A/55/305-S/2000/809, paras. 194 and 195). I indicated in my implementation report that, in conjunction with the comprehensive review, the Secretariat would develop proposals to address some of these issues, and might consider calling upon Member States and/or experts in the private sector to help conduct it (see A/55/502, para. 121).

10. Finally, in its report on the implementation of the report of the Panel, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions deferred consideration of many of my proposed changes to the structure and staffing of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, pending the completion of the comprehensive review requested by the Special Committee (see A/55/676). This applied to recommendations for, inter alia, the creation of an Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) (see A/55/676, para. 21), and the establishment of a new Office of Military and Civilian Police Affairs, headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, consisting of a Civilian Police Division headed by a D-2 level officer, and a new Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Unit (see A/55/676, para. 63). The Advisory Committee also requested that the comprehensive review address the interrelationships between the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs (see A/55/676, para. 12).

11. Given that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations' raison d'être is to serve as the operational arm of the Secretariat for peacekeeping operations and is responsible for the conduct, management, direction, planning and preparation of those operations (see ST/SGB/2000/9), it is the main focus of the present review. Furthermore, bearing in mind that the objective of the present review is to identify ways of strengthening the Secretariat's peacekeeping capacities, the primary focus is not on the Department's existing strengths but on its weaknesses, as detailed in section III below.

12. The present comprehensive review did not concentrate exclusively on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations because the entire Secretariat, as well as United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, have important roles to play in peacekeeping operations. The interrelationships between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other departments in the Secretariat and agencies, funds and programmes are critical, and are treated separately, in sections IV, V and VI below. For the sake of clarity, section III, on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, begins with a brief description of the current division of responsibility between the Department and the rest of the Secretariat.

13. An in-house review without the benefit of critical distance might have resulted in a less than fully critical assessment of the fundamental management problems and might have focused too much on the lack of resources as the sole cause of those problems. Consequently, it was decided to solicit assistance from an independent professional management consulting

firm to conduct key managerial aspects of the review from a qualitative and quantitative perspective.

14. The management consultants were selected as a result of an international bidding exercise held in December 2000. In January 2001, the consultants commenced their work, with full access to interview United Nations staff members and to review relevant documents held by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations as well as other parts of the Secretariat. They also visited three peacekeeping operations (the United Nations Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)) to assess the performance of the Department from the perspective of field personnel. Every staff member whom the consultants interviewed was encouraged to be as frank and critical as possible, and the consultants were urged to document the most prevalent criticisms in their report.

15. The consultants presented their preliminary findings to the leadership of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in early April 2001 and to an External Review Board on 16 April 2001. The Board was comprised of senior officials with extensive experience in and exposure to United Nations peacekeeping (for the list of the Board members, see annex D). The members were drawn from a geographically diverse base, with particular emphasis on representation from some of the current major troop-contributing countries. I take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the members of the External Review Board for taking time out of their hectic schedules to participate in the exercise and to the Member States concerned which assisted by making their nationals available.

16. The present report, which presents my findings of the "comprehensive review" requested by the General Assembly, has very much benefited from the input of the consultants, the External Review Board and the Office of Internal Oversight Services through the issuance of its various reports. The report that follows summarizes some of the criticisms of the Secretariat's peacekeeping capacities and recommends some of the reforms that need to be undertaken in the next few years to strengthen those capacities. A number of measures I propose in the present report can be accomplished within existing resources. I also indicate, however, that the overall required strengthening cannot be achieved without additional resources. I will submit a separate report, requesting additional resources, after the General Assembly has responded to the substantive proposals contained in the present report.

# III. Department of Peacekeeping Operations

## A. Current division of responsibilities between the Department and the rest of the Secretariat

17. The first United Nations peacekeeping operation was established in 1948, but the Secretariat did not have a separate department dedicated to peacekeeping until early 1992, at which time the Department of Peacekeeping Operations was created. It was established to enable the Secretariat to respond more effectively to the exponential growth in the volume, complexity and scope of the new generation of peacekeeping operations. After a short period of decline in the number of personnel deployed in United Nations peacekeeping operations between 1996 and 1998, their complexity, scope, scale and numbers have expanded again, as evidenced by the establishment of transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor, and the creation of new peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Eritrea/Ethiopia between 1999 and the present.

18. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is the operational arm of the Secretariat for all United Nations peacekeeping operations, and is responsible for their conduct, management, direction, planning and preparation. The Department's functions and organization are outlined in document ST/SGB/2000/9 of 15 May 2000. The Department's composition reflects the core elements common to all peacekeeping operations, which are required for it to effectively discharge its responsibilities. Its main organizational elements are as follows:

(a) The Office of the Under-Secretary-General, containing policy analysis and "lessons learned" capacities, as well as an Executive Office;

(b) The Office of Operations, consisting of the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General, three regional divisions and the Situation Centre;

(c) The Military Division, consisting of the Office of the Military Adviser and four separate Services for Military Planning; Force Generation and Military Personnel; Current Military Operations; and Training and Evaluation;

(d) The Civilian Police Division, consisting of the Office of the Civilian Police Adviser, the Mission Management Unit, and the Policy and Planning Unit;

(e) The Office of Logistics, Management and Mine Action (which I am renaming the "Office of Mission Support"), consisting of the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General, the Field Administration and Logistics Division (which is headed by a Director and is divided into three Services, for Personnel Management and Support, Finance Management and Support, and Logistics and Communications) and the Mine Action Service (which is responsible for the coordination of all United Nations-wide mine action-related activities, with partners in the humanitarian and development agencies of the United Nations system).

19. In order for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to carry out its functions, which encompass a wide range of tasks, it must work in close cooperation with other departments in the Secretariat, as well as with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, which have specific authorities and expertise. These interrelationships are covered in detail in subsequent sections, though some examples are provided below.

20. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations must work closely with the Department of Management for the provision of administrative support to a mission, including human resources management, budgeting and financial resources management and the procurement of essential goods and services. The Office of Internal Oversight Services provides independent monitoring of adherence to the Organization's rules and regulations in these areas, among many others. The Office also conducts audits of key processes associated with those activities.

21. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations benefits from the institutional knowledge of the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) about particular conflicts and countries. It also relies on the Department of Political Affairs' advice to ensure that the political direction provided to peacekeeping operations takes full account of the regional dimensions of a conflict and their potential impact on the ability of the missions to effectively carry out their mandate (it should also be noted that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations provides administrative support services to political offices and related missions managed by the Department of Political Affairs). The Department of Peacekeeping Operations does not possess dedicated expertise in the areas of public information (with the exception of one mid-level professional officer), legal affairs or human rights, all of which are critical elements of almost every peacekeeping operation. Instead, the Department relies for such expertise on the Department of Public Information (DPI), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), respectively.

22. Member States have also recently emphasized the central importance of gender issues to peacekeeping operations, such as in Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and in the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations of 6 December 2000 (see A/C.4/55/6, para. 41). The Department of Peacekeeping Operations does not, however, possess dedicated resources for gender issues, and currently relies on cooperation with the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues.

23. The Department relies upon the Office of the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, as well as the Bretton Woods institutions, often working in concert with intergovernmental, governmental and non-governmental organizations, to provide the necessary support for humanitarian and peace-building-related activities common to many of today's complex peacekeeping operations. These include the return and reintegration of refugees and displaced persons; demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; food assistance and restoration of livelihoods; economic rehabilitation; child protection; strengthening of the institutions of governance; formation of truth and reconciliation commissions and other conflict resolution mechanisms; supporting civil society; and even transitional administration. The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs also has an important role to play as the focal point for peace-building within the United Nations system. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations does not itself have any expertise specifically dedicated to peace-building or humanitarian affairs. It therefore has to coordinate inputs from throughout the United Nations system

through its Office of Operations, when planning or providing direction on these aspects of peacekeeping operations.

24. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations holds responsibility for the safety and security of United Nations personnel in peacekeeping operations, and fulfils this responsibility in coordination and consultation with the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD).

25. Finally, the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS), working closely with the other executive committees and the Senior Management Group, provides the forum to discuss comprehensive strategies and policies and ensure coherence throughout the United Nations system with respect to all peace and security-related activities in a particular country or region.

## B. Terms of reference of the managerial review

26. The management consultants were requested to focus on the management of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations from a quantitative and qualitative perspective, and within that context to analyse the interrelationships between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the rest of the Secretariat.

27. In their review, the consultants discerned that the Department manages several hundred functions, tasks and discrete processes. These activities range from, inter alia, conducting political analysis to preparing aviation safety manuals; delivering civilian police training to deploying water purification systems; managing military force generation to managing hostage-taking incidents; coordinating demining activities to recruiting thousands of civilian staff for service in the field.

28. The consultants conducted an exhaustive workload analysis for each of the tasks performed by the Department. A few statistics obtained from that analysis are mentioned in the present section, and illustrate how staffing constraints have perpetuated inefficiencies. However, the consultants did not evaluate the Department's performance in each area. Instead, they focused on the management of the Department's efforts to determine whether existing resources were being used as efficiently and effectively as possible, and to identify the structural adjustments and staffing levels required to enhance the Department's overall performance.

29. The consultants employed the basic assumption that sound management requires planning on a variety of levels. In the case of peacekeeping, this entails anticipating the demands to be created by future peacekeeping operations and articulating strategic plans for meeting them. It requires the development of policies and capacities to support such strategic plans. And it envisages that such policies and capacities will then be applied effectively, when the time comes, to the operational planning and support of specific peacekeeping operations. In order for all of these things to happen, significant portions of the Department, particularly at the senior levels, must be able to find the time to dedicate sufficient attention to them. This requires that there be a strong managerial infrastructure in place so that the majority of the Department is not consumed or overwhelmed by immediate daily demands.

30. Aided by the consultant's findings, the present section focuses on the Department of Peacekeeping Operations' approach towards and current capacities for the following: internal management; strategic planning for future peacekeeping operations; policy and capacity development; operational planning and support; and rapid and effective deployment. In the light of the findings on those subjects, I propose adjustments to the Department's organizational structure and its staffing levels.

## C. Management

### 1. Areas that need to be strengthened

*General managerial infrastructure and practices*

31. The vast majority of the Department's workload, at all levels, is directed towards dealing with short-term issues and day-to-day problems associated with the support of existing peacekeeping operations.

32. Vision, direction and mid- to long-term managerial planning are needed for the reform of any organization, and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is no exception. The qualitative analysis of the Department's workload, however, indicated that only 16 per cent of the Department's activities are directed to anticipating and planning for events one or

more years down the road; only 8 per cent of the work undertaken in the front office of the Under-Secretary-General is focused on anticipating and planning for events beyond a six-month time-frame.

33. The consultants' quantitative analysis indicated that up to 50 per cent of the Department's managerial processes, information flows and decision-making could be made significantly more efficient, as could up to 20 per cent of the Department's administrative processes required to support individual activities and tasks.

34. The following basic management practices and tools need to be considerably strengthened: standard reporting mechanisms for assessing the Department's overall performance; dedicated capacity for anticipating and planning for the Department's mid-to-longer-term needs, and proposing new ways of doing business to improve efficiency overall; standardized and documented work management procedures; institutionalized decision-making procedures; communication and coordination procedures and integrating mechanisms to ensure that the senior managers are presented with well coordinated work; a Department-wide administrative network that would cater for and relieve the administrative burden on senior management; and institutionalized guidelines or control mechanisms for coordination with elements outside the Department.

35. The consultants opined that the management culture did not always encourage initiative on the part of mid-level managers at Headquarters or in the field; to the contrary, it fuelled a risk-averse style of management. Because of this culture, authority that should have been delegated downward has instead been passed up the chain of command in a number of instances, thus detracting the senior manager's time from focusing on more strategic or longer-term issues.

36. The consultants reported having heard that communication across the Department and with other departments is sometimes incomplete or confrontational. They were also told of instances of multiple and conflicting responses to questions from the peacekeeping operations. Some members of the External Review Board confirmed that this was a problem that they had observed when serving in the field.

*Information technology*

37. The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations made a point of emphasizing that the Secretariat was behind the times in terms of employing modern information systems to enhance efficiency in the workplace, at Headquarters and the field. The consultants fully concurred with this assessment.

38. They noted, for instance, that multiple correspondence tracking and ad hoc administrative automation systems extend across the Department. Many are not inter-operable, which not only negatively affects the Department's ability to respond in a timely manner but also duplicates effort (efforts are now already under way to revise procedures for the flow of information within the Department and to automate many of the processes, though this exercise is limited by resource constraints).

39. The consultants noted that many areas of the Department's work are still being performed manually. They suggested that the Department could significantly enhance its performance and speed of delivery by automating them. For example, the consultants highlighted that the processes for reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment (COE) should be automated (for a more detailed explanation on COE reimbursement processing, see sect. IV.A.5 below).

40. The consultants observed that there is a wide disparity in the Department with respect to familiarity of IT capacities, and many in management levels have little time (and sometimes inclination) to avail themselves of existing training programmes.

41. The consultants observed that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should but does not yet have a plan for developing an integrated information technology (IT) architecture for the entire Department, nor any programme for exploiting web-based or other knowledge management technologies. The consultants asserted that the lack of a dedicated Department-wide information management strategy and capacity has significantly contributed to the problems noted above.

42. Planning for IT requirements within the Department is limited to the Field Administration and Logistics Division. The consultants assessed that the Field Administration and Logistics Division does have a well conceived strategic plan, which should be finalized as soon as possible. They believe that the plan, once approved, could be a vehicle for starting the

integration and synchronization of IT efforts within the Department, field operations and the Information Technology Services Division (ITSD) in the Department of Management.

43. On a positive note, the consultants concluded that the Department's global communications system is world class and the Department's existing IT hardware appears suited to current demands, as does the Situation Centre's video-teleconferencing facilities.

*The Department's human resources*

44. Based on their analysis, the consultants believed that a systematic programme for the career development and training of the Department's staff is urgently needed. The responsibility for the implementation of such a programme lies jointly with the Office of Human Resources Management and the Department.

45. The consultants sensed that the quality of the Department's staff covers a wide range, as it does in any organization. However, they were told by many of the staff that the existing performance appraisal system (PAS) was not being effectively applied to differentiate between excellent and poor performance, and that grade inflation characterized evaluations in a number of cases.

46. They also observed that there is a cultural divide between the Professional and General Service categories of staff. Legislative mandates do, of course, establish that contractual divide. Managers, however, must make more of an effort to overcome it by recognizing the willingness and capacity of many General Service staff to take on greater responsibility.

## 2. Contributing factors

47. A number of the issues raised in the preceding section are not unique to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations but are common to the entire Secretariat and its human resources management policies. It is for this reason that, in my report to the General Assembly of 1 August 2000 (A/55/253 and Corr.1), I proposed a far-reaching reform of the entire human resources management system. That report contained proposals for reform in 10 areas: human resources planning; streamlined rules and procedures; recruitment; placement and promotion; mobility; contractual arrangements; administration of justice; competencies and continuous learning; performance management; career development; and conditions of service. It will take some time for those reform proposals to have full impact.

48. Above and beyond the human resources management issues, there are other factors that weaken the Department of Peacekeeping Operations' overall management. The Department's reactive approach to management largely reflects the reactive nature of its role in response to political and security developments, combined with historical staffing levels which struggled to meet the immediate challenges presented to it.

49. The delegation of authority upward is not only a reflection of the managerial culture but is also attributable to lack of depth at the mid-Professional levels.

50. Moreover, the Under-Secretary-General does not have enough support in his immediate office to attend to urgent daily matters, let alone to conduct managerial planning. The same constraint applies, to some extent, with respect to the front offices of the other senior managers. Heavy reporting and representational demands, coupled with the need to travel to the field as often as possible, also detract time from management issues.

51. Finally, the managerial capacities of individual managers is an essential factor. These must be given priority when selecting staff for current and future vacancies, and may also require personnel changes in certain instances.

## 3. Proposals to strengthen the management of the Department

52. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations is already taking steps to ensure that all staff in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations are made aware of the consultants' findings on key weaknesses in the Department's management. The senior managers have already discussed them and are beginning to address as many of them as they can, within existing resources.

53. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations is also taking steps to ensure that managers give greater attention to performance appraisals in the next reporting cycle in a way that is fair to both management and staff alike. Improvements in the full application of the performance appraisal system is one

of the criteria that I use to evaluate the overall performance of the heads of departments and offices.

54. Significant strengthening of the Department's management, in toto, will also be dependent upon the provision of additional resources.

55. Specifically, I concur with the consultant's recommendation that there should be a senior and experienced staff member in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General who would be dedicated to management issues, particularly for mid-to-longer-term managerial planning. I therefore believe that the position of "Director for Strategic Planning and Management" should be created in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General. The Director would be responsible for overseeing the entire overhaul and strengthening of the Department's management systems and practices.

56. This Director would also be designated the information manager of the Department, with the responsibility to identify and prioritize the Department's information management needs. However, I agree with the consultant's assessment that it would be unnecessary to create a new unit of technical experts in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General to support the proposed Director in his/her role as information manager. The Communications and Electronic Services Section in the Field Administration and Logistics Division already possesses information technology expertise. That Section should thus be given the responsibility and the requisite additional resources to design, support and maintain the Department's information management systems, as coordinated by the proposed Director.

57. Finally, the front offices of the respective Assistant Secretaries-General also need to be strengthened so that there is a sufficiently strong administrative network throughout the Department, particularly during this process of managerial enhancement and change.

## D. Strategic planning

### 1. Areas that need to be strengthened

58. The legislative organs of the United Nations provide strategic guidance to the Secretariat in the field of peacekeeping. The Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations must ensure that the Department takes action on such guidance, and accordingly develop strategic plans to do so. However, because the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is so focused on providing immediate support to ongoing missions, strategic planning to meet the needs of future peacekeeping operations has suffered.

59. The consultants and the members of the External Review Board strongly emphasized that the Secretariat's capacity to capture and take action on lessons learned needed considerable strengthening. Many of the same mistakes made in past missions are often repeated in new missions, and successful strategies or "best practices" are not always being institutionalized and shared.

60. A number of the Board members also stressed the need for the Secretariat to take a more proactive approach in developing relations with other potential peacekeeping partners, particularly regional and subregional organizations and arrangements. The Secretariat could share considerable insights and experience with such organizations, which are currently developing nascent peacekeeping capacities, as well as learn lessons from them.

61. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations should work closely with other parts of the Secretariat and the agencies, funds and programmes, and ensure that all concerned share the same set of assumptions. Furthermore, the Department ought to take into consideration the contributions that all could make, and jointly develop their policies and capacities to prepare for future operations. However, many of those departments, agencies, funds and programmes, as well as representatives of civil society, do not have a clear interlocutor within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations with whom to work.

62. A few members of the Board also specifically stressed the importance of paying due attention to gender issues, as well as mine-action related activities, in the conception and planning of future operations. They cited these as two of the key elements missing from the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations but which should factor more prominently in strategic planning.

### 2. Contributing factors

63. There is no dedicated unit in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General to assist him in developing a strategic plan. The merged Policy and Analysis Unit

and Lessons Learned Unit, which is currently called the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, could form the embryo of a strategic planning capacity.

64. Neither unit on its own has been able to fulfil this function to date. The Policy and Analysis Unit consisted of three Professionals. It wrote speeches for the Department's senior staff. It reviewed policy papers on cross-cutting issues applicable to peacekeeping. It served as the Secretary to the Special Committee and as focal point within the Department for overseeing the implementation of its recommendations. The unit represented the Department on interdepartmental policy working groups and with academic and Member State interlocutors. These activities are essential components of what a strategic planning unit should do but are only part of the strategic planning process.

65. Lessons learned is the other key aspect of strategic planning. However, as mentioned previously, the consultant's review indicated that this unit had not effectively helped the Department to develop into a "learning organization". One of the reasons is that the reliance on external sources of funding to undertake lessons learned studies meant that the topics chosen were more often donor-driven and general in nature, rather than reflecting the real operational needs of current and future peacekeeping operations.

### 3. Proposed solutions

66. The Special Committee has already "stressed the need for a properly functioning lessons learned unit within the Department that would ensure that experience from past and ongoing peacekeeping operations would be better incorporated into peacekeeping policy and planning than has been the case to date" (see A/C.4/55/6, para. 42). The Special Committee has also stated that the unit should be "provided with reliable funding, primarily through assessed contributions under the support account, in order to allow it to meet more effectively the priorities set by the Committee" (A/C.4/55/6, para. 43). In the light of the Special Committee's recommendation and the findings of the present comprehensive review, I believe that the work of the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit should be strengthened and broadened, and to reflect its new focus should be renamed the "Peacekeeping Strategic Planning Unit".

67. The Peacekeeping Strategic Planning Unit should help to ensure that mistakes of the past are not repeated, by collecting and disseminating lessons learned and information about best practices so that they can be subsequently incorporated in policy and capacity development and operational planning, based on legislative guidance. It should also take into consideration the comparative advantages of other parts of the United Nations system, as well as regional and subregional organizations and arrangements, and serve as an interface or "entry point" for them in the Department. This would especially apply to those areas for which DPKO does not have primary responsibility or dedicated units, such as humanitarian affairs; peace-building activities; public information; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DD&R); gender issues; human rights; and security and safety of personnel. Members of the Unit should participate as members of Integrated Mission Task Forces established to plan specific operations, to ensure that lessons learned and best practices from previous operations are incorporated.

68. I remain convinced of the need for additional resources to strengthen the capacity of this Unit. The head of the Unit would report to the Director for Strategic Planning and Management, if approved, in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping. This Director would serve as the focal point within the Department for overall coordination of the recommendations of the Special Committee and those of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, which the legislative organs have endorsed and/or fall within my purview. The Director would then ensure that the managerial capacities and infrastructure being developed in the Department were properly aligned with its strategic plans for more effectively supporting future peacekeeping operations.

## E. Policy and capacity development

### 1. Areas that need to be strengthened/ contributing factors

69. A recurring theme in the consultant's findings and in the comments of the External Review Board is the need for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to dedicate more attention to planning new operations, engaging in policy dialogue with the existing missions with greater frequency, and expending less time and energy on day-to-day direction and support. However, its ability to do so is constrained

by a self-perpetuating cycle, from which it must emerge.

70. Because the Department expends the majority of its limited resources on the daily support of ongoing missions, it is not in a position to invest time and resources on the development of policies and capacities that could help the missions operate with less daily support and direction. If the Department's staff had sufficient time to put the appropriate systems, policies, guidelines and training programmes in place, then more authority could be delegated to the field, with the assurance that the additional responsibilities would be carried out in accordance with legislative guidance. A sample of the types of policy and capacity development-related activities that are only partially completed or not even started due to a lack of resources is contained in annex F.

71. The consultants' analysis indicates that basic guidelines, standard operating procedures, handbooks and training programmes are currently lacking for an average of over 50 per cent of recurring peacekeeping activities. The consultants, supported by members of the Board, assessed that the inadequacy of basic guidance documents and tools was leading to serious inefficiencies in the field, with work being done incorrectly, incompletely or not at all.

72. Because of this policy void, the Organization is highly dependent upon long-serving staff, with institutional memory, who are able to be deployed to the field. However, as described in section III.I below, in many occupational groups such staff are in short supply. This is particularly true in key administrative and logistics support areas, such as procurement, budget/finance and contracts management. Highly qualified individuals in these areas could be sought from Member States, through the standby arrangements system. These individuals could also be externally recruited from the private sector. However, neither group of individuals could be expected to be familiar with the United Nations regulations, rules and procedures. A new mission that is struggling to be established is not the appropriate place for them to acquire on-the-job training, without seriously hindering the operational effectiveness of the missions.

73. Chronic shortages in the administrative and logistics support areas are taking their toll on the level of support provided to the military and civilian police components of the peacekeeping operations. It also undermines the performance of the civilian staff deployed to implement key civilian aspects of the mandate. In addition, these military, civilian police and civilian personnel often lack basic guidance documents, tools and information systems, and too frequently are having to recreate them in every mission. While standard operating procedures for the peacekeeping military forces, for example, should naturally be tailored to specific mission circumstances and thus crafted by the missions' military components themselves, there should be a basic template from which to work available at the start-up of a mission.

74. Much greater effort also needs to be devoted to enhancing and improving the programmes for facilitating Member States' training of their personnel prior to deployment. Similarly, the United Nations standby arrangements system needs to be developed into a more effective mechanism (as discussed in greater detail in sect. III.I below).

75. The majority of the policy and capacity development work is ultimately required for the benefit of personnel in the peacekeeping operations but applies to headquarters as well. For example, the consultants noted that the Headquarters' operational planning process is not nearly as effective as it could be. The consultants identified that the following elements are lacking: explicit planning guidelines that outline each office's responsibility for various sections of a mission plan; clear mechanisms for integrating the various functional planning elements; planning models and generic plan templates to guide mission specific planners in considering all of the relevant activities and their interrelationships as they construct a mission plan. Because these basic planning tools are lacking, when a new operation is being planned the Department repeatedly has difficulties in deriving a reliable time-line that takes into account resource constraints, procurement and delivery lead-times and other key planning variables.

### 2. Proposals

76. I strongly believe that additional resources need to be allocated to enable the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to dedicate the requisite attention and give the necessary priority to policy and capacity development, so as to bring to full completion the various projects and activities listed in annex F.

77. The following existing elements of the Department will require strengthening for this purpose:

(a) The Office of the Military Adviser;

(b) The Force Generation and Military Personnel Service in the Military Division;

(c) The Training and Evaluation Service in the Military Division;

(d) The Policy and Planning Unit in the Civilian Police Division;

(e) The Transport, Supply, Communications and Electronic Services, Engineering and Logistics Operations Sections in the Logistics and Communications Service;

(f) The Financial Management and Support Service;

(g) The Office of Operations;

(h) The Mine Action Service.

78. The Personnel Management and Support Service will require considerable strengthening and restructuring, as discussed separately in section III.J below.

79. Finally, given that the administrative and logistics areas require the most strengthening, particularly in the light of the tremendous challenges presented by the enhanced rapid deployment time-frames (as discussed in sect. III.I below), it is essential that all civilian administrative planning and training initiatives are undertaken in a coordinated and integrated manner. This coordinating task will ultimately be the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary-General for Mission Support (previously referred to as the Assistant Secretary-General for Logistics, Management and Mine Action). Nevertheless, he and his senior managers will need to rely on a small dedicated group of experienced staff, who should be removed from daily support activities, to assist in developing the overall policy guidance. I therefore propose to create a small new unit in the Office of Mission Support to:

(a) Establish an administrative planning capacity for all phases of peacekeeping mission activity, with linkages to the Peacekeeping Strategic Planning Unit, the Office of Operations, the Military Planning Service, the Force Generation and Military Personnel Service, the Training and Evaluation Service, the Policy and Planning Unit in the Civilian Police Division, the field missions, the Department of Management and the other United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes;

(b) Develop integrated administrative and logistic support policies and guidelines, conduct cost-benefit analyses of various outsourcing options for logistics support, and procedural reviews;

(c) Develop and implement a civilian administrative and logistic training strategy and address chronic civilian training deficiencies in such areas as procurement and personnel administration, which have hampered the Organization's ability to provide effective mission support.

## F. Operational planning and Integrated Mission Task Forces

### 1. Assessment of areas that need to be strengthened

80. In addition to the need to strengthen the policy and capacity development infrastructure, the consultants identified the planning for specific peacekeeping operations as another area requiring significant improvements.

81. The consultants stressed the importance of improving internal coordination within the Department, because the current planning process is fragmented between the Office of Operations, the Military and Civilian Police Divisions, and the Office of Mission Support. Planning counterparts in other parts of the Secretariat and the United Nations system also expressed concern that they are not sufficiently involved in the Department's planning process, nor are they always given sufficient time to properly review a draft plan and provide meaningful input.

82. The members of the External Review Board added that the Department needed to reach out to the members of the Security Council and potential troop, police and financial contributors, more often, earlier on and with greater transparency during the planning process. If potential contributors were brought on board more consistently, they would be better able to convey their concerns, obtain clarifications and marshal the necessary support, as required.

83. Pre-deployment technical surveys to the host countries are critical in identifying mission resource requirements. However, the consultants indicated that

they may be too limited in terms of team size and duration. They added that surveys are not adequately supported by readily available geographic and infrastructure information assets, such as would be provided by a geographic information system (GIS).

### 2. Action being taken: integrated mission task forces

84. The consultants and the members of the External Review Board essentially came to many of the same conclusions as the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations about the need for greater inclusion and better coordination during the planning of a new peacekeeping operation. It will be recalled that the Panel proposed the establishment of integrated mission task forces (IMTFs) to achieve this objective (see A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 217).

85. An interdepartmental/inter-agency consultative process was instituted, during the preparation of my implementation report, to determine how the IMTF mechanism could be employed to maximum benefit. Drawing on those discussions, I outlined the generic terms of reference and composition envisaged for future IMTFs (see A/55/502, paras. 49-63). They remain valid, as does my commitment to utilize the IMTF mechanism for the planning of new peacekeeping operations.

86. The Special Committee recognized the importance of coordinating mechanisms in responding to complex challenges to peace and security, and was encouraged by the proposed creation, where appropriate, of integrated mission task forces. The Special Committee added that the individual entities participating in the task forces would continue to be guided by their respective mandates, would be responsible to their governing bodies and should participate in the task forces without detriment to their core functions (see A/C.4/55/6, para. 39). The Committee's recommendations in this regard have been fully noted and shall be adhered to whenever such task forces are formed.

87. The Secretariat has not had to plan a new peacekeeping operation since that time, and thus has not yet had the opportunity to put the full IMTF concept to the test. In the meantime, the Secretariat has instituted improved coordination mechanisms that can be expanded and transformed over time.

88. A modified version of the integrated mission task force mechanism has been established for post-UNTAET planning. In March, my Special Representative in East Timor established a working group on post-UNTAET planning, chaired by the head of the national development and planning agency. The main effort will continue at the field level, given the current United Nations presence and the need for close consultations with the East Timorese throughout the process of planning for the international follow-on presence. However, the task force at headquarters will assist the working group in this process and ensure coordination at the Headquarters level among the entities involved. The core membership comprises the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the United Nations Development Programme (in its capacity as Convener of the United Nations Development Group) and the World Bank. The Office of the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs and the operational agencies, funds and programmes will participate, as appropriate.

89. I had indicated my intention to form an integrated mission task force for Burundi when the deployment of a United Nations peace operation becomes a possibility (see A/55/502, para. 63). So far, consultations are continuing to reach consensus on the transitional institutions and leadership in Burundi. Thus, the institution of a task force to plan a United Nations mission would be premature. However, a joint working group was created to facilitate coordination and exchange of information and to assist the International Monitoring Committee created under the Arusha Agreement. The Joint Working Group, chaired by DPA, includes DPKO, OCHA, OHCHR, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), among others, and is expected to meet on a regular basis. The group will continue to review the situation on the ground and assess new developments. Its core members will also help facilitate the transition to an integrated mission task force at the appropriate stage.

90. Finally, an inter-agency working group, chaired by DPA, was established to address the evolving situation in the West Africa subregion. The group, which includes OCHA, DPKO, UNSECOORD, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), UNDP, UNHCR, OHCHR, the World Food Programme (WFP)

and the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), played a critical role in organizing the inter-agency mission to West Africa in March 2001.

### 3. Additional measures required

91. The External Review Board members' recommendations for strengthening the consultation process during mission planning is fully consistent with the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (see A/C.4/55/6, paras. 8 and 9). I am convinced that the staff in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will be able to dedicate more time and effort to this, as well as to internal coordination in general, as a result of the staffing increase authorized by the Assembly in December 2000. The additional staff already authorized for the Military Planning Service and for the Office of Operations, in particular, should help to alleviate the overwhelming demands that both have had to face in the past few years.

92. The Office of Operations has historically had only one or two "Desk Officers" per peacekeeping operation, and some Desk Officers cover more than one peacekeeping operation at a time. The heavy demands on their time to keep me fully informed of developments and support my formal reporting obligations, while concurrently trying to devise an overall concept of operations for a new mission, engage with the parties to the conflict and oversee the overall planning process, has simply precluded them from dedicating sufficient attention to any one of these activities. An increase above and beyond the capacity already authorized for the Office of Operations is required to provide it with sufficient depth to give due attention to all the attendant responsibilities associated with mission planning (and support), especially to strengthen consultations with potential troop contributors.

## G. Mission leadership and in-mission planning

93. The Special Committee welcomed my plans for implementing the Panel's recommendations to improve the procedures for selecting mission leadership, and for assembling them as early as possible at Headquarters to enable their participation in key aspects of the mission planning process, brief them more extensively and provide them with strategic guidance (see A/C.4/55/6, paras. 17 and 18; A/55/502, paras. 69-76). As no new peacekeeping operations have been established since December 2000, these concepts have not yet been fully put to the test. The Training and Evaluation Service in the Military Division is currently developing a "Mission Headquarters Orientation Programme" that addresses the leadership needs on the operational-strategic level for future military, civilian and civilian police mission appointees. In particular, the programme will include the training needs for the "on-call" list officers (see sect. III.I below). The first course will be conducted in October 2001.

94. However, the Secretariat has reflected on developing the concept further, and has determined that it would make sense, wherever feasible, to appoint the potential leaders of missions (or the designated heads of key components) as the heads of future integrated mission task forces established to plan a new operation. The mission leadership would serve in that capacity until such time as they deployed to the field, at which point mission planning would continue in-theatre, with the remaining members of the IMTF providing the necessary support and guidance at the Headquarters level.

95. Some progress has also been achieved in improving the selection process of future mission leadership (not only for peacekeeping operations but for related peace operations and peace-making activities). On 3 May 2001, the Deputy Secretary-General wrote to the permanent representatives of the Member States, inviting them to submit names of persons interested in being considered for appointment to the posts of special representative, special envoy and other senior leadership positions within the coming year. The letter included a description of the types of profiles and qualities being sought, and also encouraged Member States to submit the names of as many qualified female candidates as possible. As indicated in the Deputy Secretary-General's letter, my Senior Appointments Group will soon convene to begin a rigorous and systematic review of the list of candidates for potential future mission leadership positions. The Personnel Management and Support Service will receive nominations from Member States and keep the roster up to date.

96. Finally, as part of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) programme for briefing and debriefing special representatives and envoys of the Secretary-General, the first seminar for

current special and personal representatives and envoys was held in Mont Pèlerin, Switzerland, from 28 to 30 March 2001. The meeting, organized by UNITAR with voluntary contributions from the Governments of Canada, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, focused on the theme "Enhancing the implementation of United Nations peace operations". The seminar for special representatives and envoys is part of a larger project being carried out at UNITAR, in close cooperation with relevant United Nations departments, to develop a more systematic programme for briefing and debriefing special representatives. The proposed Peacekeeping Strategic Planning Unit, working in close consultation with other parts of the Secretariat, would be expected to support this and related exercises for the debriefing/briefing of future heads of peacekeeping operations and their key components.

## H. Mission support

### 1. Areas that need to be strengthened

97. As in their findings on operational planning, the consultants and the members of the External Review Board observed that the Department's approach to support of ongoing missions is fragmented between the Office of Operations, the Office of Mission Support, the Military Division and the Civilian Police Division. They noted a lack of formal mechanisms to ensure that staff officers in the respective offices communicate or coordinate with one another in a systematic and timely manner.

98. They noted the same problem with respect to interaction between staff in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and their counterparts in the operations themselves. They observed that the best relationships are reportedly based on personal contacts derived through visits of the Department's staff to the missions.

99. Some mission staff reported having minimal routine communications with their counterparts at Headquarters. On a similar note, many staff at Headquarters reported having to spend too much time on issues within the Secretariat at the expense of time they can devote to mission support. On a more positive note, the missions reported favourably on the increased use of video teleconferences (VTCs) to increase communication between Headquarters and the field.

100. The consultants and the members of the External Review Board echoed concerns expressed by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations that field missions do not always perceive the Secretariat as speaking with one voice. They noted that missions sometimes receive conflicting guidance from the Secretariat.

101. Some of the Board members concurred with the consultant's observations that the command relationship between the mission leadership and Headquarters is not always clearly understood or observed. The missions often do not understand why or how Headquarters makes decisions, which fuels the perception that Headquarters is sometimes arbitrary and not supportive. This observation applies not only to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations but to all of the other elements of the Secretariat that play a role in support to peacekeeping.

102. The consultants suggested that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations lacks a well-conceived and integrated mission reporting system for providing it with useful management information across all functional elements of a mission. The current reporting procedures largely address political and military issues but do not emphasize collecting and acting upon important areas, such as the status of mission staffing and deployment, critical procurement lead times and their impact on operational plans, and logistical adequacy across all commodities and classes of supply and support. The lack of an integrated mission reporting system may have added negative consequences for Member States, which sometimes report difficulties in obtaining from the Secretariat quick answers to what should be relatively simple questions.

103. The Situation Centre in the Office of Operations has been given the responsibility to maintain round-the-clock communications with the field; collate and disseminate all relevant information, databases, area maps and other reference material to those concerned; act as a point of contact during silent hours and take urgent action that may be required, with due regard to established procedures; and provide crisis management capabilities. The present comprehensive review revealed that the Situation Centre could play a more active role in addressing the lack of integrated management information on peacekeeping operations if it were given the direction and enhanced capacity to do so.

### 2. Contributing factors and proposed solutions

104. First, there is no doubt that internal coordination with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should be strengthened. The additional staff already authorized on an emergency basis in December 2000 should help to address the fact that a lack of capacity has partially accounted for why offices do not coordinate their activities with the necessary rigour and frequency.

105. Second, the Department needs more frequently to employ a "task team" approach to mission support, whether or not formal integrated mission task forces have been formed. Such an approach would be further encouraged through the physical co-location, to the extent practicable, of staff in the Office of Operations, the Logistics Operations Section, the Current Military Operations Service in the Military Division and the Mission Management Unit in the Civilian Police Division. The present distribution of staff in several different buildings creates inefficiencies. Space reallocation throughout the Secretariat, and associated costs, must be addressed as a priority.

106. Third, I propose to enhance the role of the Situation Centre to serve as a repository of factual information specific to peacekeeping operations. In this capacity, it would draw on input from the field and from those in the Regional Divisions in the Office of Operations, the Military Current Operations Service, the Logistics Operations Section and the Mission Management Unit in the Civilian Police Division. It would be responsible for producing comprehensive fact sheets in support of the Department's reporting requirements to the legislative organs and troop contributors. During times of crisis, the Situation Centre could serve as a Joint Operations Centre (JOC), drawing on input from all relevant parts of the Department and the field so that the senior management can be presented with up-to-date and comprehensive status reports.

107. The Chief of the Situation Centre would need to work closely with the Department's information manager and technical experts to develop new information management systems to enable the Centre to perform this knowledge management function efficiently and in the least resource-intensive manner. In addition, the employment of modern presentation techniques to support senior management in briefings to the Security Council and troop contributors will be explored.

108. Enhancing the capacity of the Situation Centre is vital to strengthening the overall coordinating role assigned to the Office of Operations. It will require the provision of additional resources and training for the staff.

109. Fourth, the Secretariat needs to reorient its relationship with peacekeeping operations. As mentioned above, greater emphasis should be placed on policy dialogue in relation to daily operational direction and guidance. This, of course, requires dedicating additional resources and time to strategic planning, as well as to policy and capacity development in general. It also requires more depth at Headquarters so that staff at various levels are able to visit the missions more frequently, without sacrificing their Headquarters responsibilities.

## I. Rapid and effective deployment capacities

### 1. Implications of the 30/90 deployment time-frames

110. The Special Committee urged the Secretariat to work towards the goal of being able to deploy peacekeeping operations within 30 days and to deploy complex peacekeeping operations within 90 days after the adoption of a mandate. It stressed that these time-frames require political will and more effective operational capabilities, including an efficient standby arrangements system, as well as their effective implementation (see A/C.4/55/6, para. 15).

111. I had indicated in my implementation plan that "the Secretariat is simply not able to meet those timelines within our existing logistics support systems", and that "the entire system would need to be redesigned and this will require a thorough review of a variety of areas, including the procurement and financial procedures now in place" (see A/55/502, para. 112). I added that the Secretariat would need to work throughout 2001 to study the implications of the 30/90 day deployment time-frames and review its procurement, logistics and financial procedures. Concurrently, the global logistics, financial and civilian staffing strategies would need to be devised. In addition, the United Nations standby arrangements

system, including the provision for military and civilian police personnel placed on on-call status, would also need to be enhanced. Significant work has already been done in all of these areas.

112. The challenge of deploying a peacekeeping operation within 30 to 90 days of the adoption of a resolution establishing it is considerable. Few Member States maintain such a capability, and it is a very expensive undertaking to sustain. Furthermore, specialized units, such as communications, engineering, transport, maintenance and medical units, are difficult to acquire on short notice. Experience has shown that although some units can come with a complete support package in a relatively timely manner (such as the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) which deployed to the United Nations Mission in Eritrea/Ethiopia (UNMEE)), most national contingents now require the majority of their support from the United Nations directly or through a letter of assist (LOA) with other Member States.

113. For the purposes of the present report and based on recent trends, rapid deployment options were developed under the assumption that most of the military forces provided for a peacekeeping operation would require all their strategic lift and most of their service support from the United Nations. Civilian and police components would require all their support from the United Nations. In order to generate comparative analyses two different types of missions were hypothesized: traditional and complex. The hypothetical planning assumption for a traditional mission was that it would consist of approximately 5,000 troops (50 per cent self-sustaining), 100 substantive staff, 200 military observers and civilian police, 200 administrative (international and local) staff. A complex mission was hypothesized to consist of 10,000 troops (25 per cent self-sustaining), 300 substantive staff, 1,000 military observers and civilian police, and 1,000 administrative (international and local) staff. It was also assumed that these missions were to be deployed in areas with limited local infrastructure at a frequency of one traditional and one complex mission per year. For the purpose of the present report, "effective deployment" was defined as the minimum operational capability required for a mission to begin implementing its mandate.

114. Rapid and effective deployment of a peacekeeping mission requires the capability to deliver military troops and civilian police, service support and key civilian staff to the theatre of operations in a timely manner, as illustrated in figure I.

115. Table 1 depicts the required material support, the troops/personnel and the means of delivery necessary to establish an effective mission.

### 2. Storage of a material reserve and service contracts

116. In order to deploy a peacekeeping operation in 30 to 90 days, the United Nations can choose from a number of options to deliver the key materials and support services that establish a new mission. The Organization could pre-store mission materials in its warehouses in Brindisi, Italy, and ship them through prearranged contracts. Or it could enter into extensive prearranged service agreements for materials, such as vehicles and generators; services, such as fuel, water and food; and strategic lift. When entering into contractual arrangements, the United Nations would have to pay "retainer fees" to vendors in order to ensure that they maintained the items in stock and were able to deliver them on demand. Retainer arrangements entail costs involving storage, depreciation and other associated expenses incurred by the vendor. These retainer arrangements would not include procurement costs. Alternatively, the United Nations could enter into less expensive "no fee" service arrangements that would accelerate procurement processes but would reduce the reliability of rapid delivery. The material reserve would be funded from a one-time expenditure budget, which would be established within a revised concept for the United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB). This would ultimately be replenished by mission budgets. In addition, maintenance of the material reserve and service contracts would be funded from the UNLB budget.

### 3. Pre-mandate commitment authority

117. The United Nations can also help meet its 30-to-90-day deployment objectives through the provision of limited commitment authority, prior to a mission's full authorization by the Security Council. Building on the flexibility established in the past several years by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) and the General Assembly, the United Nations could expand its current authority for advance spending on an anticipated mission — and reduce the reliance on the rather expensive material

Figure I
**Rapid deployment**




Table 1
**Mission support requirements for effective deployment**

| *Types of support* | *Materials Services* | *Personnel* |
|---|---|---|
| **Requirements** | • Strategic air/sea lift<br>• Vehicles; tracked and wheeled<br>• Communications, IT services<br>• Power generators<br>• General engineering services<br>• Office equipment<br>• Water, fuel, rations | • Formed units (infantry, support)<br>• Military observers<br>• Police contingents<br>• Political and related "substantive" staff<br>• Administrative staff<br>– Logistics, communications, procurement, contracts management, recruitment, personnel administration |
| **Means of delivery** | • Strategic Reserve (UNLB Brindisi)<br>• LOAs<br>• Service contracts (logcap)<br>• Fast track acquisition/procurement<br>• Pre-mission commitment authority<br>• Post-mission financial authorities | • Stand-by arrangements for troops and Support units<br>• Standby arrangements for police<br>• Core Surge Rosters for staff (DPKO, field Missions)<br>• Expanded surge rosters (agencies)<br>• Member States and other sources |

reserve and retainer contractual arrangements described in the previous paragraph.

118. The procurement of goods and services prior to the mission authorization by the Council entails certain risks if the mission is not eventually deployed. However, as was demonstrated in the case of MONUC in 2000, that risk is mitigated by our experience that common peacekeeping goods and services procured for one mission may very well be deployed to another. In fact, the quick deployment of UNMEE in 2000 was partly attributable to the availability of goods and services initially acquired for MONUC (but delayed due to changing local conditions). In addition, a large amount of equipment was diverted to UNAMSIL at a critical point in its mission.

119. My proposal would be limited to those cases in which a new mission appears to be imminent and would require rapid deployment to maximize its chances of success. The process would entail close consultation with both the Security Council and ACABQ. After consultations with the Security Council on the imminent need for a rapid deployment, I would inform the Council of my intentions in this regard. On receiving an affirmative response from the Council, I would then request ACABQ for authorization of commitment authority of an amount up to $50 million, as authorized by the General Assembly in its resolution 49/233 of 1 March 1995.

### 4. The Options

120. There are trade-offs associated with each method of delivery in terms of cost (either high up-front initial costs or high annual recurring sustainment costs), speed of delivery, reliability and the need to commit funds prior to the adoption of a resolution formally establishing an operation. In the light of the above, three options are proposed: **option 1, a heavy strategic reserve**, wherein the United Nations would acquire and store all its material necessities for a complex mission at UNLB, in anticipation of future operations; **option 2**, a **light strategic reserve**, maintained at UNLB and supported by sustained annual funding of extensive retainer servicing agreements and letters of assist; and **option 3**, a **medium strategic reserve**, which would be a combination of the first two options. Under the third option, only critical items requiring a long procurement lead time would be pre-purchased and maintained in Brindisi. The remainder would be procured only when required, through pre-arranged services (no fee).

121. Table 2 summarizes the key considerations of each option, and provides preliminary cost estimates.

*Option 1. Heavy strategic reserve (limited retainer service arrangements/no pre-mandate commitment authority)*

122. Option 1 entails a one-time, up-front purchase of a strategic reserve to be stored and sustained at UNLB. This would require a large up-front investment under a one-time expenditure budget, which would be replenished through the mission budget when authorized. Having the material on hand in Brindisi, with service contracts and LOAs for strategic air and sea lift, provides the United Nations with a high degree of certainty that it could deliver the logistics support to the theatre of operations in a timely manner. However, recent experience indicates that, although the United Nations can deploy forces and equipment to the theatre, there can be considerable bottlenecks to achieving full operational capability. In addition, while resulting in a shorter delivery time, peacekeeping missions may not be in a position to accept the equipment on such a reduced timeline. On arrival, the equipment must be transferred to the appropriate units. Training is required for drivers and maintenance personnel. Consequently, it could still take months for the mission to become fully operational.

*Option 2. Light strategic reserve (extensive "retainer" contracts/pre-mandate commitment authority)*

123. Option 2, which relies most exclusively on outsourcing, entails an up-front acquisition of certain items, such as armoured military observer vehicles, airport fire engines, and other specialized vehicles and communications that are difficult to obtain quickly in commercial markets. This will also require funding for small up-front investment as part of the one-time expenditure budget and pre-commitment authority for initiating procurement. This option relies heavily on vendors for robust service contracts and LOAs with contractors and Member States, to whom retainer fees would need to be paid to ensure the timely provision of goods and services. This option has a lower initial investment than option 1 but much higher annual recurring costs.

Table 2
**Key considerations of rapid deployment options**

| *Options* | | *Option 1*<br>*Heavy strategic reserve* | *Option 2*<br>*Light strategic reserve* | *Option 3*<br>*Medium strategic reserve* |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Main feature** | | • In-sourcing<br>• One-time up-front investment<br>• Minimum retainer contracts | • Outsourcing<br>• Small up-front investment<br>• Pre-mandate commitment authority<br>• Maximum retainer contracts | • Combination of in-sourcing and outsourcing<br>• Up-front investment<br>• Pre-mandate commitment author<br>• Mix of no fee service arrangements and minimum of retainer contracts |
| **Key requirements** | **Amount of equipment required** | • Complete equipment load-list available and maintained at UNLB, Brindisi | • Minimal equipment load-list available and maintained at UNLB, Brindisi | • Critical items of equipment load-list available and maintained at UNLB, Brindisi |
| | **Prearranged contracts** | • Prearranged service contracts primarily for sea and air lift, reduced requirements for LOAs | • Extensive requirement for prearranged retainer service contracts and LOAs | • Significant requirement for prearranged service contracts with no fees and LOAs. Minimal retainer contracts |
| | **Assurance of rapid deployment** | • High probability of timely delivery of all matériel | • Potential delays in procurement and delivery of matériel and services | • High probability of ensuring rapid deployment regarding critical items on hand. Possibility of some delays in procurement and delivery of matériel and services |
| | **Inventory management at UNLB, Brindisi** | • Major inventory management cost. Major increase in staff | • Limited increase in inventory management cost. Limited increase in staff | • Medium increase in inventory management cost. Moderate increase in staff |
| | **Financing mechanisms and General Assembly authority** | • No changes to current mechanisms | • Changes to current mechanism (i.e., pre-mandate commitment authority) | • Changes to current mechanisms (i.e., pre-mandate commitment authority) |
| **Cost implications** | | • Large up-front cost (some $350 million one-time fixed costs)<br>• Smaller annual recurring costs (some $50 million) | • Reduced up-front cost (some $30 million)<br>• Very large annual recurring costs (some $100 million) | • Less than 50 per cent up-front costs (some $170 million)<br>• Smaller annual recurring costs (some $40 million) |

*Option 3. Medium strategic reserve (mix of retainer and no-fee service arrangements/pre-mandate commitment authority)*

124. Option 3 entails a modest up-front procurement of strategic reserve materials for Brindisi, which would require funding from one-time expenditure budget, and a mix of no-fee and retainer contracts. This option is more economical than option 1 in both initial and overall costs. It does not rely heavily on contractors for the delivery of critical items, and enables the delivery of most critical items within 30/90 days from the up-front investment. The remaining items, which will be purchased using the pre-mandate commitment authority and retainer and no-fee contracts, may entail a slightly longer period to deploy. Option 3 provides a reasonable guarantee of timeliness, with less long-term costs than option 1 or 2. I, therefore, believe that option 3 is the most appropriate and practical option of the three proposed.

*Baseline of activities and strategic reserve for all options*

125. Each of the options outlined above requires a one-time acquisition of a baseline of strategic reserve and more robust service contracts with a range of providers. All three options entail the following baseline requirements:

- Enhancement of the strategic deployment stocks at UNLB, Brindisi, and increased capability at UNLB;
- Entry into prearranged contracts and LOAs for key services;
- Increased reliability of standby arrangements, especially for support units;
- Improved personnel surge capacity, particularly for staff in areas of administrative support.

126. Should the General Assembly decide that the Secretariat should continue to work towards meeting the 30-to-90-day deployment timelines, I would then welcome the opportunity to submit a detailed budget proposal for any one of the three options agreed.

127. While all three of the options would enhance the Organization's rapid and effective deployment capacities, none of them assures deployment within the 30/90-day deployment time-frame. This can only be achieved by the provision of fully self-sustaining and completely self-sufficient troops provided by Member States.

## 5. Enhancements to the standby arrangements system and on call lists

*Military personnel*

128. The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations indicated that a critical facet of meeting the 30/90-day deployment time-frames is the deployment of a cohesive mission headquarters. The Panel thus proposed creating within the United Nations standby arrangements system a revolving on call list of approximately 100 experienced, well qualified military and civilian police officers, available for deployment on seven days' notice (see A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 117 (d)).

129. It was indicated in the implementation report that the Secretariat would be defining the profiles of the expertise required and would consult with Member States concerning the implementation of the system, and would communicate its requirements by February 2001, along with a request for them to participate within the context of the standby arrangements system (see A/55/502, para. 94).

130. In a letter dated 9 March 2001 to all Member States' permanent representatives to the United Nations, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations communicated those profiles for military personnel, together with a proposal for how the on call system would operate, and invited them to respond by 30 June 2001. The letter indicated that the Military Adviser in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations had held a working-level consultative meeting with Military Advisers and other staff from permanent missions, and that he would continue holding such meetings to provide a forum to exchange information and ideas.

131. The same letter contained a follow-up to the various commitments undertaken in the implementation report, with respect to proposed enhancements to the United Nations standby arrangements system, and also sought Member States' views on other aspects of the Panel's recommendations, such as on the formation of "coherent brigade-sized forces" (see A/55/502, paras. 71, 80, 81, 84 and 89). The forthcoming meeting of the Special Committee provides an ideal and opportune venue for further dialogue and consultations on this

subject. The Military Division intends to conduct another meeting with interested Member States to reiterate the requirements of the on call lists and seek their views on this and all other aspects of the standby arrangements in the coming month. The development of the Mission Headquarters Orientation Programme by the Training and Evaluation Service in the Military Division will enhance the preparedness of the on call list of personnel.

*Civilian police*

132. The Civilian Police Division in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has finalized a draft set of profiles for the phased deployment of 100 civilian police officers within 90 days of the establishment of an operation. Included in the proposal are the preliminary logistical and support requirements for these 100 officers. The Division is also exploring options for the holding of a conference later in 2001, in which all Member States could participate. The purpose of the conference is to discuss the proposal with Member States prior to the publication of the profiles and to explore the mechanisms by which police-contributing countries might provide the requisite personnel in a timely manner. It is also envisaged that the conference will raise the issue of the training of civilian personnel who are on on call status and thus available for rapid deployment.

133. In a related effort, the Civilian Police Division conducted a workshop in Sweden from 17 to 20 April 2001, for which the support of the Government of Sweden is greatly appreciated. The purpose of the workshop was to review the selection assistance team (SAT) policy, as had been envisaged last year as a reprise to the one held in April 2000 at which the SAT policy was first standardized. As with the original workshop, representatives of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) and UNTAET attended. It is anticipated that a revised SAT policy will be finalized by June 2001.

134. I had indicated in my implementation report that the "Principles and guidelines for United Nations civilian police operations" would be published and ready for distribution by end February 2001 (see A/55/502, para. 95). The guidelines have been finalized and are expected to be distributed shortly. The Secretariat regrets any inconvenience caused by the delay.

135. I had also indicated in my implementation report that many of the projects associated with enhancing the rapidity and effectiveness of civilian police deployment would not be expected to be completed before mid-2002 (see A/55/502, paras. 96-98). However, some progress has already been achieved in certain areas.

136. For example, since May 2000 the Civilian Police Division has been involved in a thorough and ongoing overhaul of its information management system. Each of the new systems is designed to be accessible by all potential users wherever they may be within the United Nations system, at Headquarters or in the mission areas. As of today, the Civilian Police Division has completed the following:

(a) An automated selection assistance training management and planning system;

(b) An automated Special Police Unit management system;

(c) An automated civilian police personnel management system, which is up and running in UNMIBH and UNTAET, and is currently being installed in UNMIK.

137. The following information management systems are in development, all of which could be completed as early as October 2001: a centralized civilian police rotation system for all peacekeeping operations and the deployment of civilian police personnel; a centralized Civilian Police Division library capable of being updated by Headquarters and the civilian police components of peacekeeping operations; and an automated civilian police repatriation system.

138. Beginning in December 2000 and as part of the larger standardization of United Nations civilian police administrative procedures, the Civilian Police Division initiated the drafting of universal civilian police disciplinary measures and procedures. It is expected that the initial draft will be completed by July 2001. This project is intended to be part of the civilian police administrative start-up kit and will be incorporated into the new Civilian Police Division information management package in its library.

139. In conjunction with the Department of Public Information, the Civilian Police Division anticipates it will begin work on the development of a series of

linked web sites for the Division and the associated civilian police components of peacekeeping operations in October 2001, though this project is dependent upon sufficient allocation of resources.

#### 6. Civilian specialists

140. Any logistics strategy for rapid deployment will need to be supported by the requisite number of administrative and technical support staff, ready and available to be deployed to the field, within the time-frames stated. Work has already started in this regard. Plans are being developed to enable the rapid deployment of pre-screened and pre-cleared staff members already within the United Nations system, in each of the following capacities:

(a) Standby teams available on 72 hours' notice to deploy as part of an initial mission survey team, for periods of up to two weeks;

(b) Mission start-up teams, available on one week's notice for assignments of up to 60 days in order to help establish a mission headquarters;

(c) Longer-term deployment teams, available on 30 days' notice for deployment for periods of 12 to 24 months.

141. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is currently in the process of defining the composition, pre-clearance requirements and other parameters for the creation of rapid-deployment standby teams.

142. Staffing sources for such arrangements will include existing staff in the field (particularly for standby), staff from the Secretariat, from United Nations common system organizations and programmes and United Nations Volunteers. The Secretariat will seek the support of Member States for this purpose, through the standby arrangements and in accordance with General Assembly resolution 51/243. Furthermore, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will expand its capacity for rapid deployment by institutionalizing arrangements with the United Nations Offices in Geneva (UNOG) and Vienna (UNOV) to assist in handling urgent requirements for medical clearance, travel, visas etc.

143. This is but one rapid deployment initiative within a broader global strategy for civilian staffing that addresses current deficiencies and prepares for the future, as discussed in section III.J below.

## J. Recruitment processes for civilian staff in peacekeeping operations

#### 1. Assessment of areas that need to be strengthened

144. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is responsible for recruiting, deploying and administering international civilian staff serving in field operations. The consultants and the members of the External Review Board echoed and supplemented many of the same criticisms offered by the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations in this area. As one member of the Review Board noted, "all reform would be irrelevant if the Department did not get this critical function right".

145. The consultants observed that mission staff members, at all levels, expressed concern about staff shortages, the quality of staff assigned to the missions and the recycling of known poor performers from one mission to another. Some members of the Board acknowledged having indirectly contributed to the problem by themselves having failed to document poor performance, for some of the same reasons indicated in section III.D above.

146. The consultants characterized the existing roster for civilian peacekeepers as ineffective and inadequately supported. They noted that advertising for vacancies is limited in extent and visibility. They asserted that the grading system for newly recruited staff is inflexibly applied and results in qualified candidates turning down offers because they are not offered grades commensurate with their experience. They heard from managers in the field that the interview process does not adequately identify and confirm skills or suitability. Interviews are often conducted by telephone or not done at all because of the volume and speed of deployment required. Mission managers, more so in administrative rather than substantive areas, expressed concern that they seldom participate in the selection process for international staff members.

147. The consultants assessed that the lack of career development and training systems applies even more to the staff in the field than it does to those at Headquarters. There is no preferred career path, with supporting incentives, associated with advancement in the peacekeeping field. There are no assigned proponents for functional career groups in the peacekeeping field and no training and education

requirements associated with advancement. They concluded that there is no real succession planning so that senior personnel rotations and retirements can be supported by early identification of a range of suitable replacement candidates.

148. Members of the Board also stressed the need for any field recruitment and training capacity to pay due regard to gender issues. They felt that the insufficient attention paid to this important area had taken its toll in the relations between peacekeeping personnel and the host communities, between internationally and locally recruited staff and among internationally recruited staff themselves.

149. The consultants expressed considerable dismay at what they felt was the lack of priority accorded to ensuring proper care of civilian, military and civilian police personnel in the field, particularly those serving in severe and unsafe environments. They heard that new staff members assigned to missions routinely may not be paid for several months, and that new personnel often arrive in an unfamiliar mission environment with little or no support. During their visits to the field missions, they observed that mission personnel located in more remote sectors sometimes lacked basic life support systems, and that staff evacuation and security plans are not kept up to date and practised (staff safety and security is addressed in considerable length in section V below, on the basis of the separate study on the subject conducted in response to the Special Committee's request).

### 2. Contributing factors

150. There is no doubt that staffing constraints, particularly within the Personnel Management and Support Service, have contributed to the litany of problems described above. This is supported by the workload data collected by the consultants. The Service has experienced a 75 per cent increase in workload over the past year, with the number of international staff supported by it increasing from 2,428 to 4,257, between June 1999 and September 2000. Seven recruitment officers service approximately 5,000 mission posts, with 746 vacancies reported as of January 2001. The Service receives about 150 applications per day and has a current backlog of 3,500 unprocessed applications. On average, DPKO recruitment officers process over 2,600 applications each per year, in contrast to the average in other United Nations agencies of 761 applications per recruitment officer. The number of staff travelled by the Service has increased from 3,919 in 1998 to 8,094 in 2000. The cost of these movements has increased from $11.6 million to $28 million during the same period.

151. On a broader level, the qualitative demands placed upon the Personnel Management and Support Service have been tremendous. The mere fact that Member States are providing fewer and fewer support elements for peacekeeping operations requires the Secretariat to recruit such expertise itself, although it has not yet had sufficient time to build up a systematic means of doing so. Commercial service providers can make up much of the shortfall, but this still requires the Secretariat to identify, screen, train and deploy sufficiently qualified contracts managers, procurement officers, finance officers and other officers with financial certifying authority, as these responsibilities cannot be outsourced.

152. Furthermore, while transitional administration missions may not be the standard for the future, it is a fact that the two existing transitional administrations now in existence have placed an incredible strain on the Personnel Management and Support Service. These missions have required qualified personnel in hundreds of occupational groups for functions never before required by the Organization (e.g., municipal administration, infrastructure, tax collection, sanitation services, air traffic controllers, fire department management, the whole range of expertise required to administer a territory). The United Nations standby arrangements system could have been an ideal vehicle through which to obtain such services at least for the start-up phase if it had been developed to anticipate the requirements of transitional administration prior to the establishment of the missions in Kosovo and East Timor.

153. The consultants observed that the structure of the Personnel Management and Support Service, divided into one section for administration and another for staffing and travel, had contributed to some of the problems as well. The recruitment, travel and administration of a single staff member can be handled by three or more individuals, leading at times to a lack of accountability and confusion.

## 3. Proposed solutions

*Global strategy for civilian staffing*

154. I had announced in my implementation report that the Secretariat would require several months to prepare a global strategy for civilian staffing, to identify ways of correcting present weaknesses and prepare for the future (see A/55/502, paras. 103-107), as a follow-up to the recommendations of the Special Committee (see A/54/839, para. 77) and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 145). Meaningful progress achieved on this front builds on the consultants' critical analysis of the problems.

155. Senior managers from the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Management, as well as those from the United Nations Office in Geneva, the United Nations Volunteers programme and Directors of Administration in a number of field missions, have recently given the process a serious start by collectively outlining the main elements of the strategy, resources required and potential timelines for implementation.

156. As a general caveat, it should be noted that the Organization has long been aware of the impediments to the effective and efficient staffing of peacekeeping operations. The emerging series of United Nations human resources management reforms, in particular those outlined in my last report on the subject (A/55/253 and Corr.1), addresses a number of deficiencies. The broader human resources management reforms may not, however, fully remedy the unique challenges of peacekeeping missions.

157. The staffing strategy proposed essentially comprises five key elements, as depicted in figure II.

158. It will be recalled that the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations had recommended the creation of a central Intranet/Internet-based roster for civilian candidates, to which field missions could be granted access and be delegated authority to recruit candidates from it, in accordance with guidelines on a fair geographic and gender distribution to be promulgated by the Secretariat (see A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 145 (a)). Considerable progress has already been achieved on the design of this new roster system.

159. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of Human Resources Management have collaborated on the establishment of this new system, called the "Galaxy Project". The Project envisages re-engineering and automating the full range of United Nations staff recruitment and selection procedures applicable to job profiles, vacancy announcements, applications, selection processes, recruitment, placement, promotion and mobility of staff within the United Nations Secretariat. The entire system will be managed and maintained through a web-enabled application software system. Efforts are under way to develop and tailor the system to meet the needs of peacekeeping operations. The completion of data preparation, development and testing is planned through November 2001 with a view to being operational by January 2002.

160. Concurrent with the Galaxy Project, the Secretariat will be strengthening links with United Nations information centres, the regional commissions and other United Nations offices around the world to ensure that non-Internet-based channels of communication continue to afford universal access to peacekeeping vacancies, as recommended by the Special Committee (see A/C.4/55/6, para. 28).

161. As mentioned in my implementation report, a key facet of the staffing strategy would be to delegate additional recruitment authority to the field missions. Such delegation should take into consideration lessons learned from the delegated authority to the United Nations Administration Mission in Kosovo on a pilot basis (see A/55/502, para. 108). Subsequently, a similar delegation of authority was provided to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor in November 2000.

162. Based on an initial assessment of the results, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of Human Resources Management concluded that written procedures, policy guidelines and monitoring mechanisms need to be developed to ensure consistency of approach as well as geographic and gender distribution. Further delegation of recruitment authority to field missions also necessitates that recruitment standards are established, qualified recruitment specialists are deployed to the missions and appropriate administrative oversight mechanisms are instituted at Headquarters. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations will also set up a monitoring function with the Office of Human Resources Management, based upon agreed parameters.

Figure II
**Global staffing strategy**


Advance planning
Streamline recruitment process
Expand sources of recruitment
Rapid deployment
Retain staff manage careers
• Actualize mission modules and templates
• Update generic job profiles
• Succession planning
• GALAXY
• Rosters
• Mobility and release of staff
• Delegation of authority
• Advertising/communication
• Agreements with UN entities, agencies and Member States
• Create standby and mission start-up teams
• Revise conditions of service and contractual arrangements
• Comprehensive training programmes

163. An important part of the global strategy for civilian staffing is also to develop and maintain a systematic career management of field staff, with improved career planning, more secure employment and re-tailored contractual arrangements that would offer enhanced career prospects for both new recruits and staff members who have already acquired invaluable on-the-job experience in United Nations peace operations.

*Strengthening and restructuring the Personnel Management and Support Service*

164. In order to develop further, support and implement the global strategy for civilian staffing, I propose to create a new Section in a significantly restructured Personnel Management and Support Service to undertake civilian workforce planning and analysis; expand the sources of recruitment; expedite and enhance the effectiveness of recruitment (including through conducting interviews and assessing competencies); manage the rapid civilian personnel deployment capability; and manage the careers of civilian staff in peacekeeping operations (through succession planning, skills and training assessment etc.).

165. This new Section should include gender expertise in order to ensure that equitable gender distribution continues to be a factor in recruitment strategies for peacekeeping operations.

## K. Organizational structure of the Department

### 1. Issues that need to be addressed

166. The consultants noted four specific areas where the Department's internal structure appeared to hinder effective management.

167. First, there is considerable overlap in the functions assigned to the Assistant Secretary-General for Mission Support with those of the Director of the Field Administration and Logistics Division. In fact, the only difference in their respective responsibilities is that the Assistant Secretary-General also nominally oversees the work of the largely autonomous Mine Action Service (UNMAS). Second, UNMAS does not properly belong together with the Field Administration and Logistics Division, although it does not naturally fit anywhere else in the Department's existing structure.

168. Third, though not fully highlighted by the consultants, the Field Administration and Logistics Division is now among the largest divisions in the Secretariat, currently comprising 300 authorized staff. The Logistics and Communications Service alone will consist of 147 staff, the Personnel Management Support Service of 86 staff and the Financial Management and Support Service of 59. The sheer magnitude of the Division's tasks suggest that it should be divided into at least two divisions in order to secure proper daily oversight at a sufficiently senior level and for the Headquarters structure to be more closely aligned with the field.

169. Fourth, in accordance with the recommendations of the Special Committee (see A/C.4/55/6, para. 40) and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (see A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 222), the Civilian Police Unit has now been separated from the Military Division. However, as the proposed upgrade of the rank of the Civilian Police Adviser and the establishment of an Assistant Secretary-General for Military and Civilian Police Affairs remain pending, the current D-1-level interim Civilian Police Adviser is reporting directly to the Under-Secretary-General.

170. This rank is at present not consistent with that of the rest of the senior leadership. Civilian police matters, which are critical to today's peacekeeping operations, frequently cannot receive sufficient attention from the Under-Secretary-General, whose span of direct supervision is already demanding given the number of managers reporting directly to him and the complexity of the issues covered.

171. The separation of the Civilian Police Division from the Military Division remains valid on the grounds of the unique nature of each. However, since the two Divisions have been separated, the consultants and managers within the Department have noted that coordination between the two has weakened. In addition, some responsibilities, such as training for civilian police, have not yet been resolved.

## 2. Proposed structural adjustments

### Office of Military/Civilian Police Affairs and Mine Action

172. The present comprehensive review has reaffirmed the recommendation of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations about the importance of civilian police and the complexity of their work. Therefore, I remain convinced that the rank of the Civilian Police Adviser should be upgraded to the Director level.

173. Given the level of autonomy and importance of the activities performed by the Mine Action Service as well as its fund-raising responsibilities, I believe that it should be upgraded to Division status and its head upgraded to the Director level.

174. I had previously accepted the recommendation of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations that a new Assistant Secretary-General for Military and Civilian Police Affairs be created (see A/55/502, paras. 123-125). I believe that the need for this Assistant Secretary-General remains valid, for the reasons articulated previously and for two additional reasons as well.

175. First, this comprehensive review has confirmed the need for the Civilian Police Division and the Military Division to work more closely together, while retaining their distinct identities. The promotion of such cohesion would be an important function of this new Assistant Secretary-General.

176. Second, the recommendations of the Special Committee and the input received from the External Review Board have all emphasized the need for the Secretariat to reach out more frequently, in particular to Member States, troop and police contributors. However, the Military and Civilian Police Advisers are limited in the time that they can dedicate to travelling to capitals in order to meet with senior national-level authorities on the development of United Nations peacekeeping capacities and the operational planning and support of specific operations. This Assistant Secretary-General would play a critical role in strengthening such relations, particularly at a senior level.

177. As previously indicated, I still firmly believe that the Military Adviser plays an essential role, which should not in any way be seen as diminished by the appointment of the proposed new Assistant Secretary-General. I therefore reaffirm that the Military Adviser, as the highest ranking military officer at Headquarters, should continue to have direct access to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and to me, as required.

178. In the light of the findings of this comprehensive review, I propose to place the United Nations Mine Action Service under the responsibility of this new Assistant Secretary-General, if approved.

179. The Office of Military/Civilian Police Affairs and Mine Action, headed by an Assistant Secretary-General, would thus consist of three Divisions: the Military Division, the Civilian Police Division and the Mine Action Division.

180. Finally, it will be recalled that I had proposed to create a small new unit, staffed with just a handful of experts, to provide advice to the Civilian Police Adviser on criminal law and judicial issues that are critical to the effective use of civilian police in United Nations peacekeeping operations (see A/55/502, paras. 127-130). The reasons articulated in my implementation report for the creation of this unit remain valid, as do its proposed terms of reference, though its placement should be slightly different than originally envisaged.

181. This comprehensive review has indicated that internal coordination within the Department needs to be strengthened to overcome "fragmentation" during operational planning and support. Bearing in mind that the primary purpose of the proposed unit for criminal law and judicial affairs would be to work with and strengthen the Civilian Police Division, I believe that it would be best placed within the Civilian Police Division and not in the office of the proposed Assistant Secretary-General, if approved.

182. I should stress that the unit, if approved, should be of an operational nature, working alongside the civilian police officers in the Civilian Police Division on a daily basis. It should interface with and rely on other parts of the United Nations system, such as the Office of Legal Affairs, as well as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Development Programme, to provide the necessary advice and support for capacity-building programmes to strengthen rule of law institutions.

*Office of Mission Support*

183. In the light of the magnitude of the responsibilities of the current Field Administration and Logistics Division and to mirror organizational structures which function well in the field, I propose to divide the Field Administration and Logistics Division into two separate Divisions, one for Administrative Support (Personnel and Finance) and the other for Logistics Support. These two Divisions would report directly to the Assistant Secretary-General for Mission Support.

184. An organigramme reflecting the proposed new structure for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is contained in annex H. As indicated in my implementation report, the Assistant Secretary-General for Operations would be the senior of the three Assistant Secretaries-General (see A/55/502, para. 125).

## L. Baseline staffing levels and mechanism for growth/retrenchment

### 1. Identifying the baseline levels for the present level of activity

185. The Consultants' quantitative analysis revealed that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should have roughly 650 staff (approximately 150 more than the current authorized strength), according to the current level of peacekeeping activity, so that it would have:

(a) A solid management infrastructure;

(b) Effective strategic planning and "lessons learned" capacities;

(c) Significantly enhanced policy and capacity development capabilities;

(d) The establishment and maintenance of a solid operational planning infrastructure;

(e) Depth in its resource base to dedicate sufficient (and quality) time to operational planning and mission support;

(f) Capability to provide the first line of response to operational exigencies (or "surge requirements"). This would include the need to plan an unexpected new mission, providing back-up to colleagues to deploy to the field for mission start-up or to trouble-shoot an existing one.

186. Of the 150 additional posts resulting from the quantitative analysis, roughly two thirds would be dedicated to strengthening managerial, strategic planning, policy and capacity development-related capabilities, and to establishing and maintaining a solid operational planning infrastructure. Most of those capabilities are referenced in sections III and IV of the present report, as well as in annex F.

187. The remaining one third of the additional posts would create depth in the resource base to enable the Department to more effectively meet its current operational requirements and ensure a capacity to continue doing so during periods of "surge" requirements by working longer hours. The workload data collected by the consultants revealed that Department staff already work well in excess of official working hours. Over 30 per cent or 161 of the Department's staff work an average of 50 to 60 hours per week, and 60 staff average a work week of 60 hours or more. The averages are noticeably higher for Professional staff (who do not earn overtime pay).

188. The consultants recognized the difficulties in recruiting and training new staff quickly to deal with a sudden increase in workload for the Department. They therefore argued that staffing the Department to a level which would reduce the average hours worked by the staff to a more normal workweek would allow staff to increase their number of hours worked to meet peak demands. The current situation, whereby many staff are already working excessive hours, takes away such flexibility. The consultants determined that approximately 50 additional posts would be required just to allow the staff concerned to carry out their current workload within a more normal workweek. However, they point out that this figure does not take into account the additional staff required to devote more time to certain aspects of work. Neither does this increase address areas where enhancements in current performance are required or new capabilities are necessary (the figure of 50 posts is additional to the 93 authorized in December 2000; the status of recruitment to fill those posts is summarized in annex I).

189. Naturally, any additional resources to be sought would rely first on the General Assembly's response to the substantive proposals contained in the present report, and second on a post-by-post justification that

would stand on its own merits, within the context of a subsequent budget submission.

### 2. Mechanism for growth and retrenchment

190. There is a certain relationship between the required staffing levels in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the number and complexity of peacekeeping missions being supported. However, any mechanism for growth or retrenchment in staffing must also presume that a certain baselevel of staffing is required, irrespective of expected fluctuations in peacekeeping activity. Such baseline staffing should apply first and foremost to management, strategic planning and policy and capacity development. It is only when sufficient resources can be devoted to these areas, with the associated time needed to develop and put into place the required managerial structures and procedures, that the Department will possess a sufficiently firm base to be able to flexibly expand or contract.

191. A baseline staffing level would also maintain sufficient staff for operational planning and support at a level of peacekeeping activity to be expected at any given time based on historical trends.

192. The consultants were asked to try to quantify the workload associated with operational planning, conduct, support and liquidation for just one operation. They found it difficult to do so, however, for the same reasons that such a formula has hitherto been elusive to the Secretariat. Each operation is unique in the workload it creates. A mission in a country such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, creates an enormous logistics workload, despite the fact that the overall numerical strength of the mission is not that large. Moreover, the political and substantive support required for the mission — as for any peacekeeping operation — is related to a function of the number of parties involved and their willingness to abide by their agreements. In the case of MONUC, the implementation of the Lusaka Agreement involves some three main internal warring factions and six external States, not all of which have been ready to cooperate and implement their commitments. Similarly, the size of some of the smaller and longer established missions, such as the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) or the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) — which do not create significant workload for the Military and Civilian Police Divisions, or the administrative and logistical arms of the Department — mask the complexity of the political issues involved and hence the significant time spent by the Office of Operations in supporting the implementation of their mandates.

193. Therefore, the current level of peacekeeping activity, in terms of the numbers, complexity and scope of the current operations, has served as the basis for the analysis in the present report. If, at a later stage, activity has dramatically declined and is not expected to increase again in the near term, then the Department's staffing levels should be reassessed. It should be remembered, however, that there have been an average of 14 to 16 operations over the past 10 to 12 years, and that periods of apparent lull in peacekeeping activity have been followed by a sudden and dramatic increase of activity.

## IV. Need for enhanced interrelationships with other parts of the Secretariat

194. The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, the management consultants and the members of the External Review Board all recognized that the Organization is at a crossroads, in terms of the allocation of responsibilities for peacekeeping support within the Secretariat. On the one hand, today's complex peacekeeping operations have many unique needs that do not apply to the rest of the activities of the Secretariat. Some might therefore argue that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should be refashioned as a fully self-contained peacekeeping agency, with its own set of rules and regulations designed specifically for the needs of those operations.

195. On the contrary, and as the present report clearly indicates, I strongly believe that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations should strengthen its links with other parts of the system. I have emphasized that other parts of the Secretariat, as well as the rest of the United Nations system, possess distinct expertise essential for multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The recreation of those capacities in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations would duplicate effort.

196. Thus, the management consultants proposed the following basic principles for evaluating the effectiveness of the present divisions of labour within the Secretariat:

(a) Planning substantive and support capabilities that constitute core peacekeeping tasks should be retained in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and to the extent possible should be subsequently delegated to the field missions, provided that appropriate financial controls and mechanisms are in place;

(b) Where planning and support processes do not represent core peacekeeping tasks but are core capacities of other activities of the Organization, the Department should establish new or enhanced relationships and collaborative mechanisms should be established, as needed, with the other organizational entities concerned;

(c) If a required capability for peacekeeping does not exist anywhere else in the United Nations system, it should be created in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

197. These basic principles, together with an assessment of where particular activities and processes are not being performed effectively, have provided the basis for the Secretariat's own review of the interrelationships between all of the elements that play a role in peacekeeping, and are summarized below.

## A. Department of Management

### 1. Background

198. The relationship between the Department of Management (DM) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is an essential one because the two Departments between them manage the entire span of administrative and logistics functions required to support peacekeeping operations, from mission planning and start-up through to mission liquidation. The Department of Management sets and monitors the overall administrative policy. The Field Administration and Logistics Division in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations shoulders the entire responsibility and accountability for logistics support, whereas the labour is divided between it and the Department of Management in a broad range of administrative areas. These divisions of labour have continued to evolve over time since the Field Administration and Logistics Division (originally known as the Field Operations Division) was transferred from the Department of Management to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations in 1993. The divisions of labour have generally shifted in the direction of more authority and responsibility — and consequently accountability — being delegated to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and in turn to the field.

199. As part of the present comprehensive review, the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Management jointly identified approximately 200 discrete administrative functions associated with Headquarters support to peacekeeping operations. Annex J lists each and indicates the current divisions of labour between the two Departments.

### 2. Peacekeeping procurement

200. Annex J describes the current divisions of labour between the two Departments in the area of procurement. A separate flow chart of the entire acquisition and deployment process, within which procurement falls, is contained in annex K.

201. The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations had recommended that the Department of Management delegate authority and responsibility for peacekeeping procurement to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, on a two-year trial basis (see A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 233 (d)). I had deferred action on this recommendation, bearing in mind the substantial changes that might be required to the entire logistics support system to meet 30/90-day rapid deployment timelines and the impact they would have on existing procurement arrangements and procedures (see A/55/502, para. 117).

202. A number of the procedural reviews have already been conducted, whereas others are still in process. The two Departments have jointly identified areas that could be streamlined and/or improved through the increased delegation of procurement authority to the field, fast-track procurement and other mechanisms to expedite the speed of response, while still ensuring independent monitoring of adherence to the Organization's financial regulations and rules, via the missions' resident auditors (who represent the Office of Internal Oversight Services). In this regard, the Secretariat has taken full note of the Special Committee's recommendation that all of these measures should include appropriate regulations to ensure propriety, accountability and transparency, and that the necessary resources should be made available to mission leadership for the same purpose (see

A/C.4/55/6, para. 33). This will require additional resources.

203. With or without increased delegated authority to the field, additional training for procurement officers in the field is required so that they are in a position to perform their duties. Pilot courses are to begin in September 2001. However, the full and effective institution of these programmes, coupled with the promulgation of appropriate guidance documents, have resource implications, not only for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations but also for the Procurement Division in the Department of Management.

204. Notwithstanding the variety of other internal reforms, policies and procedural reviews and training that can and will be pursued to support rapid and effective deployment, the rapid deployment strategy outlined in section III above clearly indicates that all of those elements represent only a fraction of the institutional changes required to meet the 30/90-day deployment timelines. A major undertaking is required to create a strategic reserve of equipment and matériel, as well as to expand the breadth, scope and numbers of systems contracts. The bulk of this workload will fall not on the peacekeeping missions but on Headquarters.

205. The present comprehensive review has helped to clarify that the technical acquisition planning and evaluation process will be the most labour-intensive and time-consuming part of the exercise. In fact, the present review concluded that the Procurement Division is involved in only three of the 14 sectors of activity associated with the entire process (see annex K). However, with respect to the procurement process, defined in its Organization-wide context, the consultants concluded that a centralized Headquarters procurement process can yield synergies, and furthermore that the Procurement Division in the Department of Management has made considerable improvements to its systems and procedures, as has been recognized by Member States. The consultants thus did not recommend delegating procurement authority from the Department of Management to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at this time. I agree.

206. However, there remains the need to strengthen the planning of procurement activities. When requisitioning goods and services, it is particularly important to develop accurate and adequate specifications, without which procurement actions will take a longer period of time. I therefore propose to establish a Contracts Management Section within the (proposed) Logistics Support Division to strengthen these capacities. This section would liaise with the Procurement Division and the entire Office of Mission Support to facilitate smooth procurement-related activities through the process of advance planning and requisition, bidding and selection, including technical evaluation and contract management, and contractors performance evaluation.

207. The two Departments need to work much more closely together than they have in the past to ensure that the stringent deployment timelines are met. The Departments should consider, for example, out-posting procurement officers from the Procurement Division to the Office of Mission Support. These officers should also participate in coordination meetings within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and visits to the field missions. The Procurement Division should consult more frequently with its counterparts in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations when designing system-wide policies and procedures, to ensure that they are sufficiently flexible to cater for the unique aspects of peacekeeping procurement. And lastly, the two Departments should treat as a shared responsibility and priority the building of capacity in the field to assume greater levels of authority for local procurement.

### 3. Peacekeeping budgeting

208. The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations had also recommended that the Under-Secretary-General for Management delegate peacekeeping budgeting authority to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations for a two-year trial period (see A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 233 (d)). I deferred action on this recommendation, for the same reasons stated in the case of peacekeeping procurement.

209. The consultants recommended that responsibilities for peacekeeping budgeting be transferred, along with the requisite resources, from the Peacekeeping Financing Division in the Department of Management to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. They based this recommendation on the premise that budgeting should be considered a core peacekeeping task, and on the belief that perceived duplications of effort could be addressed by consolidating the budgeting expertise that now exists in both Departments.

210. Whether or not budgeting is a core peacekeeping task is part of a broader debate on whether the budgeting function in general should be fully decentralized to programme managers throughout the system. It happens to be a higher profile issue with respect to peacekeeping because of the amount of money involved, relative to other programmes carried out by the Secretariat.

211. Full budgeting authority has not been decentralized because of the need to retain a solid system of checks and balances and financial controls in place. In the case of peacekeeping, I do believe that the sheer volume and complexity of such operations' budgets warrants that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations possess a capacity to prepare budgets for new missions, as well as to assist field missions, once they have been established, in the preparation of their budgets.

212. However, I believe that the Department of Management should retain the authority (and capacity) to review those budgets prior to their presentation to the General Assembly, so that a system of checks and balances is retained. I thus do not believe that the full peacekeeping budgeting authority should be delegated from the Under-Secretary-General for Management to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. Nor do I believe that the Peacekeeping Financing Division in the Department of Management should be merged with the Financial Management and Support Service in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, at this time.

213. As in the case for peacekeeping procurement, I believe that coordinating mechanisms between DPKO and DM/Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts (OPPBA), and with the field missions, should be strengthened. For example, staff from the Peacekeeping Financing Division recently accompanied staff from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on an extended assessment visit to MONUC, and have also begun to attend internal coordination meetings within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. These are excellent initiatives to enhance coordination, and should become the norm rather than the exception.

214. I have asked the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping Operations and Management to consider whether the physical co-location of staff from the Peacekeeping Financing Division and the Financial Management and Support Service would be warranted and practicable to further enhance cooperation.

215. I concur with the underlying sentiment expressed in the Panel's report that as much authority as possible should be delegated to the field, and that all concerned at Headquarters should treat as a shared responsibility and priority the development of personnel to assume such authority in the field, while safeguarding propriety, transparency and accountability. I expect the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Management to work jointly towards this end.

### 4. General impact of increased peacekeeping activity on the Department of Management

216. Backstopping support to peacekeeping operations by the Department of Management, both at Headquarters and field missions, is not limited to budgeting and procurement. It also covers a wide range of other less visible functions.

217. In the financial and accounting area, the backstopping includes the maintenance of direct financial relationships with peacekeeping operations. The Department of Management reviews and prepares vouchers for all cash remittance requests and imprest accounts; processes large number of inter-office vouchers; approves obligations at Headquarters for recording in the accounts, and processes all reimbursement payments for troop costs and contingent-owned equipment (COE) to Member States. It reviews the accounts of each mission, prepares financial statement for each financial period and handles bank reconciliations for numerous individual bank accounts, as well as other transactions that must be processed in the account system. It processes large volume of disbursement to vendors and provides payroll services to peacekeeping staff at Headquarters and international staff recruited for peacekeeping missions, including salary payments, education grant, tax reimbursement, hazard pay and settlement of travel claims.

218. Further, the Department arranges treasury actions relating to cash deliveries to peacekeeping missions and overseas funding levels in peacekeeping missions. As concerns contribution activities for each funding cycle, including revisions to approved funding levels for missions in transition, actions include issuance of assessment letters; recording pledges and receipts of

voluntary contributions; and reporting on assessed contributions and credits to each Member State.

219. As concerns human resources, support is provided to peacekeeping operations by establishing the conditions of service for civilian personnel serving at peacekeeping missions; conducting salary surveys for locally recruited staff and travelling to the mission area to set initial salaries and allowances of mission staff at the inception of a new mission; advising DPKO on interpretation of human resources policies and rules; and, together with DPKO, coordinating training.

220. The Department of Management also provides 24-hour telecommunications service between the United Nations Headquarters and peacekeeping missions, cryptographic services to the missions, as well as telephone, facsimile and local area network (LAN) services to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In addition, mail and messenger operations are provided to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. As to security, training for security officers assigned to peacekeeping missions is provided by DM.

221. In order for the Department of Management to adequately provide the necessary support to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and peacekeeping missions, the capacity of the Department of Management would need to be strengthened.

#### 5. Contingent-owned-equipment reimbursement processing

222. The current methodology of reimbursing troop contributors for the provision of equipment and services to peacekeeping operations has significantly improved. The phase IV, phase V and post-phase V working groups on reimbursement of contingent-owned equipment have further enhanced the procedures and delineated responsibilities of the United Nations and troop contributors, in particular in the areas of medical services provided to contingent units and painting and repainting of equipment.

223. The receipt and processing of monthly verification reports has been streamlined. In order to further expedite the verification process, an electronic transmittal of monthly verification reports would increase the efficiency and speed of COE processing, as noted by the consultants. This may require an IT strategy to address all aspects of COE processing. Additional dedicated staff resources will also be required. I wish to stress, however, that the timeliness of payment on COE reimbursement is contingent upon the receipt of assessed contributions from Member States.

### B. Office of Internal Oversight Services

224. Peacekeeping operations must receive adequate internal oversight coverage. The Office of Internal Oversight Services considers peacekeeping operations as a priority area. Internal audit services are provided at the mission level through the use of OIOS resident auditors (see A/55/735). In two missions, OIOS also has resident investigators. However, OIOS will require additional resources to provide adequate internal oversight coverage to field missions that do not have resident auditors or investigators, as well as to DPKO activities at Headquarters, particularly in the light of the changes proposed in the present report.

225. The Audit and Management Consulting Division, the Monitoring, Evaluation and Consulting Division and the Investigations Section are the constituent units within OIOS that provide internal oversight services to DPKO. The current resource levels in OIOS are inadequate to conduct high-level peacekeeping oversight at Headquarters and in the field. To promote a more proactive approach in its oversight coverage of peacekeeping operations, OIOS will need to conduct risk management and control self-assessment exercises, with the involvement of managers at various levels, at Headquarters and in the field. The task of providing effective supervision and guidance to resident auditors in the field has become much more involved and daunting. To provide a more articulated analysis of the management control systems and administrative procedures put in place by DPKO, OIOS will need to conduct horizontal audits, assess benchmarks and performance indicators and recommend best practices that are most relevant to peacekeeping operations. In addition, OIOS has not been able to respond to requests by DPKO for management consultancy to review structures, streamline processes and raise productivity. Investigation services, too, are provided on a limited basis. To improve the quality and adequacy of internal oversight services over peacekeeping operations, the resource level for OIOS at Headquarters must be appropriately augmented.

## C. Department of Political Affairs

226. I have already provided a detailed outline of the division of responsibilities of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs, in my report of 4 March 1999 on the support account for peacekeeping operations (see A/53/854/Add.1 and Add.1/Corr.1). The table depicting those detailed responsibilities is reproduced in annex L.

227. I requested the Under-Secretaries-General for Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs to revisit the current division of labour between the two Departments, within the context of the present comprehensive review, to ascertain if changes were required to improve the overall political direction and support provided to peacekeeping operations. They have jointly indicated to me that the division of labour remains valid, in the light of the guiding principles articulated at the beginning of the present section (see paras. 189-192 above). I agree with their conclusion and also accept their assessment that there is room to improve the day-to-day working relationships of the two Departments.

228. As to the division of labour, the functions performed by the two Departments are very different despite the fact that they both have political affairs officers and regional divisions.

229. Within the United Nations system, the Secretary-General's functions in the political area are supported by the Department of Political Affairs, which works closely with other departments, offices, agencies, funds and programmes. In addition or more generally, the Department of Political Affairs assists in the prevention, control and resolution of conflicts, including peace-building. The Department also provides electoral assistance to Member States, at their request and in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. Furthermore, the Department provides secretariat services and substantive support to the General Assembly in connection with the activities of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the Security Council and other related intergovernmental bodies. The Department of Political Affairs is the lead department regarding my reporting obligations to the legislative bodies on all the aforementioned responsibilities, and the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs chairs the Executive Committee on Peace and Security.

230. One of the key DPA responsibilities is to follow political developments throughout the world and identify potential or actual conflicts in which the United Nations could play a preventive or other useful role. DPA is also the focal point for prevention and peace-building in the United Nations system. The four geographical divisions within DPA are each charged with identifying potential crisis areas and providing early warning to the Secretary-General on developments and situations affecting peace and security. To this end, desk officers of the four DPA geographical divisions develop country profiles on their respective countries and then monitor developments over time. By tracking developments over time, they are well placed to detect changes that may lead to crisis. On a daily basis, DPA also provides me with detailed briefing materials on a variety of subjects. This includes coordinating inputs from throughout the entire United Nations system for my meetings with representatives of Member States, whether here in New York, or during my visits abroad. These desk officers are often asked to produce briefing materials with only a few hours' notice, and I find their input invaluable.

231. In contrast to the global watch maintained by the Department of Political Affairs, the desk officers in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations' Office of Operations, which is the lead department for all aspects of peacekeeping operations, focus only on the 15 or so current peacekeeping operations or on the design of new peacekeeping operations, as directed by the Security Council. Their responsibilities range across a broad spectrum of support to these operations, and conducting political analysis of the situation on the ground represents only a fraction of the political work in which these officers are engaged. For example, they devise overall concepts for specific peacekeeping operations, based on Security Council mandates. They interact with the parties to conflicts and Member States on the implementation of those mandates. They provide operational guidance to peacekeeping operations, based on the subsequent decisions of the Security Council, and prepare briefing materials and reports to support my reporting obligations. They engage continuously with representatives of troop-/police-contributing countries about all aspects of an operation (though not

always with the speed and frequency that they desire, due to staffing constraints, as indicated earlier). Desk officers also advise on the political consequences of a particular military or logistics support concept, because the location of a mission headquarters or regional office does have political implications, for example.

232. Virtually every aspect of peacekeeping has a political dimension. In fact, the analysis contained in section III above indicates that the Office of Operations should strengthen its integrating and coordinating role to ensure that peacekeeping operations do not receive conflicting guidance.

233. The fact that there may be an inherent but marginal overlap in some aspects of the work of the two Departments' respective regional divisions in countries where peacekeeping operations are deployed is not necessarily an issue. In order for the Department of Political Affairs to assess accurately the regional political dimensions of the conflicts in West Africa or the Great Lakes region, for example, it stands to reason that its political officers would need to monitor events in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, respectively. It is for this reason that the Department of Political Affairs automatically receives copies of all situation reports and coded cables sent by the heads of peacekeeping operations. Similarly, the desk officers in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations need to be aware of regional developments in order to provide effective guidance to the peacekeeping operations in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). They are thus copied on correspondence from special envoys and representatives in charge of other United Nations peace operations (e.g., special political missions, peace-building support offices and peacemaking initiatives).

234. It is essential that the political affairs officers in both Departments exchange information, views and perspectives with one another as a matter of course. Both Departments have been encouraging this and an improved culture of cooperation is evident. For example, the Department of Political Affairs has recently established an interdepartmental working group on the Balkans, which meets on a regular basis. Political officers in both Departments report that this initiative has helped to improve information-sharing between them, particularly on how the recent developments in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia affect the activities of the United Nations Administration Mission in Kosovo. DPA and DPKO desk officers also interact in the context of other coordination mechanisms and in support of high-level departmental interactions, e.g., through ECPS.

235. It is important to expand on this type of formal coordination mechanism (included but not limited to the establishment of integrated mission task forces), because in the absence of an institutionalized framework the regular exchange of ideas and views becomes dependent upon the interpersonal relations and mutual respect of the individual officers concerned. Such relations and mutual respect are strong in many cases, but the consultants reported having heard that this was not always the case.

236. The Under-Secretaries-General for Political Affairs and for Peacekeeping Operations concurred that the consultants had correctly recognized that some frustrations do exist. They therefore jointly recommended to strengthen the day-to-day cooperation between the two Departments' political officers by seeking to physically co-locate their respective regional divisions. I agree with their recommendation, and have requested that plans be drawn up as soon as possible to effect the change, within the context of an overall reassessment of space allocations within the Secretariat.

237. The two Departments must also rethink how their political officers accumulate knowledge. At present, the two Departments are often dependent upon a single individual's institutional knowledge about a particular country or conflict. This risks being lost when his/her portfolio is transferred to another colleague in the same Department or outside of it. The provision of additional staff and the institution of modern information systems should help to enable the accumulation of knowledge in a more uniform and structured way. Institutional knowledge should be readily accessible to all who need it to plan or support an operation, and it should not be lost when the lead changes hands from one Department to another.

238. This approach to knowledge accumulation will be essential to enable staff to change assignments with greater frequency, as well as to move between Departments with greater ease. Mobility, in general, is a key aspect of the human resources management reforms that I have put forward. I expect it to be applied to the Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations.

## D. Department of Public Information

239. The Department of Public Information has responsibility for the Organization's overall public information and communications programme. Accordingly, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations relies on it to develop the strategies, policies and capacities required to effectively plan, deploy and support the public information components of peacekeeping operations. The Peace and Security Section in DPI is tasked with this role, though it does not have any resources allocated to it from the support account. Thus, within existing resources (four Professional and three General Service posts), which are also required to support the Organization's public information and promotional requirements for peace and security activities, in general, it concurrently undertakes the following, inter alia:

(a) Participating in survey and planning missions to establish new peacekeeping operations;

(b) Preparing proposals relating to the public information strategy and structure of public information components in the field;

(c) Advising on public information related requirements to be included in status of mission/forces agreement;

(d) Developing concepts for programming packages during the pre- and post-deployment stages of peace missions, taking advantage of DPI's ongoing relationships with regional broadcasting partners;

(e) Developing the deployment timetables and equipment requirements of field information components and preparing related budgets;

(f) Maintaining a roster of candidates for field information offices, and screening and recommending candidates for public information posts in the field;

(g) Monitoring field information work and providing guidance to public information components;

(h) Organizing briefings at Headquarters for senior information officials appointed to field missions.

240. The amount of time the Peace and Security Section's staff can dedicate full time to these activities is limited by its other mandated responsibilities. These include:

(a) Preparing, producing and disseminating promotional materials on peace operations and disarmament, including books, information kits, timeline wall charts, the *Year in Review*, monthly background notes, newsletters, posters, press releases and features;

(b) Creating and maintaining pages on the United Nations web site about peacekeeping, as well as other peace operations (e.g., peacemaking and peace-building);

(c) Organizing promotional events, media encounters, NGO briefings and press conferences, in close collaboration with the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General and substantive offices;

(d) Preparing memorial panels for United Nations peacekeepers and staff members who have lost their lives in the service of peace.

241. Clearly, these are all important tasks that help the Organization to disseminate information about its peacekeeping and related peace and security work and should continue to be undertaken by DPI. I therefore do not wish to pursue the redeployment of resources from DPI to DPKO in order to create a new unit in DPKO for the operational support of public information, as originally envisaged (see A/55/502, paras. 133-139).

242. However, I remain convinced that the Secretariat needs to dedicate considerably more attention to strengthening future (and current) peacekeeping operations' capacities to meet the public information needs of the local populations. As the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has repeatedly recognized, most recently in its last report, the provision of objective, independent, accurate and impartial information, at the local level, can make an important contribution towards the attainment of mission mandates and the enhancement of the safety and security of mission personnel (see A/C.4/55/6, paras. 46-47).

243. The one public information officer in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations is primarily occupied with handling the day-to-day media relations for the Department itself and on behalf of the Under-Secretary-General. This officer does not have sufficient time either to dedicate to incorporating public information into the strategic plans for future

operations, or to trouble-shoot shortcomings in the public information components of existing operations.

244. I therefore believe that a few public information specialists should be included in the Peacekeeping Strategic Planning Unit. This would require additional resources.

245. I note the Special Committee's strong support for the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Public Information to enhance their cooperation (see A/C.4/55/6, para. 47), and the recent recommendation of the Committee on Information (see A/AC.198/2001/L.3), requesting the continued involvement of DPI from the planning stage of such future operations through interdepartmental consultations and coordination with other departments of the Secretariat, in particular the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Therefore, the two Departments should collaborate closely on the provision of public information support to peacekeeping operations. Additional resources should be provided to the Peacekeeping Strategic Planning Unit for this purpose (see annex M).

## E. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

246. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations does not have any resources allocated to it for human rights, and is thus entirely dependent upon the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights for such support. The latter does not currently receive any resources from the support account for peacekeeping operations, and relies on regular budget resources as well as voluntary contributions.

247. With regard to the execution of human rights activities of peacekeeping operations, cooperative arrangements have been established between DPKO and OHCHR to strengthen the substantive guidance provided to peacekeeping operations on human rights and rule of law issues. Such arrangements are reflected in the memorandum of understanding that was concluded in 1999 by the two Departments, whereby OHCHR would provide substantive backstopping to human rights components of United Nations peacekeeping operations, as well as training, in order to ensure a coherent and effective approach to United Nations human rights work in the field. The memorandum remains in effect and clarifies the division of labour between the two Departments.

248. OHCHR, in cooperation with DPKO, currently carries out one training programme of three weeks' duration a year for national trainers of military and civilian police staff to be deployed to peacekeeping operations. OHCHR is responsible for designing and conducting the human rights section of the programme. Staff also participate in the yearly training programme organized by the Swiss Government for human rights officers to be included in standby arrangements in support of peace operations. In addition, depending on the Office's capacity, staff participate in training programmes for potential peacekeeping operation personnel organized by national institutes, by delivering human rights sessions (an average of three a year). The Office also works with DPKO as regards the pre-deployment of training of trainers of military and civilian police staff of peacekeeping operations, and conducts induction briefings in Geneva for newly recruited staff of human rights components of peacekeeping operations.

249. The support currently provided to human rights components in peacekeeping operations and to human rights training for peacekeeping personnel is inadequate. This is largely due to the fact that OHCHR lacks sufficient staff to do the entire range of work required of it in support of peacekeeping operations.

250. Substantive backstopping to the human rights components of peacekeeping operations is provided by OHCHR through its geographic desks and methodology team. This includes assistance in the screening of candidates for human rights posts in peacekeeping operations, contributions to reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, as well as to briefings to the Security Council, support to technical cooperation activities, coordination with Commission on Human Rights mechanisms, ensuring information flow between United Nations human rights mechanisms and human rights components of peacekeeping operations, and other support. Furthermore, such activities as training of civilian police and human rights personnel of peacekeeping operations has been conducted in a number of missions (e.g., UNMIBH, UNTAES, UNTAET, UNMIK); the same goes for the development and implementation of technical cooperation projects in such missions as the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), UNTAET and UNOMSIL. These activities

have been funded directly by OHCHR. Yet, such substantive backstopping is provided by OHCHR only to the extent that its resources allow and is not adequate. In order to enable OHCHR to provide adequate, systematic and prompt substantive support and to facilitate links with the broader United Nations human rights programme, there is a need to strengthen its capacity for daily advice and substantive backstopping to the increasing number of peacekeeping operations with human rights components.

251. OHCHR needs to be more closely involved in planning peacekeeping operations that address human rights. OHCHR currently has inadequate resources to carry out these responsibilities. If such operations are to have effective human rights components, OHCHR should be able to coordinate human rights fieldwork in peacekeeping operations; second personnel to integrated mission task forces in New York; recruit human rights field personnel; organize human rights training for all personnel in peacekeeping operations, including the law and order components; and create model databases for human rights field work, incorporating gender perspectives throughout.

252. OHCHR should also develop a standardized information management system to be applied consistently in all peacekeeping operations. Such work will build on the experience developed by OHCHR in Yugoslavia/Kosovo and elsewhere. The system will need to take into account the specific confidentiality needs of human rights information-gathering and management, and to be designed in such a way that the information gathered can be fed into existing OHCHR databases and other United Nations human rights mechanisms and procedures.

253. OHCHR is tasked with devising an integrated mission strategy for human rights, which includes concepts of operation, staffing structures, resource requirements and other elements necessary to the effective design of human rights components of peacekeeping operations. Particular emphasis does need to be placed on the interaction of human rights with other mission components, especially civilian police.

254. In this context, there is a need to enhance OHCHR capacity to analyse the experience of past peacekeeping operations and draw lessons applicable to future planning (both directly and by linking up to relevant expertise within research and civil society institutions); translate lessons learned in the development of flexible concepts of operation so as to adjust them to the specific needs of each mission; develop best practices in the design of human rights components of peace operations, the formulation of mandates, the definition of effective human rights strategies and the integration of human rights into the work of other components; rapidly deploy staff to gather information and assess needs to support the planning of human rights components. Such enhanced capacity will result in a less ad hoc and more institutionalized approach to United Nations human rights field work in the context of peacekeeping operations.

255. The report of the United Nations Panel on Peace Operations recommended the preparation of an interim criminal procedure code to be applied under United Nations transitional administrations, pending the re-establishment of local rule of law and local law enforcement capacity. The report of the Panel recommended that the Secretary-General invite a panel of international legal experts to evaluate the feasibility and utility of developing an interim criminal code. A working group set up to that end agreed that further elaboration of the practical aspects of criminal procedures would be of great benefit. These rules should fully take into account international human rights standards. The Secretary-General has asked the relevant offices to conduct a needs assessment regarding interim rules of criminal law and criminal procedure. Once the needs assessment is completed, the first draft of interim rules could be produced. Consultations with UNMIK and UNTAET indicate that there are urgent needs in this regard. OHCHR has been assigned to undertake this task but has not been allocated any resources for this new responsibility. Such resources are indispensable for this task to be carried out.

256. The present comprehensive review has not only reaffirmed my previous findings that the capacity of OHCHR needed to be strengthened in support of peacekeeping (see A/55/502, para. 144) but has revealed that the amount of work to be undertaken by OHCHR is even greater than previously estimated.

## F. Office of Legal Affairs

257. DPKO does not have any resources for addressing legal issues arising from peacekeeping operations and relies entirely on the Office of Legal Affairs in this regard. In this connection, five posts have been provided to OLA under the support account for peacekeeping operations.

258. OLA support to DPKO includes preparing legal opinions, studies and advice on the interpretation of relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to peace and security, United Nations resolutions and regulations, as well as international instruments, such as the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their additional Protocols; preparing and participating in the negotiations of all necessary legal arrangements, including status of forces agreements, status of mission agreements and agreements with contributing States; providing legal advice on the use of force and reviewing the rules of engagement established for each operation; advising on governance issues arising from the mandates of UNMIK and UNTAET; providing advice on the operational arrangements governing the staffing and support to peacekeeping operations, as well as claims arising therefrom. In addition, OLA handles a number of legal issues arising from peacekeeping operations on an ad hoc basis, and maintains a close liaison on all matters relating to international and war crimes tribunals as they relate to peacekeeping operations.

259. The responsibilities of OLA and DPKO in this regard are distinct and clear. The two Departments enjoy a close and cooperative relationship. Contributions from OLA, while significant and often involving a substantive analysis of complex legal issues, are provided expeditiously due to their urgent nature.

260. The upsurge and increased complexity of peacekeeping operations has resulted in an increased workload for OLA. This situation has been compounded by unprecedented issues that have arisen in these operations.

261. There is no doubt that the rapid and effective deployment of peacekeepers to the field, as envisaged in the present report, will entail the increased use of a variety of legal arrangements with Member States and commercial contractors.

262. Although the criminal law unit, as recommended in the present report (see sect. III.K above) will be an integral part of DPKO, the work which will be entrusted to that unit will have to be supported by OLA. Furthermore, any strategic review and planning of peacekeeping policy and practices, as recommended by the present report, will also require the support of OLA.

263. The additional tasks reflected above will have resources implications for OLA.

264. From a managerial point of view, coordination between DPKO and OLA could improve if legal officers were part of the rapid deployment capacity recommended in the present report and if there were closer collaboration between the legal officers in the field and those at Headquarters. On the first issue, as legal issues arise from the deployment of the first element of a peacekeeping operation, the rapid deployment capacities recommended in the present report should include legal expertise. In addition, a sufficient number of posts for legal officers should be established in the budget of a peacekeeping operation. On the second issue, the advice provided by OLA could be enhanced through a better understanding of issues in the field. In this connection, while my special representatives are responsible for reporting to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, legal officers in the field should be encouraged to maintain informal communications with their counterparts in OLA. They should be kept fully informed of any informal communications with Headquarters, and actions decided through such communications should be formally communicated by them to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. It is also recommended that legal officers from OLA dealing with peacekeeping operations visit the field on a regular basis to gain a more in-depth understanding of aspects of peacekeeping that affect their work.

## G. Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women

265. The Division for the Advancement of Women, under the oversight of the Special Adviser on Gender

Issues and Advancement of Women, has responsibility for the substantive and technical serving of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. The Committee is mandated by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and its Optional Protocol to monitor implementation of that Convention through the review of States parties' reports, consideration of individual communications and inquiries. The Division has the responsibility for the provision of policy advice to intergovernmental bodies, including the General Assembly and the Commission on the Status of Women, concerning violence against women, including trafficking in women and girls. It is also charged with monitoring implementation of critical areas of concern in the Beijing Platform for Action concerning the human rights of women, women and armed conflict, and violence against women. The Division has significant expertise in issues relating to the human rights of women in all contexts, including armed conflict and post-conflict situations. It also supports the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women in its monitoring role with regard to States parties affected by conflict.

266. The Special Adviser on Gender Issues chairs the inter-agency task force on women, peace and security of the ACC Inter-Agency Meeting on Women and Gender Equality, which was established in October 2000 to ensure collaboration and coordination throughout the United Nations system in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). I have requested my Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women to take the responsibility for coordinating the preparation of the report on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building, and the gender dimensions of peace processes and conflict resolution, as requested in Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), in close collaboration with other relevant parts of the United Nations system, including the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Political Affairs and Disarmament Affairs, and the Office for Coordination of Human Affairs.

267. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations does not currently have any dedicated resources for addressing gender issues in peacekeeping. The Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women does provide overall policy support and guidance, as mentioned above, but does not have an operational role and does not have any resources allocated to it from the support account for peacekeeping support.

268. The present comprehensive review has confirmed that there is a great deal of work to be undertaken with respect to gender and peacekeeping, not only as a result of the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations (May 2000), but also in the light of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (see A/C.4/55/6, para. 41). It is for this reason that I had previously proposed the creation of a gender unit in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (see A/55/502, para. 142).

269. I still believe that a dedicated focus on gender issues is required in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. However, instead of creating a separate unit, I would recommend that a few gender experts be included in the Peacekeeping Strategic Planning Unit so that a gender perspective is interwoven into all aspects of its work. The proposed new Section in the Personnel Management and Support Service (PMSS) should include a gender expert to help expand the sources of personnel from which qualified female candidates could be recruited.

## H. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

270. The relationship between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is vital and must be improved in order to rationalize and strengthen the United Nations engagement in crisis countries. In practically all places of armed conflict, particularly in intra-State conflicts, the United Nations will be involved both in consolidating peace and security and in the provision of emergency humanitarian assistance. These principal and overarching aims are not always complementary, and any peacekeeping operation should be mandated, designed and resourced to support and at the very least not hinder humanitarian action. How this should be done will differ from case to case; there is no single model, and there thus needs to be close cooperation between DPKO and OCHA at all stages of mission design and planning, in particular on such pivotal issues as those related to the protection of

civilians and support for humanitarian assistance efforts.

271. OCHA and DPKO mutually support each other in daily management at the Headquarters level of crisis countries where a peacekeeping force is deployed. Exchange of information between the two Departments is critical. This is of particular value in the establishment of new peacekeeping missions because humanitarian agencies are usually well established on the ground and can be a source of information and support.

272. The nature and extent of cooperation, coordination and integration between United Nations humanitarian and peace and security actors in the field must depend upon the local context. There may be places where United Nations humanitarian actors are incorporated into a peacekeeping mission and many others where a clear separation between the peacekeeping mission and United Nations humanitarian agencies will be vital in order to secure and maintain humanitarian access to needy populations. A peacekeeping mission may be designed primarily to support a peace process, in which case it must also be designed to ensure that its deployment and operations do not, inadvertently, make more difficult the provision of emergency humanitarian aid. In other situations, the peacekeeping mission may itself be mandated to assist humanitarian action, in which case a much closer link between military, political and humanitarian actors will be essential. In every situation, systematic cooperation between DPKO and OCHA in strategic and operational planning is critical and must be institutionalized.

273. At the level of strategic planning, this means that there should be a strong link between DPKO's strategic planning capacity and OCHA. Peacekeeping strategy cannot be formulated without a clear understanding of the specific objectives, concerns and strategies of the humanitarian community. OCHA's role is to act as this bridge between operational humanitarian actors and United Nations peacekeeping operations. At the operational planning level, this means the routine involvement of OCHA in integrated mission task forces and joint working groups, especially in joint assessment missions. In addition, there should be closer cooperation between DPKO's strategic planning and policy capacity and OCHA's policy development branch on such cross-cutting issues as the separation of civilians and armed elements or the use of armed escorts. Finally, in the areas of knowledge management, OCHA must not only, as a member of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security, play an active role in the establishment and working of mechanisms to strengthen its decision-making and analytical capacities but must also strengthen links between the knowledge management capacities in the humanitarian and peace and security domain.

## I. Department for Disarmament Affairs

274. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants is an essential element of many peace agreements and, consequently, many peacekeeping operations. This process is dependent on both the political will of warring factions to disarm and the provision of financial resources to develop and sustain the process. The process requires detailed and integrated planning with a number of partners involved, including the peacekeeping forces, humanitarian agencies and donor Governments.

275. To date, the Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) has not been involved in the planning and implementation of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes in peacekeeping because its mandate is geared more towards advisory services regarding multilateral and regional disarmament issues. In keeping with its mandate to provide substantive expertise regarding disarmament and confidence-building measures in the conflict-prevention and post-conflict peace-building efforts of the United Nations system, including practical disarmament, DDA has gathered considerable experience in disarmament-related programmes of Member States, and can share its experiences and know-how with DPKO, particularly at the planning stage.

276. The regional centres for peace and disarmament in Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean, part of DDA, may assist the integrated mission task forces in compiling, analysing and assessing field-based information relevant to the planning and deployment of a peace operation. This information may also be shared with other agencies through Headquarters.

277. It is therefore recommended that closer ties be established with DDA, particularly during the planning of peacekeeping operations. DDA should also be called upon to provide relevant information and expertise to DPKO; it may also be able to assist in the

identification of expertise to assist the process in the field.

278. The Peacekeeping Strategic Planning Unit would be the ideal interlocutor with the Department of Disarmament Affairs and the rest of the United Nations system on enhancing the capacity to acquire best practices about the conduct of DD&R programmes in a peacekeeping setting. It would also be well placed to ensure that lessons learned are incorporated in the planning of such programmes for future operations. I believe that the Peacekeeping Strategic Planning Unit should be provided with additional resources to bring on board a field-tested expert in this area, who could help the Unit more effectively coordinate with the rest of the United Nations system.

# V. Security management system: Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator

## A. Background

279. In response to a request of the Special Committee (see A/54/839, para. 116), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations undertook a comprehensive review of security requirements in peacekeeping missions. The review, which was completed in early May 2001, was built on a similar exercise conducted in mid-2000 regarding the security management system of the United Nations Secretariat, agencies, programmes and funds. The findings of the previous review were conveyed to the General Assembly in my report of 18 October 2000 (A/55/494), in which I made, inter alia, several recommendations for the strengthening of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator.

## B. Scope of study

280. The purpose of the review was to assess security management in peacekeeping, identify any weaknesses that may exist and identify practical ways of rectifying such deficiencies. The terms of reference included the review of organizational structures and procedures, decision-making processes, delegation of authority, information needs, accountability mechanisms, crisis management, and measures to prepare mission leaderships and personnel for their tasks in the field. The study benefited from the deliberations of the International Seminar on the Safety of United Nations Peacekeepers and Associated Personnel, held in March 2001 in Tokyo, under the sponsorship of the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Swedish National Defence College.

## C. Summary of findings

281. While UNSECOORD is responsible for the security of the personnel of the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, the security of military, civilian police and civilian personnel serving in peacekeeping operations is the responsibility of the head of the peacekeeping mission, reporting to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. DPKO supports peacekeeping operations in the field in this regard by drawing on the technical expertise of UNSECOORD in such areas as selection of field security personnel, advice on security procedures and structures in the field, and planning and ongoing assessments of security management. Three posts have been provided to UNSECOORD through the support account for peacekeeping for this purpose. Member States have also responded favourably to budgetary requests for security personnel in peacekeeping operations in the field.

282. The review raised concern, however, about the need to clarify current arrangements for security management. In particular, it noted the need to codify security policy, procedures and standards for peacekeeping, as well as command and reporting arrangements, and to clarify their relation to those established for the United Nations agencies, programmes and funds, as laid out in the Field Security Handbook.

283. As in the findings of the managerial review of DPKO, the security review considered the mission planning process to be insufficiently integrated. Although an UNSECOORD specialist often participates in the initial reconnaissance visit to a country where a mission may be deployed, UNSECOORD lacks the staff to participate fully in the entire planning process for each mission and to address the full range of security implications and requirements. As a result, the initial threat/risk assessments tend to focus on political and military

considerations and pay less attention to security management issues.

284. In devising the initial security infrastructure, the review noted that special attention must be given to the necessary material resources needed to support it. There are currently no templates or guidelines concerning the minimum equipment required for security reasons. Often, mission personnel are deployed before such essential items as communications equipment, vehicles, protective gear and medical evacuation aircraft are available in sufficient quantities. The review warns that the deployment of personnel without adequate security equipment constitutes a serious breach of the Organization's Duty of Care.

285. In the operational phase, security management is almost entirely the responsibility of the mission leadership, especially the head of mission. The review noted that, clearly, there can be no alternative to a field-driven approach given the volatility of the environment. However, in order to fulfil his responsibilities in this regard, the head of mission must have good knowledge of the many aspects of security management and enjoy adequate support mechanisms. For example, there is insufficient capacity at Headquarters to provide the necessary security training prior to deployment or to make standard operating procedures or other guidance materials on this issue available. Moreover, senior mission personnel require the advice of qualified security specialists in the field.

286. The review urges that managers with responsibility for the safety of staff have those responsibilities clearly recorded in their terms of reference, and that all staff receive security awareness training consistent with their role and responsibilities. Once trained, negligent performance or non-compliance with security management should be identified and those involved held accountable.

287. There is also need for more attention to the outlying team sites and regional headquarters, where the majority of security incidents occur. Assets and capacities tend to be concentrated at mission headquarters due to its central command functions. However, in order better to protect staff in the most vulnerable areas it is imperative that missions allocate equipment according to security needs, ensure the full integration of regional sites into security planning, and improve information exchange among all locations and all components. Moreover, personnel should not be deployed to areas where speedy evacuation cannot be guaranteed in an emergency.

288. In line with the reports of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations and the present comprehensive review, the review emphasizes the importance of better information collection, analysis and dissemination at Headquarters and in the field, and the development of integrated strategies to guide the implementation of mandates, based on continuous threat/risk assessments. An essential mechanism in missions is the establishment in peacekeeping operations of joint operations centres, staffed by military, police and civilian personnel. In terms of the collection and dissemination of information, the review recommends a strengthening of the Situation Centre at Headquarters, which is already envisioned as part of the management reforms in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

289. The review also made recommendations for the improvement of security oversight processes at Headquarters. In this connection, it recommended that further clarification was required in terms of the relationship between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator, perhaps through a memorandum of understanding. The review also made some recommendations in regard to the increased staffing at Headquarters necessary to provide a greater capacity to support security management of peacekeeping. DPKO is studying this recommendation, along with the full range of the findings and recommendations of the review, in consultation with UNSECOORD.

# VI. System-wide information, analysis and decision-making capacities

## A. Background

290. In my report to the General Assembly, dated 20 October 2000, on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, I proposed the creation of the ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS), effective January 2001 (see A/55/502, paras. 42-48). It will be recalled that the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations had proposed the creation of such an entity (see A/55/305-S/2000/809, para. 75) in order to address

shortcomings within the United Nations system with respect to information flow and analysis of issues that are fundamental to the work of the Organization in the field of peace and security, and to find a way to improve the effectiveness of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security as a decision-making body. The exact structure and resource requirements for EISAS were subsequently outlined in my report on the resource requirements for implementation of the report of the Panel (see A/55/501/Add.1, sect. 3.A).

291. In summary, EISAS was proposed to comprise 53 staff in total (35 Professionals and 18 General Service), all drawn from existing resources, with the exception of nine new Professional and seven General Service posts. It was proposed to consist of an Office of the Director, and three distinct elements: the Strategic Planning and Analysis Service; the Information Management Service; and the Peace-building Unit.

292. In its report of 4 December 2000, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, recognizing the informational and analytical requirements of the United Nations, mainly with respect to United Nations peacekeeping operations, expressed the view that the Committee and other relevant bodies of the General Assembly should continue to consider the United Nations needs in this regard and how best to use existing resources (see A/C.4/55/6, para. 13). The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions deferred consideration of the proposed creation of EISAS, pending the completion of the present comprehensive review (see A/55/676, para. 21).

## B. Findings of comprehensive review

293. In the light of the Special Committee's response to the proposed creation of EISAS and the concerns expressed by Member States during the Committee's general debate, I directed the Secretariat to work closely with the relevant agencies, funds and programmes to reassess the proposal for the formation of EISAS, within the context of the present comprehensive review. The findings of that internal review, together with some of the observations made by the management consultants and the External Review Board, reaffirm that there are several weaknesses, as addressed below.

### 1. Knowledge management

294. During the conduct of mandated peace-making efforts and during the planning of mandated peacekeeping operations, United Nations negotiators, mission planners and senior mission leadership are not always operating with the benefit of a comprehensive assessment of the political, socio-economic, development, human rights and humanitarian factors that have contributed to the conflict concerned. This impacts their credibility with the parties to the conflict and might affect the Organization's ability to effectively carry out its mandate. Some members of the External Review Board indicated that they had not been provided with such information and analysis prior to their deployment to the field in leadership positions. They thought it imperative that the Secretariat provide such information to mission leaders.

295. In many cases, the relevant information already exists within the United Nations system and in most cases is available in public reports. However, there is no organizational unit within the system to pull that information together into a coherent whole. Nor is there a unit to identify gaps in knowledge and synthesize that background information into a digestible format for the benefit of senior-level decision makers and expert-level officials within the United Nations system (including members of an integrated mission task force or other coordinating bodies), the senior leadership of United Nations operations, Security Council members, or troop- and police-contributing countries.

296. Contrary to perceptions, the desk officers in the Department of Political Affairs are not performing this knowledge management function from a multidisciplinary perspective because their numbers are too few (normally only one officer for several countries), their time is limited (and mainly focused on meeting the short-term informational and analytical requirements of senior managers, the legislative organs and/or field operations managed by DPA) and their expertise is mainly restricted to political analysis.

297. Knowledge accumulation and access from within the United Nations system would be much less time-consuming and labour-intensive if greater use were made of modern information systems. The humanitarian community has made considerable strides in employing Internet-based systems to accumulate and disseminate knowledge. However, neither the

Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations nor most of the other members of ECPS possess a chief information manager and/or sophisticated enough technical IT capability and infrastructure. Moreover, most staff in the substantive areas lack an understanding of how information technology could be used to render their work easier or more efficient. As a result, the technical specialists in the Information Technology Services Division/ Department of Management, the Department of Public Information and the Field Administration and Logistics Division of DPKO often lack the guidance that they require to develop new information systems in accordance with the needs of the users.

### 2. Executive-level decision-making and policy analysis

298. The Executive Committee on Peace and Security[1] is not living up to its full potential. As I indicated in my report entitled "Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform" (A/51/950), the aim in establishing the four executive committees was to sharpen the contribution that each unit makes to the overall objectives of the Organization by reducing duplication of efforts and facilitating greater complementarity and coherence. I indicated that the executive committee structure was designed as an instrument of policy development, decision-making and management, and added that it would provide a forum in which the heads of United Nations entities consult with one another on work programmes as well as other substantive and administrative matters of collective concern, to identify and exploit ways of pooling resources and services so as to maximize programme impact and minimize administrative costs, and more generally to facilitate joint strategic planning and decision-making. The report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations accurately observed that ECPS is not always functioning as such, often serving instead as an information-sharing body.

299. The Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, in his capacity as Convener of the Committee, does not have sufficient time or resources upon which to rely to ensure that the preparation for ECPS agenda items reflects a truly interdepartmental/agency focus. One P-3 level officer in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General is currently serving as the Secretary of ECPS, as but one of many duties which she performs on a daily basis.

300. ECPS is not being presented with the requisite documentation and policy recommendations prior to its meetings. As is plainly evident, no executive-level body can be expected to take decisions unless the necessary background work has been completed beforehand. Furthermore, papers presented to ECPS tend to reflect the views of the particular department, agency, fund or programme that has drafted it and are generally limited to that one perspective. This is not problematic when the issues open for discussion are specific to a single operation and are of a short-term nature. In those instances, the lead department is best placed to present the topic, based on input from the senior representative in the field. However, longer-term policy decisions and strategies, affecting several different operations and mandated activities in the field, require a truly multidisciplinary and coherent system-wide approach.

## C. Alternative proposal to EISAS

301. I am convinced that EISAS, as originally proposed, would substantially help to address the shortcomings noted above, while operating strictly in accordance with legislative mandates. However, mindful of the Special Committee's recommendation and concerns expressed about the original proposal, I propose to create a more modest unit for system-wide policy and analysis. This unit would maintain some of the objectives previously articulated for EISAS (see A/55/502, paras. 42-58) but would differ from it in the following ways: (a) it would be less than half the size of EISAS; (b) it would not absorb the information technology, cartographic and media monitoring capabilities from the Department of Information; and (c) the Peace-building Unit would be de-linked from it.

### 1. Terms of reference

302. The terms of reference of the unit would be as follows:

(a) To serve as the secretariat of ECPS, proposing its agenda, preparing and taking records of its meetings and monitoring follow-up of decisions taken;

(b) To undertake, at the request of my Executive Office, members of ECPS, the integrated mission task forces and/or other interdepartmental/ agency working groups, medium and long-term

analyses of cross-cutting issues that are fundamental to the successful planning and support of mandated peacekeeping operations, peace-building support offices, special political missions and peacemaking/diplomatic activities;

(c) In that context, to prepare proposals for comprehensive mid-to-long-term strategies, drawing on information that already exists within the United Nations system or is in the public domain.

### 2. Composition

303. The unit should be headed by a Director and be comprised of no more than 12 Professionals, along with a limited number of General Service staff, for administrative support. The members of the unit would require analytical expertise in such areas as geographic; political-military; development; socio-economics; human rights; humanitarian; disarmament; gender issues; and information management (to serve as the interface between the unit and those in the rest of the system, with the relevant technical expertise, who could help to design systems that would render its work more efficient.

### 3. Placement

304. There are essentially five alternatives for the administrative and budgetary placement of the unit. One, to place it in the Department of Political Affairs, as had been proposed for EISAS, in the light of the fact that the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs is the Chair of ECPS. Two, to place it in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations because many of the issues it will look at will pertain to issues affecting peacekeeping operations. Three, to place it in my Executive Office, as a stand-alone unit given that its multidisciplinary nature does not necessarily lend itself to placement in any one department, agency, fund or programme. Four, to merge it with the Strategic Planning Unit in my Executive Office, whose primary purpose is currently to identify emerging global issues and trends, analyse their implications for the roles and working methods of the United Nations, and devise policy recommendations for my Senior Management Group (see A/51/950). Or five, to pursue an innovative approach, in which it would not substantively be placed in any particular department or my Executive Office but would be established as an autonomous new unit.

305. I am not inclined to place the unit in either the Department of Political Affairs or the Department of Peacekeeping Operations because it is essential that it be seen and utilized as a common service of ECPS. I am also not inclined to place the unit in my Executive Office, either as a stand-alone unit or as part of the Strategic Planning Unit, for three reasons. First, it is essential that this policy and analysis group serve the needs of ECPS. Its placement in my Executive Office might give impressions to the contrary. Second, I do not wish to further expand my Executive Office to such a large extent. Third, the Strategic Planning Unit does not address issues related to specific conflicts and, furthermore, is very much focused on socio-economic and development related issues, including follow-up to the United Nations Millennium Declaration. The inclusion of this policy and analysis unit would divert the Strategic Planning Unit from its primary focus.

306. I thus propose to pursue the fifth innovative option, establishing an autonomous new unit, not belonging to any particular department but which receives its guidance from ECPS. The members of ECPS would be invited to approve the work programme of the unit so as to prioritize its workload, avoid duplicating what is already being done elsewhere in the system and ensure that it would draw upon and complement existing expertise.

307. A similar precedent already exists, in fact, for this type of arrangement. The United Nations Development Group Office (UNDGO) serves as the secretariat of the United Nations Development Group and as a common resource for the entire Group.

*Notes*

[1] ECPS is chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, and consists of the following: the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Disarmament Affairs; the Offices of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs, the Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict and the Legal Counsel (OLA); the United Nations High Commissioners for Human Rights and Refugees; the United Nations Development Programme; and the United Nations Children's Fund. The World Food Programme is also considering the possibility of joining ECPS.

# VII. Concluding remarks

308. The present comprehensive review has been the first in-depth and comprehensive managerial examination of the way in which the Organization implements one of the most important aspects of its mandate. Most of the findings are not surprising. They confirm that what many of us have feared would be the consequences of trying to make do with too little for too long. The overall peacekeeping capacities of the Secretariat have not developed at the pace they should have because sufficient time, energy and resources have not been dedicated to planning for the future. Furthermore, if we continue to define our required capacities strictly based on the bare minimum needed today, and only today, then we will be no better off two to three years down the road. After more than 50 years of United Nations peacekeeping, the time has come for us to acknowledge that the instrument is not a temporary aberration. We should not lose this opportunity, therefore, to reverse the trend and invest in the future.

309. To be sure, the United Nations has had many peacekeeping successes and the hard work and dedication of the staff in the Secretariat, agencies, funds and programmes is not in doubt. But performance can significantly improve if certain changes are brought to structures, systems and procedures, and if additional resources are provided. We can no longer afford to continue with the "gifted amateurism" that has characterized this Organization's approach to peacekeeping to date. Higher professional standards are required, as are enhanced mechanisms to monitor performance and progress more effectively.

310. Enhanced analytical capacities are essential to ensure that mandated operations are well conceived, within coherent overall strategies for United Nations peace and security activities in a particular country or region in conflict. This will help the Organization to put the totality of its resources to the most effective use possible.

311. Enhanced planning capacities are essential for the Secretariat to develop the most effective and efficient ways of meeting operational objectives.

312. Enhanced rapid deployment capacities are essential to ensure that peacekeeping operations are on the ground and able to carry out their mandates before the parties' commitment to a peace process wanes, so that opportunities are not lost from the beginning.

313. Enhanced capacities to produce standard operating procedures, guidelines and training programmes are essential to ensure that the Secretariat and the staff in the field are able to better support Member States' military and civilian police personnel.

314. All of the enhancements proposed require strengthening the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other parts of the Secretariat. These additional staff should also provide the Secretariat with greater time and flexibility to interact with Member States, to ascertain and respond to their concerns, and to provide them with better quality information in a more timely manner.

315. The full impact of the reforms proposed should be to increase the likelihood of success of peacekeeping operations. However, strengthening the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and other parts of the Secretariat is not the only answer to the challenge. The decisions made by the Security Council and its willingness to do all that is required to make sure that operations do not fail are determining factors. So too is the political will of Member States to match the mandates with the human, material, financial and political support required to enable their full implementation. The partnership between the Security Council, troop contributors and the Secretariat must therefore be strengthened. This is what the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations has suggested and Member States have strongly supported, as evidenced in their continuing discussions on the Panel's report. While this issue goes beyond the Secretariat's purview and is therefore outside the scope of the present report, the importance attached to it by Member States is clear. The Secretariat remains ready to do its part.

316. Of course, the success and failure of peacekeeping depends on the parties to conflict themselves. The international community affords them the opportunity to choose peace over war when it deploys its men and women to help implement an agreement. The parties' will to seize the opportunities before them cannot be replaced by a better logistics system, a more efficient Department of Peacekeeping Operations or even better mission leadership. But where the will to peace does exist, we should have the ability to respond swiftly, professionally and effectively. The proposals contained in the present report have been formulated in that spirit.

## Annex A

### Status of implementation: recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations contained in its report of 4 December 2000 (A/C.4/55/6)

| Special Committee recommendations | Comments/updates |
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| The Special Committee notes the Secretary-General's intention to submit a report on conflict prevention to the General Assembly and the Security Council and is of the view that the report should be considered by the Assembly. (Para. 5) | The report is being finalized and expected to be submitted in June 2001 to both the General Assembly and the Security Council. |
| The Special Committee supports exploration of the concept that a small percentage of a mission's first-year budget should be made available to the head of mission to fund quick-impact projects targeted at enhancing the mission's effectiveness in implementing its mandate in its area of operations. (Para. 6) | Subject to approval by the legislative bodies, the Secretariat will continue to make budgetary provisions for quick-impact projects (as in the case of UNMEE) wherever the operational environment calls for such activities. |
| The Special Committee recommends that, when they are mandated by the Security Council as part of a peacekeeping operation, programmes for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration be provided with adequate and timely resources, and urges that consideration be given to bringing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes into the assessed budgets of relevant peacekeeping operations for the start-up of an operation. (Para. 7) | The opportunity has not yet presented itself to pursue this recommendation, as no new operations have been established since December 2000. |
| On matters affecting the safety and security of personnel, countries that have committed personnel to an operation should be fully and regularly briefed by the Secretariat. The Special Committee urges that the Secretariat's briefings to troop-contributing countries be timely, comprehensive and professional, and should, as a general rule, be accompanied by written briefs. (Para. 12) | The Secretariat attaches the highest importance to providing frequent and timely briefings to the troop-contributing countries, especially during crises or other events affecting the security of personnel. On the basis of the comprehensive security review (described in Chapter V), further improvements in the general information flow on these issues are expected. The Secretariat also intends to qualitatively enhance the briefings provided to troop-contributors. As discussed in Chapter III of this report, improvement in the quality of presentations and the timeliness of information for TCCs would be supported through an expanded role for the Situation Centre, according to which it would assume the central knowledge management function within DPKO for factual information on peacekeeping missions and provide up-to-the-minute operational information on all missions. The Situation Centre would also be responsible for producing comprehensive fact sheets in |

| Special Committee recommendations | Comments/updates |
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| | support of briefings and reporting requirements, and would liaise with the DPKO information manager to provide visual presentations. |
| While recognizing that transitional civil administrations in United Nations peacekeeping operations have been undertaken on an exceptional basis, the Special Committee notes the establishment of a working group to conduct a needs assessment as set out in relevant paragraphs of the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/502) and requests that it consult in a timely manner with Member States before finalizing its report. (Para. 14) | The Secretariat reiterates its commitment to consult with Member States before the draft interim rules of criminal law and procedure are finalized and distributed. Progress on this issue has been delayed in light of the fact that additional resources previously sought for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights have been deferred. |
| The Special Committee urges the Secretariat to work towards the goal of being able to deploy peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a United Nations mandate and to deploy complex peacekeeping operations within 90 days after the adoption of a mandate. (Para. 15) | The work undertaken by the Secretariat to study the implications of the 30/90 days deployment time frames is described in detail in Chapter III of the present report, along with different options for meeting the material and personnel requirements. |
| The Special Committee welcomes actions taken by the Secretary-General to improve the selection of mission leaders and emphasizes that prior to being selected, all mission leaders must be interviewed by the senior leadership, as a general rule, at United Nations Headquarters. (Para. 17) | As described in Chapter III of this report, several concepts for improving the selection of senior mission personnel have been reviewed. The Deputy Secretary-General wrote to the Member States on 3 May 2001 to request nominations for such positions, which will be reviewed by the senior appointments group. |
| The Special Committee urges that, as a standard practice, an assessment team from the Secretariat be sent to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor and stresses that such assessments should be administered impartially, without geographic bias. (Para. 21) | The Department of Peacekeeping Operations now undertakes pre-deployment visits to troop contributors on a routine basis, with teams including military planning and logistics officers. |
| The Committee takes note of the Secretary-General's intention to communicate to Member States his requirements for on-call lists of military officers by February 2001 after fully consulting all Member States on how best to develop a workable system. The Special Committee looks forward to further considering this matter at its next regular session. (Para. 22)<br><br>The Special Committee takes note of the Secretary-General's intention to communicate to Member States his requirements for on-call lists of civilian police officers by February 2001 after fully consulting all Member States on how best to | The efforts by the Secretariat in developing on-call lists for military and civilian police officers are described in Chapter III of the present report. Consultations are continuing with all Member States on ways to strengthen the United Nations Standby Arrangements System. |

| Special Committee recommendations | Comments/updates |
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| develop a workable system. The Special Committee looks forward to further considering this matter at its next regular session. (Para. 27) | |
| The Special Committee looks forward to the Secretary-General's review of the effectiveness of delegating recruitment authority to the field, including guidelines required to ensure equitable geographical distribution and gender balance. (Para. 29) | Based on the review of the delegation of recruitment authority to UNMIK and UNTAET, further delegation of recruitment authority to field missions should be accompanied by the preparation of recruitment procedures and policies, deployment of qualified recruitment specialists to missions and the institution of monitoring mechanisms at Headquarters (see Chapter III). |
| The Special Committee encourages the reform of the Field Service category of personnel and a review of the working conditions of externally recruited staff, welcomes the recommendation of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to formulate a comprehensive staffing strategy for peacekeeping operations and, in this context, stresses the need to maintain equitable geographic distribution and gender balance in all of these cases. The Committee looks forward to further consultations between the Secretariat and all members of the Committee on these matters. (Para. 30) | A team of senior managers has prepared an outline of the main elements of a global staffing strategy, covering measures to improve advance planning, streamline recruitment, expand sources of recruitment, facilitate rapid deployment, and improve conditions of service and career development (see Chapter III). In this context, work on the reform of the Field Service category of personnel is continuing. |
| The Special Committee urges that any delegation of procurement authority to the field include appropriate regulations to ensure propriety, accountability and transparency and that appropriate resources be made available to mission leadership for the same purpose. (Para. 33) | The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Management work closely together to ensure that any delegation of authority is undertaken in full accordance with existing rules and regulations and with due regard for transparency and accountability. |
| The Special Committee reiterates its recommendation that active service military and civilian police officers should be adequately represented in all future staffing actions undertaken by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to reflect the important contributions these officers can make to peacekeeping operations at the Headquarters level. (Para. 36) | Of the 93 additional posts provided to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations under the emergency Support Account increase, 19 posts are earmarked for active service military officers and five posts for civilian police officers. |
| The Special Committee stresses that the increase in the number of staff in the Department, once approved by the relevant bodies of the General Assembly, should be carried out in an open and transparent manner. In this regard, it requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to be considered by the relevant bodies of the Assembly. (Para. 37) | An update on the recruitment process for all posts under the emergency Support Account increase is being provided at Annex I. |

| Special Committee recommendations | Comments updates |
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| The Special Committee recognizes the importance of coordinating mechanisms in responding to complex challenges to peace and security, and is encouraged by the proposed creation where appropriate of integrated mission task forces. The individual entities participating in the task forces would continue to be guided by their respective mandates, be responsible to their governing bodies and should participate in the task forces without detriment to their core functions. (Para. 39) | A status report on the implementation of the integrated mission task forces (IMTF) mechanism is provided in Chapter III of the present report. |
| The Special Committee requests the Secretariat to provide clarification at its next regular session about its intention to develop a "military doctrine", a term which is open to several interpretations, thus causing concern to the Special Committee. (Para. 45) | The term "doctrine" refers to common principles, guidelines and procedures to assist Member States in preparing for United Nations peacekeeping tasks and to assist field missions in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. They are designed to enhance understanding and are complementary to national publications. |
| The Special Committee strongly underlines the need to explore the possibilities for improving the safety and security of United Nations and associated personnel working in United Nations peacekeeping operations. (Para. 51) | In line with the Special Committee's request, the Secretariat undertook a comprehensive study on security management in peacekeeping operations. A summary of the findings and conclusions of the study is presented in Chapter V of this report. |

## Annex B

### Status of implementation: recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations contained in its report of 20 March 2000 (A/54/839)

| Special Committee recommendations | Comments/updates |
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| The Special Committee strongly recommends that Member States concerned be fully consulted and provided on a timely basis with a copy of all United Nations internal investigations or inquiries into incidents, including the final outcome reached, which involve the death or injury of personnel from Member States or loss/theft of property of Member States. (Para. 64) | It should be recalled that the Head of Mission is responsible for discipline, holding investigations and establishing Boards of Inquiry in the mission area. Investigation reports and related information on incidents involving military and police personnel are provided to the respective governments through their Permanent Missions. With regard to international civilian staff members, their status as international civil servants requires that United Nations investigations and inquiries are carried out in accordance with established policies and procedures and that they are treated as internal documents. The Organization has had long-standing guidelines for the investigation of any incident involving injury or death of mission personnel, which apply to all categories of personnel and require the activation of a Board of Inquiry. Results are being shared to the extent possible in cases involving military or police personnel. It must be emphasized that the confidential treatment of investigation reports serves to protect witnesses and other persons who provide testimony during an investigation. |
| The Committee requests the Secretariat to develop, in consultation with Member States, a set of guidelines governing action to be taken in such instances and requests the Secretary-General to provide an update on the request in his next report. (Para. 65) | The administrative procedure on discipline for military and civilian police personnel in mission areas was forwarded to the Permanent Missions of all Member States on 19 September 2000 (MPS/651). This procedure indicates that in cases in which serious personal misconduct is suspected, an initial "fact finding" investigation may be conducted by the national contingent commander (for formed troops), or a senior member of the Mission HQ. Although overall responsibility for subsequent investigation, including Boards of Inquiry, rests with the Head of Mission, consultation with national contingents will normally take place throughout the investigation process. While authority for repatriation rests with the Under Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, subsequent disciplinary action is a national responsibility. |
| The Special Committee recommends that, in cases of gross misconduct, Member States concerned be invited to take part in the investigation to the greatest extent possible, for example, through representation in the force-level international military police unit, bearing in mind the need to | Where an investigation of possible misconduct by peacekeepers takes place, this is conducted by other members of the peacekeeping operation, who may or may not include compatriots of the individual under investigation. For reasons which Member States will appreciate, only the Head of Mission can decide the composition of this team. |

| Special Committee recommendations | Comments/updates |
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| maintain discipline in the mission area and the desirability of justice being done in all such cases. (Para. 66) | |
| The Committee reiterates its request that the Secretariat implement a consultation mechanism on sample rules of engagement, and that the Secretary-General provide an update in his next report. (Para. 80) | The sample rules were circulated to the Member States in February 2001, with a deadline in April. However, since several Member States have requested additional time to submit their comments, the Secretariat continues to receive contributions. These will be taken into account in the finalization of the sample rules, along with inputs from the field missions. |
| The Special Committee requests the Secretariat to consult all prospective troop contributors in the formulation of rules of engagement for new missions, with a view to ensuring their uniform application. (Para. 81) | The Secretariat develops mission-specific rules of engagement (ROE) with a view to achieving the mandate as successfully and safely as possible, given the realities in the area of operation. As a matter of routine, Secretariat staff discuss the anticipated nature of a new operation with Member States that are considering a contribution of personnel. The Secretariat frequently shares views, even at a very early stage, with regard to ROE in order to help ensure their uniform application when finally adopted. Changes to ROE in an existing peacekeeping operation normally result from changing requirements on the ground. The Secretariat holds specific consultations with troop contributors during the formulation and revision of concepts of operations and at times of crisis. |
| The Special Committee requests the Secretary-General to carry out consultations on the ST/SGB/1999/13 with the Special Committee. (Para. 82) | The Secretary-General's Bulletin on the Observance of International Humanitarian Law has been in effect since its issuance. Should Member States wish to jointly develop an alternative set of guidelines, however, these would take precedence, assuming that they received the endorsement of the appropriate legislative bodies. |
| The Special Committee requests the Secretariat to provide a status report on the preparation and issue of the Dag Hammarskjöld Medal. (Para. 84) | The Secretariat is collaborating closely with Member States in verifying the records of those eligible for the Medal, in accordance with ST/SGB/2000/15, issued on 1 December 2000. The Secretariat expects to be in a position to begin awarding the medals in August, when the first monthly consignment of medals is scheduled to arrive. |
| The Special Committee requests the Secretary-General to address, in a detailed manner, peacekeeping procurement in his next report to the Special Committee. (Para. 96) | Issues related to peacekeeping procurement are being reviewed jointly by DPKO and DM, as described in Chapter IV of the present report. Areas for streamlining the process are being identified. |
| The Special Committee requests the Secretariat to update the Manual following approval of the results of the revised Manual on Policies and Procedures concerning Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-owned Equipment of Troop-contributing Countries Participating in Peacekeeping | The Secretariat wishes to confirm that the revised Manual will be updated following approval by the General Assembly. It will be made available at the earliest opportunity in all of the official languages of the United Nations. |

| Special Committee recommendations | Comments/updates |
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| Missions Phase V Working Group and to make it available at the earliest opportunity in all of the official languages of the United Nations. (Para. 100) | |
| The Special Committee, mindful of the range of projects currently in hand or contemplated for the Lessons Learned Unit, recommends that the Unit convene a meeting of interested Member States, with a view to developing mechanisms for validating lessons learned at field level, and that the Secretary-General include an update on this issue in his next report. (Para. 101) | In view of the transformation of the Lessons Learned Unit, and the resultant change in functions, consultations on specific projects will resume when the new Unit is fully staffed and operational. |
| The Special Committee reiterates the need for the Secretary-General to fulfil the request made by the ACABQ (A/51/491, para. 11) to provide the compendium of instances in which the Organization is due restitution, as a result of non-compliance with status-of-forces agreements or other agreements, and to withhold claims submitted by Member States concerned until the matter of expenditures is resolved. (Para. 110) | The compendium is being revised in response to comments received after circulation of the draft and will be submitted to the General Assembly at its fifty-sixth session. |
| The Special Committee attaches the same importance to status-of-mission agreements as it does status-of-forces agreements and requests the Secretariat to report to the Special Committee on the possibility of developing a model status-of-mission agreement, in consultation with Member States. (Para. 112) | It should be noted that SOMAs (which are concluded in the form of an exchange of letters) are based on relevant provisions of the model SOFA (A/54/594) as it has evolved. Like SOFAs, they provide for the application of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, customary principles of United Nations peacekeeping operations, and additional provisions emerging from developments in peacekeeping practice. As the model SOFA continues to serve as the basic framework for the drafting of individual SOFAs and SOMAs, with the necessary adjustments accepted by host States, there appears to be no need for a model SOMA. |
| The Special Committee notes the critical role played by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations Air Safety Unit in ensuring the safety and security of United Nation peacekeeping personnel and requests that the Unit be considered as part of the Secretary-General's review of security requirements in peacekeeping operations. (Para. 117) | Since a far-reaching review of the United Nations peacekeeping air operations, with special emphasis on air safety issues, was conducted last year by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), under the authority of the Deputy Secretary-General, this area was not included in the recent study of security management in peacekeeping missions (see present report). The Department continues its efforts to implement the ICAO recommendations; however, certain actions to strengthen air operations are pending the approval of additional resources, as explained in the Secretary-General's report A/55/507/Add.1. |

| Special Committee recommendations | Comments/updates |
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| The Special Committee notes the Secretary-General's comments regarding the Secretariat's efforts in providing training materials in all the official languages of the United Nations. It maintains, however, that the Secretary-General's report to the Special Committee should contain an update on this issue, including measures taken to secure appropriate funding. (Para. 123) | In the most recent Support Account submission, specific funding was sought for the provision of training materials in all official languages of the United Nations. Additional funds will be requested in the later half of this year to increase the number of publications translated. |
| The Special Committee reiterates its encouragement to the Secretariat to continue to provide assistance for the conduct of regional training programmes through the Secretariat's participation, or by any other means feasible. (Para. 125) | In 2000, the Training and Evaluation Service (TES) conducted, inter alia, United Nations Training Assistance Team (UNTAT) courses, gender and DDR seminars, induction workshops and pre-deployment training in a significant number of countries in all regions. These activities will continue to be expanded during the next budget period. |
| The Special Committee encourages continued attention to gender-sensitivity training for peacekeeping personnel, at both Headquarters and field level. (Para. 126) | A new Gender Awareness training package for military personnel is being completed by TES. |
| The Special Committee believes that, with reference to the in-mission train-the-trainers initiative, the cohesiveness of a peacekeeping unit, once deployed, should be maintained at all times. It would therefore be preferable if all training of this sort took place prior to any deployment to the theatre. (Para. 127) | In-mission training activities are designed to complement pre-deployment training. The suggested core curriculum and detailed pre-deployment training and in-mission briefing programmes under the "Standardization and Evaluation" concept have been developed and distributed to the Member States, in preparation for further consultations with troop contributors. At the same time, training cells have been established in four missions — UNTAET, UNAMSIL, MONUC and UNMEE. |
| The Special Committee reiterates that the Secretariat should develop guidelines on the role of United Nations civilian police. (Para. 134) | The "Principles and guidelines for United Nations civilian police operations", defining the tasks and responsibilities of civilian police officers in peacekeeping, have been finalized and will be published shortly. Moreover, a revised Selection Assistance Team policy will be finalized by June 2001. The Secretariat engaged in extensive contact with Member States throughout the preparation of these texts, including seminars hosted by Sweden and Spain, and a workshop hosted by DPKO. |
| The Special Committee encourages the Secretariat to continue to expedite the processing of all claims from personnel or equipment contributors. (Para. 148) | The processing of claims from personnel and equipment contributors has been significantly accelerated under the new procedures, which became operational in 1996. Nevertheless, the actual reimbursement depends on the availability of funding from the payment of assessed contributions by Member States. All departments involved in the peacekeeping reimbursement process are cognizant of the importance of expeditiously processing claims from troop- and equipment-contributing countries. |

| Special Committee recommendations | Comments/updates |
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| | Subject to the availability of funds, the Secretariat processes reimbursements in the following order of priority: death and disability claims, troop reimbursement, contingent-owned equipment and self-sustainment and letters of assist. |
| The Committee notes that the issue of pre-deployment immunization and post-repatriation medical treatment costs for peacekeeping personnel has been taken up by the contingent-owned equipment Phase V Working Group, and supports the consideration of this issue in the appropriate bodies of the General Assembly, from the perspective of enhancing the ability of Member States to participate in peacekeeping operations. (Para. 151) | The post-Phase V Working Group on reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment reviewed the policy on pre-deployment immunization/post-repatriation medical treatment costs. The recommendations of the Working Group in their report A/C.5/55/39 indicate that, based on the data provided by Member States, the Working Group calculated an estimate of these costs. Some of the Member States agreed on the policy of the new rates, while other Member States had reservations. The need for reimbursement of these costs was questioned. The Secretariat is of the view that reimbursing vaccination and examination costs will have a substantial financial impact on the peacekeeping budgets. |
| With a view to improving the conditions for those peacekeepers who are injured while in the service of the United Nations as well as the families of those peacekeeping personnel who have died while in service, the Special Committee urges the Secretariat to accelerate the verification and claims payment process. The Committee requests the Secretary-General to provide an update on this issue in his next report. (Para. 154) | The Secretariat is cognizant of the importance of providing contingent personnel serving in peacekeeping operations prompt payment in compensation for service-incurred disability and compensation to their families in case of death. Substantial progress has been made in the past year in expediting processing and payment of such claims. In January 2001, pending death and disability claims numbered 90, and an additional 37 claims have been received for the period January to April 2001. Of the total 127 claims to date, 39 have been processed. The Secretariat also continues to provide guidelines to assist Member States in preparing death and disability claims to ensure the speedy and complete submission of all required information. |
| The Special Committee expresses its deep regret at the failure of the Secretariat to take the necessary action to disburse death compensation to the families of the victims of United Nations flights 806 and 806A which crashed in Angola in December 1998 and January 1999. (Para. 155) | All death and disability compensations to the families of those killed on United Nations flights 806 and 806A have been disbursed. |
| The Special Committee looks forward to the establishment of a group on the enhancement of African peacekeeping capacity, which was proposed by the Secretariat in August 1998. The Committee urges the Secretariat to continue its consultations with all interested Member States on the terms of reference of the group with a view to establishing it in a timely manner. (Para. 164) | The Secretariat initiated consultations for the establishment of such a working group; however, the matter is pending agreement between donor and recipient countries. |

## Annex C

### Status of implementation: summary of key recommendations of the implementation plan for the report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of 20 October 2000 (A/54/502)

| Implementation plan | Comments/updates |
|---|---|
| Submission of a report on conflict prevention in May 2001. (Para. 16) | The report is being finalized and expected to be ready in June 2001. |
| Preparation of a plan by ECPS to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies. (Para. 23) | The Secretariat is still in the process of preparing a system-wide peace-building plan and expects to submit a more conceptual paper to Member States by the end of 2001. |
| Preparation, by the end of July 2001, of a common set of interim rules on criminal law and procedure for transitional administrations. (Para. 34) | After an initial needs assessment of areas to be covered, the preparation of interim rules on criminal law and procedure will commence when the necessary resources are available for OHCHR to undertake its role as lead agency. |
| Establishment of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS). (Paras. 42-48) | An alternative to EISAS is being proposed in Chapter VI of this report, based on the creation of a small unit for system-wide policy and analysis, which would fulfil the following tasks: (i) serve as the secretariat of the ECPS; (ii) undertake medium- and long-term analyses of cross-cutting issues that are fundamental to peace operations and political offices/missions; and (iii) propose mid to long-term strategies for the successful conduct of operations and activities of ECPS members. The unit, headed by a director and composed of no more than twelve professionals, would be autonomous and report directly to the ECPS. |
| Institution of integrated mission task forces (IMTF), with members seconded from throughout the United Nations system, as necessary, for the planning and initial deployment phases of all new multidisciplinary operations. (Para. 57) | As discussed in Chapter III of this report, a smaller-scale version of the first IMTF has been established to plan for the United Nations follow-on presence in post-independence East Timor. Moreover, core members of a system-wide joint working group to monitor developments in Burundi are already designated as the nucleus of a future IMTF when planning for a United Nations operation begins. |
| Formation of a senior appointments group to oversee the improvement of the selection process for senior mission personnel and to prepare related training/briefing procedures. (Paras. 70-73)<br><br>Identification and assembly of the entire leadership of a mission at Headquarters prior to the deployment of the start- | Several concepts for the selection and assembly of mission leaderships have been discussed within the Secretariat, as described in Chapter III of this report. The senior appointments group will address this issue when it is scheduled to review potential candidates for such positions, submitted by Member States in response to a request for nominations by the Deputy Secretary-General in her letter of 3 May 2001. |

| Implementation plan | Comments/updates |
|---|---|
| up team to enable their participation in the mission planning process. (Para. 65) | |
| Deployment of traditional peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a Security Council resolution, and within 90 days in the case of complex peacekeeping operations. (Para. 68) | Significant work has been done to study the implications of the 30/90 days deployment time frames, conduct procedural reviews, devise global logistics, financial and staffing strategies, and propose enhancements to the UNSAS. Support requirements are elaborated in Chapter III of this report, along with options for meeting the material and personnel needs of traditional and complex missions. Upon confirmation by the General Assembly of the 30/90 time frames, a budget proposal will be submitted. |
| Improvement of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), including the creation of a revolving on-call list of about 100 military officers and the dispatch of DPKO teams to confirm the preparedness of each potential troop contributor. (Paras. 77-94) | Profiles for the required military personnel were communicated to Member States by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on 19 March 2001; the Military Adviser is continuing his consultations with Member States on this issue (see Chapter III of this report). DPKO now undertakes pre-deployment assessment visits to troop contributors on a routine basis, with teams including military planning and logistics officers. |
| Implementation of a range of projects, by mid-2002, to strengthen support of civilian police in the field, and creation of a revolving on-call list of about 100 police officers and related experts to participate in UNSAS. (Paras. 93-94) | The Civilian Police Division has finalized a draft set of profiles for civilian police personnel as well as a system for their phased deployment as part of the on-call list (see Chapter III). As part of the projects to strengthen support, CPD has already implemented an automated Selection Assistance Team (SAT) management and planning system, an automated Special Police Unit management system, and automated civilian police personnel management systems in selected missions. A revised SAT policy will be finalized by June 2001, and the "Principles and guidelines for United Nations civilian police operations" will be published shortly. |
| Formulation of a comprehensive staffing strategy for peace operations, reform of the Field Service category of personnel, and establishment of a central Internet/Intranet-based roster of pre-selected civilian candidates available to deploy on short notice, with proposals for implementation to be submitted to the General Assembly in early 2002. (Paras.104-107)<br><br>Submission of a plan of action for delegating recruitment authority to a few additional missions and field offices. (Para. 108) | As described in Chapter III of this report, a team of senior managers has prepared an outline of the main elements of a global staffing strategy, covering measures to improve advance planning, streamline recruitment, expand sources of recruitment, facilitate rapid deployment, and improve conditions of service and career development. Progress has also been made in the creation of an electronic roster, called the "Galaxy Project", which is being developed by DM and DPKO to automate staff recruitment and selection procedures. The roster is expected to be operational by January 2002. Based on the review of the delegation of recruitment authority to UNMIK and UNTAET, further delegation of recruitment authority to field missions should be accompanied by the preparation of recruitment procedures and policies, deployment of |

| Implementation plan | Comments/updates |
|---|---|
| | qualified recruitment specialists to missions and the institution of monitoring mechanisms at Headquarters. |
| Preparation of a global logistics support strategy for rapid and effective mission deployment, covering a number of interrelated issues, including the maintenance of five start-up kits, advance funding, procurement policies and procedures, increased delegation of procurement authority, and financial management in missions. (Para. 113) | Significant progress has been made in the formulation of a global logistics strategy and different options have been developed for enhancing material reserves. Funding issues are being addressed in this context (see Chapter III). DPKO and DM have reviewed several aspects of peacekeeping procurement with a view to streamlining the process through further delegation, fast-track procurement and other mechanisms (see Chapter IV). Work is also progressing on the policies and procedures governing financial management in the field, including the revision of the Finance Manual and liquidation guidelines, and further delegation of authority with regard to imprest accounts. |
| Temporary transfer of support functions for smaller, non-military missions to the United Nations Office for Project Services. (Para. 118) | Discussions are continuing between DPA, DPKO and UNOPS on ways to implement this recommendation without causing disruptions in operational support. |
| Restructuring of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including creation of a third post of Assistant-Secretary-General, strengthening of the military and civilian police functions, increased support for public information activities related to peacekeeping, enhancing the lessons learned unit, and creation of a gender unit in DPKO. (Paras. 123-142) | After further review, the Secretary-General proposes several structural changes within DPKO in the present report, including the creation of the Office of Military and Civilian Police Affairs and Mine Action, to be headed by the third ASG; the division of FALD into two separate divisions reporting directly to the ASG for Mission Support; the creation of a post of Director for Strategic Planning and Management in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General; and the establishment of an Administrative Planning and Training Management Unit in the Office of Mission Support. Smaller changes are being proposed within Divisions, such as the creation of new units for civilian workforce planning and contracts management, respectively. |

# Annex D

## Members of the External Review Board

**Major General Hasan Abaza (Jordan)**
Former Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)

**H.E. Dr. Nabil A. Elaraby (Egypt)**
Former Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt to the United Nations

**General Cheick Oumar Diarra (Mali)**
Former Police Commissioner of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)

**Major General Tariq Ghazi (Pakistan)**
Former Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)

**Lieutenant General (ret.) Satish Nambiar (India)**
Former Force Commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)

**Major General Seth Obeng (Ghana)**
Former Force Commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

**Mr. Karl Paschke (Germany)**
Former Under-Secretary-General for Internal Oversight Services, United Nations

**H.E. Ms. Elisabeth [redacted] (Finland)**
Former Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)

**Major General Cameron Ross (Canada)**
Former Force Commander of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

**Mr. Behrooz Sadry (Islamic Republic of Iran)**
Present Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

**H.E. Ms. Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland)**
Former Deputy Head of Mission of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)

**Major General Evergisto de Vergara (Argentina)**
Former Force Commander of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)

## Annex E

### Current structure of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations




* Support to field operations is integrated and coordinated through the ASG for Operations, as senior ASG.

## Annex F

### Sample of policy and capacity development-related activities requiring additional resources

MILITARY DIVISION

*Office of the Military Adviser*

- Conducting strategic liaison with regional and subregional organizations and arrangements in the development of their peacekeeping capacities, and means of cooperation with the United Nations
- Writing and publishing planning directives and standard operating procedures (SOPs) etc.
- Providing adequate information to Member States to assist them in gaining national-level support from troop contributions

*Military Planning Service and Force Generation Service*

- Managing an enhanced and more effective United Nations standby arrangements system
- Increasing contact with and visits to potential troop-contributing nations to assess their capacity to provide personnel and/or equipment

*Training and Evaluation Service*

- Conducting roaming training teams requested by contributing nations
- Conducting timely pre-deployment assessment of contingent capabilities
- Information sharing by TES web page (*www. un.org/depts/dpko/training)*, email, news bulletin, posters, publications and contact with training partners and troop contributors
- Conducting and/or supporting CPXs, exercises and specialized courses
- Supporting and coordinating with Member States and regional peacekeeping training centres, UNITAR POCI and other peacekeeping institutions
- Cooperating and liaising closely with Best Practices and Lessons Learned
- Facilitate the establishment of additional training cells; provide training guidance and advice to training cells; provide inputs for the establishment of mission training budgets and assist in-mission sustainment training
- Conduct research and development to revise existing training material as well as produce training packages for newly identified needs

- Develop policies and guidelines for standardized peacekeeping training and assessment criteria

## CIVILIAN POLICE DIVISION

- Assisting in the preparation of comprehensive plans to implement mandates involving the restructuring/establishment of police services
- Supervising and coordinating the development of the curricula for local police services, academies, and in-service training
- Providing advice on the development of local police career development systems and assisting in the establishment of policing systems
- Developing the guidelines and parameters by which Member States could maintain their own roster systems for rapid deployment of civilian police officers, through the United Nations standby arrangement system
- Standardizing United Nations civilian police induction programmes in the mission areas
- Developing assessment and evaluation policies, in consultation with Member States, for senior United Nations civilian police officers
- Developing systems and procedures to facilitate the law enforcement-judicial nexus in peacekeeping operations
- Developing systems and procedures for the deployment and assessment of formed police units

## FIELD ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS DIVISION

*Logistics and Communications Service: Office of the Chief of Service and the Logistics Operations Section*

- Developing systems to ensure integrated planning of all support aspects of peacekeeping
- Developing integrated support services (ISS) concept
- Revising logistics support manual (LSM)
- Redesigning and completing operations support manual (OSM)
- Preparing a mission planning process (MPP) handbook
- Preparing systems and procedures for the material request order (MRO) process
- Preparing standard operation manuals (SOPs)

- Identifying and designing enhancements for United Nations Logistics Base (UNLB) Brindisi

*Logistics and Communications Service: Communications and Electronic Services and Support Section*

- Conducting research on, identifying, and benchmarking new technologies
- Developing a central master plan for ICT training
- Coordinating the set-up and establishment of an effective and adequate information security model
- Assessing IT needs of mission components and information integration
- Developing a communications and electronic services support capability for putting in place a uniform ICT policy within DPKO
- Establishing a logistics and communications decision support system
- Establish a knowledge management system for LCS-FALD-DPKO
- Aligning information management processes on peace and security within DPKO and developing an IM capability
- Developing decentralized 24/7 help desk for field mission systems
- Reviewing and reorganizing replication topologies and configurations
- Developing and managing disaster recovery scenarios, firewalls
- Coordinating the development of an Extranet and Intranet for peacekeeping
- Coordinating the development of peacekeeping operations web site co-management model, together with the Department of Public Information and the Information Technology Services Division in the Department of Management
- Implementing a military signals capability
- Developing and deploying rapid response mechanisms for public information
- Enhancing rapid deployment capacities and follow-up of non-peacekeeping related requirements currently supported by DPKO, including for OCHA and DPA-led presences
- Developing and deploying security for voice, data and image
- Developing ICT infrastructure for deep field entities

*Logistics and Communications Service: Transport Section*

- Defining generic specifications, identifying optimum methods of supply, and accordingly preparing and reviewing technical and contractual specifications

- Providing advice on air safety to new mission planners
- Preparing and revising aviation safety manuals, standards and accident prevention programmes
- Providing advice on aviation safety to field missions, other United Nations agencies and programmes
- Verifying mission performance on aviation safety
- Implementing aviation standardization programmes
- Establishing movement control system in three missions (30/90-day commitment a 8w equiv.)
- Conducting movcon specialist training
- Establishing three regional aviation safety offices
- Updating United Nations air operations manual
- Devising procedures for control of out-of-mission-area flights
- Conducting aviation specialist training
- Reviewing and assessing national aviation regulations
- Establishing air transport controls for establishing new missions
- Conducting COE pre-deployment surveys
- Establishing motor transport controls for the establishment of new missions
- Developing follow-on systems contracts (MPV, trk, trlr, plant, workshop)
- Implementing transport specialist training programme
- Developing and implementing occupational health and safety programmes

*Logistics and Communications Service: Engineering Section*

- Deploying GIS systems in United Nations field missions
- Deploying water purification systems in United Nations missions
- Developing master plans, standardized drawings, and field implementation packages to start new missions
- Developing engineers on-line web site
- Developing environmental programmes in United Nations missions

*Financial Management and Support Services*

- Updating existing manuals to include lessons learned and new procedures
- Reviewing budget handbook
- Updating field finance training modules
- Elaborating standard operating procedures (SOPs)

- Conducting field finance and IT mission assessment visits
- Reviewing coordination with DM
- Reviewing delegation of authority
- Reviewing intra-mission decentralization
- Coordinating a DPKO planning/reviewing mechanism for identifying financial resources
- Developing Intranet FMSS page with Headquarters finance-related data for use by field missions
- Designing one comprehensive database for MOU, COE, LOA and D&D monitoring
- Developing claims tracking system
- Designing new system for third-party claims
- Developing link with HPSB database
- Identifying improved mission wide IT financial monitoring techniques

*Personnel Management and Support Service*

- Advance planning
- Completing mission modules and templates
- Updating generic job descriptions
- Creating the succession planning system
- Developing and managing the succession plan
- Streamline recruiting
- Identifying and inputting Galaxy requirements
- Creating the roster and sub-rosters. Inputting and updating the data
- Managing the mobility and release of staff
- Setting groundwork for delegation of recruitment to missions
- Expand sources of recruitment
- Developing the strategic communications framework
- Institutionalizing agreements with other United Nations agencies, Member States
- Rapid deployment
- Assisting to develop policy, guidelines and support strategy
- Creating and updating start-up and stand-by teams
- Preparing teams including updating lists and training

- Managing the rapid deployment of civilians to missions

- Retain staff and manage careers

- Developing and implementing career management policy for field staff, including systematic linkage of career development, active performance management, promotion system, managed rotation and mobility
- Identifying and adjusting career development needs
- Restructuring Field Service category
- Reviewing and revising contractual arrangements of field staff
- Revising conditions of mission service
- Revising performance assessment tools
- Creating promotion policy and procedures for field staff
- Developing DPKO training policy and implementing annual programme
- Evaluating training and career development

## MINE ACTION SERVICE

- Developing guidelines and tools for UNMAS headquarters management, management of field programs, and management for the Voluntary Trust Fund
- Conducting lessons learnt, evaluation and review missions
- Developing and overseeing UNMAS role as central repository for mine action information through management of information management tools, web sites and databases
- Developing and implementing a public relations strategy
- Overseeing the ongoing development of international mine action standards
- Overseeing the development of the mine action emergency response and contingency planning capacity
- Developing new systems for reporting more effectively to donors on financial and substantive issues

## OFFICE OF OPERATIONS

- Developing overall political strategy for peacekeeping operations and road-map for its implementation, in coordination with others concerned
- Providing support to the International Criminal Tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, national commissions on events which occurred in closed missions

and other research/document support (e.g., report on the fall of Srebrenica; report on the genocide in Rwanda)

- Establishing, in conjunction with the "lessons learned" entity, a virtual resource centre where all information and guidance on substantive issues can be accessed on a closed internet site by colleagues in the field
- Developing manuals, standard operating procedures, and other guidance documents for the work of desk officers in the Office of Operations (currently non-existent), as well as for the political affairs and related components of peacekeeping operations
- Conducting training for political affairs officers in the field, as well as training on political matters for staff in all other areas of the Department
- Participating in training arranged by the Training and Evaluation Service, for the benefit of Member States, on the political and related dimensions of peacekeeping operations

# Annex G

## Letter dated 19 March 2001 from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations to the Permanent Representatives of all Member States on enhancing the standby arrangements system

I have the honour to refer to the current efforts to strengthen the United Nations rapid deployment capacities, in particular the proposed enhancements to the United Nations Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), and to request the assistance of your Government in this regard. Detailed information on UNSAS, in particular the military component of the system, is contained in the UNSAS Military Handbook.

As you are aware, Member States have recently reaffirmed their belief that UNSAS can and should be significantly enhanced. In its consideration of the recommendations of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (A/55/305-S/2000/809 dated 21 August 2000), and the Secretary-General's report on the implementation of those recommendations (A/55/502 dated 20 October 2000), the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations urged the Secretariat to "work towards the goal of being able to deploy peacekeeping operations within 30 days after the adoption of a United Nations mandate and to deploy complex peacekeeping within 90 days after the adoption of a mandate" (A/C.4/55/6 dated 4 December 2000, para. 15). In its report of 4 December 2000, the Special Committee stressed that these time frames required "political will and more effective operational capabilities, including an efficient United Nations Standby Arrangements System, as well as their successful implementation" (A/C.4/55/6, para. 15).

In this connection, I would like to seek the assistance of your Government in supporting three main areas of UNSAS in need of strengthening: creation of on-call lists; update of current UNSAS assets; and contribution of enabling forces.

In its 4 December 2000 report, the Special Committee noted the Secretary-General's intention to communicate to Member States his requirements for on-call lists of military and civilian police officers, after fully consulting all Member States on how best to develop a workable system for such lists. In this context the Military Adviser in DPKO, Major-General Tim Ford, has held a working level consultative meeting with Military Advisers and other staff from Permanent Missions. He will continue holding such meetings to provide a forum to exchange information and ideas. I would like to invite Member States to send initial nominations to the Military Division of DPKO by 30 June 2001. The general and specific requirements and the procedure for nomination of on-call military officers are contained in the UNSAS Military Handbook.

In regard to updating information on current UNSAS assets, the Secretary-General invited participants in the System to inform DPKO, by 1 December 2000, if the assets that they have listed in the System "are in fact available for deployment, today" (A/55/502, para. 79). The Secretary-General also invited participants to automatically indicate, at the end of each month, "any changes to the status of availability of the assets that have potentially been made available" (A/55/502,

para. 80). To date we have received very few responses to the aforementioned invitations, and would be grateful to receive the information requested from those UNSAS participants who have not yet responded. To assist in this, and future responses, I have also enclosed, **for UNSAS participants**, the latest status report regarding your contribution. The procedure to be used for the monthly reports is detailed in the UNSAS Military Handbook.

As also requested by the Secretary-General in his 20 October 2000 report, we would be grateful if you could indicate whether your Government could contribute to UNSAS such critical "enabling forces" as specialized units for movement control, communications and terminal or air-traffic control capability, and whether you would be able to provide strategic lift assistance to troop contributors (A/55/502, para. 84).

In addition to the three areas I have mentioned above, and as requested by the Secretary-General, I would be grateful to receive your Government's views about the proposal for the formation of "coherent brigade-sized forces", so that I may report back to the Secretary-General with a plan of action for taking the exercise a step forward, in such a way that addresses the concerns of Member States (A/55/502, paras. 85-90).

While this letter refers specifically to military personnel, I have asked the Office for Logistics, Management and Mine Action to review aspects of Standby Arrangements related to civilian personnel, including for mine action. I expect to be writing to you again on this matter in the near future, as well as on the standby arrangements for civilian police. In this connection the Civilian Police Adviser is establishing a system of consultation with Member States with the aim of developing on-call lists of civilian police officers, similar to that being established for military officers.

I recognize that discussion on the issues and proposals referred to above are currently taking place at various levels within each Member State. At the same time, much of the detailed work that DPKO will need to do, in order to achieve the rapid deployment objectives set by Member States, shall depend on the timely and active support of all concerned. I therefore kindly invite a response from your Government, on all of the aforementioned requests, as well as any comments on enhancing the System, as soon as possible. Responses should be forwarded to the Office of the Military Adviser (room S-3650C).

I thank you, in advance, for your continued assistance and cooperation in this important endeavour.

(*Signed*) Jean-Marie **Guéhenno**
Under-Secretary-General
for Peacekeeping Operations

# Annex H

## Proposed new structure of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations




* Support to field operations is integrated and coordinated through the ASG for Operations, as senior ASG.

# Annex I

## Status of the recruitment process

In its resolution 55/238, the General Assembly approved 93 additional posts for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. The vacancy announcements for the civilian positions were circulated between December 2000 and January 2001, with deadlines for the submission of applications from February to March 2001. Those for military and civilian police positions were transmitted to all Member States on 15 January 2001, with a deadline of 15 April 2001. In order to assist with the application process, the Military Adviser conducted a briefing for all Member States on 12 January 2001 to explain the application and selection process.

The response to the vacancy announcements was tremendous. A total of 6,258 applications were received for the circulated posts; 4,331 applications were received for the civilian positions, 1,031 applications were received for the military positions and 896 applications were received for civilian police positions.

The emergency nature of the Department's requirements for additional staff, coupled with the tremendous volume of applications received, necessitated that it undertake the development of new electronic procedures for the handling of these cases, in close collaboration with the Office of Human Resources Management. Once fully developed, these procedures are expected to have future application for staffing the peacekeeping missions and the Organization as a whole. In addition, I have approved a mechanism whereby candidates who are determined to meet the requirements of the circulated posts would be placed on a roster that will remain valid for one year, from which they may be selected in the event that additional posts of a similar nature become available. This mechanism would be used to expedite the recruitment or placement of staff in the event that a selected candidate is unable to take up the function concerned, or in the event that additional posts are approved for the Department later in 2001. The large number of applications has also provided the Department of Peacekeeping Operations with the opportunity to identify candidates who are suitably qualified for potential service in the peacekeeping missions.

Throughout the evaluation procedure, the Department has been mindful of the need to improve overall geographical and gender representation, particularly for troop-contributing countries, in accordance with the recommendations of the Special Committee (see A/C.4/55/6, paras. 36 and 37).

It is currently expected that offers of appointment for civilian staff will be transmitted by August 2001 and those for military and civilian police staff by September 2001. Efforts will continue to move those time-frames forward to the extent possible.

In the interim, many of the positions have been filled on a temporary basis, given the emergency nature of the requirement.

# Annex J

## Division of labour between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Management in support of peacekeeping operations

| Functions | Responsibilities | Responsible Office | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | DPKO | DM & [others] |
| **I. Human Resources Management for Mission Personnel** | | | |
| **Staffing requirements** | • Determine the staffing requirements and propose organizational structure for peacekeeping operations | FALD/PMSS<br>Field missions | |
| | • Propose staffing tables for field missions | FALD/PMSS<br>Field missions | |
| | • Review and approve the staffing tables as part of budget | FALD/FMSS<br>Field missions | OPPBA |
| | • Determine the costs for submission in budget proposals | FALD/FMSS | OPPBA |
| | • Develop generic job descriptions for posts | | OHRM |
| | • Develop standard job descriptions | FALD/PMSS | |
| | • Review of generic job descriptions | FALD/PMSS<br>Field missions | OHRM |
| **Recruitment, appointment, assignment and termination of personnel** | • Selection | FALD/PMSS | |
| | • Recruitment | FALD/PMSS[i] | |
| | • Release of staff from other agencies | FALD/PMSS | |
| | • Determination of the level/step | FALD/PMSS | |
| | • Appointment of personnel for mission assignment | FALD/PMSS | |
| | • Extension of appointments | FALD/PMSS[ii] | |
| | • Extension of appointments beyond retirement more than one year | | OHRM |
| | • Termination of appointment | | OHRM |
| **Personnel Administration (entitlements and benefits)** | • Administration of mission entitlements for all personnel serving in peacekeeping operations for the duration of their assignments to a field mission | FALD/PMSS[iii] | |
| | • Administration of the totality of entitlements for FS category | FALD/PMSS | |
| | • Reviewing requests for exceptions to Staff Regulations and Rules | | OHRM |
| | • Administration of leave entitlements | FALD/PMSS | OHRM |
| | • Promotion of local staff in established missions | FALD/PMSS | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | • Authority to establish, review and revise the emoluments, allowances and other entitlements applicable to personnel; including technical survey missions and field review to assess conditions of services | | | OHRM |
| | | • Compensation for death, injury or illness | Submission | FALD/PMSS<br>Field missions | |
| | | | Decision | | OPPBA/Controller |
| | | | Processing of payment | FALD/FMSS/PMSS | OPPBA |
| **Post/people management and career support** | | • Creation of posts | In IMIS | | OPPBA |
| | | | In PKDB and FPMS | FALD/PMSS | |
| | | | For local staff | Field missions | |
| | | • Performance management | Reporting on performance appraisal in the field | FALD/PMSS<br>Field missions | |
| | | | Analysis of performance appraisal | FALD/PMSS | OHRM |
| | | • Career Development | Coordination of training | FALD/PMSS | OHRM |
| **Medical Administration (medical clearance, services, evacuation, casualties, security and safety of field personnel)** | | • Services of medical examination and medical clearance for personnel selected for mission assignment | | | OHRM |
| | | • Advise on the need for immunizations for personnel leaving from HQ | | | OHRM |
| | | • Provision of medical service in the field | | Field missions | |
| | | • Discharge the responsibility for decision on the medial evacuation or repatriation of personnel assigned | | Field missions[v] | OHRM |
| | | • Injury/casualties | | FALD/PMSS<br>Field missions | |
| | | • Security & safety measures | Decision | | [UNSECOORD] |
| | | | Implementation | FALD/PMSS<br>Field missions | |
| | | • Verify medical expenses in all cases where the Organization incurs expenditure | | Field missions | OHRM |
| **Administration of Justice (appeals and disciplinary matters)[v]** | Request for reviews | • Receipt and review of the request | | | OHRM |
| | | • Comments to the request | | FALD/PMSS<br>Field missions | |
| | | • Propose and advise on settlement | | FALD/PMSS | OHRM |
| | | • Decision on action and notification | | | OHRM |
| | Appeals to Joint Appeals Board (JAB) | • Receipt of appeal | | | OHRM |
| | | • Provision of comments | | FALD/PMSS | |
| | | • Submission of Respondent's comments to JAB | | | OHRM |
| | | • Representation of Respondent before the JAB | | | OHRM |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | • Decision on JAB report and notification of SG's decision to Appellant and JAB | | DM/OUSG |
| | | • Processing of decisions | FALD/PMSS<br>Field missions | OPPBA/Controller |
| | Applications to the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (UNAT) | • Receipt of Application | | [OLA] |
| | | • Provision of comments | FALD/PMSS | OHRM |
| | | • Submission of Respondent's Reply to UNAT Judgement | | [OLA] |
| | | • Representation of Respondent before UNAT | | [OLA] |
| | | • Notification of administrative action to be taken in response to UNAT Judgement | | DM/OUSG |
| | Joint Disciplinary Committee (JDC) and related matters | • Report of incident of misconduct | FALD/PMSS<br>Field missions | OHRM |
| | | • Investigation of incident | Field missions | [OIOS] |
| | | • Review and analysis of findings of investigations | FALD/PMSS | OHRM |
| | | • Decision on whether and how to proceed | | OHRM/DM/OUSG |
| | | • Decision and notification to convene ad hoc JDC or Standing JDC (NY) | | OHRM |
| | | • Convening of ad hoc JDC | Field missions | |
| | | • Prepare the necessary submission to the Joint Disciplinary Committee | | OHRM |
| | | • Review of JDC findings | | OHRM |
| | | • Decisions and notification of decision | | DM/OUSG |
| | | • Processing of decision | FALD/PMSS<br>Field missions | OHRM |
| **Monitoring of delegation** | Implementation of delegation to DPKO | • Monitoring compliance with United Nations Staff Regulations and Rules and delegated HR policies | | OHRM |
| | | • Checks of procedures and HR management reviews | | OHRM |
| | | • Provide documentation and records requisite for monitoring | FALD/PMSS | |
| | | • Ensure that the official status files of staff on mission assignment are kept up to date by forwarding copies of all relevant documentation of the Personnel Data Unit, OHRM | FALD/PMSS | |
| | Implementation of delegation to field missions | • Monitoring of implementation of delegation | FALD/PMSS | |
| | | • Provide documentation and records requisite for monitoring | Field missions | |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Staff-Management Consultation** | Consultation with SMCC | • Representation of SG/OHRM | | OHRM |
| | | • Representation of DPKO/Management | FALD/PMSS | |
| | Consultation on field personnel matters | • Consultation with FSSU and NY Staff Committee with respect to local staff, mission with local staff representatives | FALD/PMSS | |
| | | • Consultation with staff in the Secretariat and the United Nations systems | | OHRM |
| **Travel and claims administration** | | • Certification of travel authorization | FALD/PMSS | |
| | | • Establishment of ticket costs | | OCSS/TTS |
| | | • Higher standard accommodation | | OCSS/TTS |
| | | • Establishment of ad hoc DSA and increase of amount of personnel effects shipment | | OHRM |
| | | • Reimbursement of travel costs to governments | FALD/PMSS | |
| | | • Issuing tickets | | [Travel agent] |
| | | • Monitoring of travel arrangements in missions | FALD/PMSS | |
| **II. Procurement related functions** | | | | |
| **Planning and Requisitioning** | | • Acquisition plan | FALD/LCS<br>Field missions | |
| | | • Identification of requirements | FALD/LCS<br>Field missions | |
| | | • Preparation of requisition | FALD/LCS<br>Field missions | |
| | | • Certification of requisitions | FALD/FMSS | |
| | | • Prepare specifications | FALD/LCS<br>Field missions | |
| **Bidding and selection of vendors/contractors** | | • Invitation to bid (ITB) or request for proposal (RFP) | Mission Procurement | OCSS/PD[vi] |
| | | • Bid opening | Mission Procurement | OCSS/PD[iv] |
| | | • Technical evaluation of bids | FALD/LCS[vii]<br>Field missions | |
| | | • Commercial evaluation of bids | Mission Procurement | OCSS/PD[iv] |
| | | • Presentation to the LCC | Mission Procurement | |
| | | • Presentation to the HCC | | OCSS/PD[iv] |
| | | • Review and recommendations to DOA or CAO or to ASG/OCSS | LCC | [HCC] |
| | | • Approvals of offers | COA | ASG/OCSS |
| | | • Awarding, Contracting | Mission Procurement | OCSS/PD[viii] |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Contract Management** | • Receipt & Inspection (R & I) | FALD/LCS<br>Field missions | |
| | • Monitoring of provision of Services | FALD/LCS<br>Field missions | |
| | • Evaluation of contractor's performance | FALD/LCS<br>Field missions | |
| | • Certification of payments | FALD/LCS<br>Field missions | |
| | • Handling disputes | | OCSS/PD<br>[OLA] |
| **III. Budgetary functions** | | | |
| **Financial implications for the Security Council** | • Prepare costing | FALD/FMSS | |
| | • Review draft report/cost plan | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Issue addendum/aspects | | OPPBA/PFD |
| **Meeting immediate financial requirements** | • Prepare cost estimates | FALD/FMSS | |
| | • Review cost estimates | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Approve under FR 110.6 | | OPPBA/Controller |
| **Funding from ACABQ under RES/49/233** | • Prepare cost plan | FALD/FMSS | |
| | • Review/revise cost plan | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Submit to ACABQ | | OPPBA/PFD |
| **Budget formulation** | • Issue budget instructions | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Update standard cost manual | FALD/FMSS | |
| | • Review updated manual | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Transmit updated manual to ACABQ | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Formulate budget proposal | FALD/FMSS/Missions | |
| | • Review budget proposal | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Establish budget level | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Draft financing report of SG | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Prepare ACABQ Handout | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Introduce budget in ACABQ | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Defend budget in ACABQ | FALD/FMSS/Missions | OPPBA |
| | • Provide supplementary information | FALD/FMSS/Missions | OPPBA |
| | • Submit supplementary information | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Introduce budget in Fifth Committee | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Defend budget in Fifth Committee | FALD/FMSS | OPPBA |
| | • Issue consolidated budget summary | | OPPBA/PFD |
| **Legislative bodies/approval** | • Prepare annotated agenda | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Prepare document submission list | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Liaise with 5th Committee Secretariat | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Prepare talking points for meetings | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Prepare draft financing resolution | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Brief coordinators | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Draft 5th Committee report | | OPPBA/PFD |
| **Implementation of the** | • Authorize expenditures and posts | | OPPBA/PFD |

| IV. Financial Management Functions | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Financial administration & control** | Certification & preparation of financial statements | • Designate certifying officers | FALD/FMSS | |
| | | • Approve certifying officers | | OPPBA/Controller |
| | | • Certify claims for payment | FALD/FMSS | |
| | | • Effect payments | | OPPBA/Accounts |
| | | • Maintain accounts | | OPPBA/Accounts |
| | | • Issue and certify financial statements | | OPPBA/Accounts |
| | | • Reply to audit queries | FALD/FMSS | OPPBA |
| | Ancillary functions | • Payment of assessments | | USG/DM |
| | | • Inter-mission loans | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Cash forecast | | DM (Treasury) |
| | | • Use of Peacekeeping Reserve Fund | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Request opening/closing of bank accounts | FALD/FMSS | |
| | | • Request delegations of authority | FALD/FMSS | |
| | | • Approve delegations of authority | | OPPBA/Controller |
| | | • Timing of payments for troops/COE | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Monitoring claims in accounts payable | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Clearing claims in accounts payable | | OPPBA/PFD |
| **Preparation of financial performance reports** | | • Issue instructions | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Review draft financial statements | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Prepare annex and explanations | FALD/FMSS/Missions | |
| | | • Review draft submission | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Verify against financial statements | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Prepare report of SG | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Prepare ACABQ handout | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Introduce in ACABQ | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Defend in ACABQ | FALD/FMSS | OPPBA |
| | | • Introduce in 5th Committee | | OPPBA |
| | | • Defend in 5th Committee | FALD/FMSS | OPPBA |
| **Payments to Governments for troops** | | • Send out questionnaire to Governments | | |
| | | • Analyse data in replies | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Report to GA on rates of reimbursement | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Calculate monthly troop reimbursement | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Prepare payment letters | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | | • Track payments & amounts owed | | OPPBA/PFD |
| **Payments to Governments for COE** | | • Prepare for COE working group meetings | FALD/FMSS | |
| | | • Participate in COE working group meetings | FALD/FMSS | |
| | | • Update COE manual | FALD/FMSS | |
| | | • Calculate/certify COE reimbursement | FALD/FMSS | |
| | | • Maintain database for consolidated amounts owed for troop payments and COE | | OPPBA |

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Other Government claims** | • Process/certify LOA claims | FALD/FMSS | |
| | • Review of certified LOA claims | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Process/certify D & D claims | FALD/FMSS | |
| | • Review of certified D & D claims | | OPPBA |
| **Trust funds/voluntary contributions** | • Prepare terms of reference | FALD/FMSS | |
| | • Review/revise terms of reference | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Prepare birth certificate for trust funds | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Approval of trust funds | | OPPBA/Controller |
| | • Authorize expenditures | FALD/FMSS | |
| | • Monitor contributions and fund balance | | OPPBA/PFD |
| **Support account requirements** | • Issue budget instructions | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Formulate budget proposal | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Review budget proposal from Departments | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Establish budget level | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Draft financing report of SG | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Prepare ACABQ handout | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Introduce budget in ACABQ | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Defend budget in ACABQ | Executive Office | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Include in consolidated budget summary | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Provide supplementary information | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Submit supplementary information | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Introduce budget in 5th Committee | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Defend budget in 5th Committee | Executive Office | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Include in consolidated budget summary | | OPPBA/PFD |
| **Other assignments** | • Maintain standard templates | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Maintain standard templates for official correspondence | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Maintain databases for troop payments, Perm. Reps., history of approved financial resources for missions | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Maintain inventory for furniture & equipment (re. disposal of assets) | | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • Training for staff | FALD/FMSS | OPPBA/PFD |
| | • LAN administration | | OPPBA/PFD |
| **Miscellaneous** | • Prepare 3rd party liability cases sent to HQ | FALD/FMSS | |
| | • Certify 3rd party claims | FALD/FMSS | |

[i] Field recruitment authority has been delegated to UNMIT and UNTAET on a pilot basis.
[ii] This authority is limited to mission assignment.
[iii] Except for the approval of SPA at the D-2 level, which is the authority of the SG.
[iv] This applies to "life-threatening" cases.
[v] Reports on the Panel on Discrimination and other Grievances (PDDG) on complaints by staff alleging discriminatory

## Annex K

### Flow chart depicting the matériel/services acquisition, planning and delivery processes



# Annex L

## Division of responsibilities between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs*

| *Department of Political Affairs* | *Department of Peacekeeping Operations* | *Comments* |
|---|---|---|
| Assists the Secretary-General in the discharge of his responsibilities under the Charter relating to the maintenance and restoration of peace and security, including preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-building. | Serves as the operational arm of the Secretary-General for all United Nations field operations, in particular the management and direction of peacekeeping operations. | The term "all field operations" is accurate only insofar as administrative and logistical support is concerned. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations' substantive responsibility is limited to peacekeeping operations. |
| Advises on and supports electoral assistance matters and coordinates appropriate response to Member States' requests of such assistance. | | As the focal point for electoral assistance, the Department of Political Affairs makes a substantive contribution to the electoral components of peacekeeping operations. |
| Monitor, analyse and assess political developments throughout the world, identify potential or actual conflicts in whose resolution the United Nations could play a useful role, provide early warning to the Secretary-General and recommend and execute political action. | Responsible for the day-to-day executive direction of peacekeeping operations, with emphasis on political and operational aspects. Coordinates and integrates inputs from other departments, agencies and programmes. (In the case of a multidisciplinary peacekeeping operation, it chairs the task force comprising the entities contributing to it.) | Officers from the Department of Political Affairs cover several countries or a region, maintaining up-to-date information as well as keeping track of a broad range of political, social and other variables that have a bearing on the genesis or resolution of conflicts. This is a permanent task that is performed prior to, during and after a peacekeeping operation. By contrast, officers from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations/Office of Operations function as project officers for a peacekeeping operation and their involvement ends with the operation's termination. |
| Direct and manage special political missions including those authorized by the General Assembly. | | |

| *Department of Political Affairs* | *Department of Peacekeeping Operations* | *Comments* |
|---|---|---|
| Support the Secretary-General in the political aspects of his relations with Member States and regional organizations. | | This is a broad task, which entails significant coordinating functions. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations provides inputs relating to its responsibilities, e.g., a peacekeeping operation or relations with a troop contributor. |
| Plan and participate in fact-finding, peacemaking and other missions to areas of actual or potential conflict where the Secretary-General's preventive and peacemaking efforts may be needed or are already engaged. | Leads the planning process for a peacekeeping operation by providing the overall framework, developing options for courses of action, leading reconnaissance missions to the field and coordinating and integrating inputs from within the department and from other entities into a comprehensive plan for approval by the Security Council. | |
| Provide political guidance and support to special representatives and other senior officials appointed by the Secretary-General to assist his preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-building efforts. | Provides guidance and support to the chiefs of peacekeeping operations (Special Representative, Force Commander or Chief Military Observer). | |
| Maintain and expand links with other United Nations offices and departments and other relevant institutes and experts. | Coordinates and integrates inputs from other departments, agencies and programmes that are active in the mission area of a peacekeeping operation. | Each department works with other entities in carrying out its respective mandate (see paragraph directly above). |
| Liaise, consult and negotiate with Member States at Headquarters or in their capitals. | Supports the operation vis-à-vis the parties to the conflict and other interested parties, the members of the Security Council and the contributors. | Each department deals with Member States on the matters for which it is responsible. |
| Maintain and develop cooperation with the secretariats of regional organizations and arrangements through joint meetings, consultations, liaison and attendance at meetings held by | Maintains contact with regional organizations on peacekeeping matters, particularly when they are active in a theatre where the United Nations has a peacekeeping operation. | |

| *Department of Political Affairs* | *Department of Peacekeeping Operations* | *Comments* |
|---|---|---|
| Maintain contact with non-governmental organizations and academic institutions worldwide and participate in seminars and academic meetings relating to the mandate of the Department. | Responds to requests by such organizations for information relating to peacekeeping. | |
| Prepare reports related to preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-building to the General Assembly and the Security Council, and contribute to reports on some peacekeeping operations. | Prepare reports on peacekeeping operations to the Security Council. | Each department reports on matters in its respective sphere of responsibility. |

# Annex M

## Proposed division of responsibilities between the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Public Information

DPKO retains managerial responsibility and operational oversight for all aspects of peacekeeping operations, from planning through execution, and is therefore accountable for the delivery of public information activities in the field. Mission personnel, fielded and supported by DPKO, have direct responsibility for addressing the needs of populations and media (both local and international, including media of contributing countries) in the mission areas. DPI has responsibility for the Organization's overall public information and communications programme.

Such a complementary approach requires a dedicated capacity for planning, management and oversight within DPKO, reliance on resident public information and communications expertise in DPI, and close collaboration between the two Departments with regard to planning and content, as follows:

| *Public information tasks in support of peacekeeping operations* | *Responsible office* | *Inputs advice* |
|---|---|---|
| Organize and oversee pre-deployment field surveys of public information, media and public outreach requirements | DPKO/DPI | |
| Advise on public information related requirements to be included in the status of mission/forces agreement | DPKO/DPI | |
| Develop deployment timetables, equipment requirements, draft budgets and staffing tables | DPKO/DPI | |
| Identify and recommend the appointment of qualified and experienced public information personnel for mission service, including the spokesman, and establish a roster of such personnel | DPKO/DPI | |
| Ensure the early deployment of appropriate public information staff and all necessary equipment, including a rapidly deployable start-up kit | DPKO | DPI |
| Maintain regular contact with the missions' public information components and provide assistance and guidance in carrying out the operational plan | DPKO | DPI |
| Liaise with the Military Adviser's office and the | DPKO | |

| *Public information tasks in support of peacekeeping operations* | *Responsible office* | *Inputs advice* |
|---|---|---|
| Develop ongoing training procedures for mission personnel whose work entails significant public information activity, including the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Force Commander, the military spokesperson and the civilian police spokesperson | DPKO | |
| Enhance standby capacity through cooperative arrangements with Member States, non-governmental organizations and United Nations Volunteers | DPKO | DPI |
| Translate overall the political and strategic information requirements of each mission into operational public information plans | DPKO/DPI | |
| Develop concepts for programming packages during the pre-and post-deployment stages of peace missions, taking advantage of DPI's ongoing relationships with regional broadcasting partners | DPI | DPKO |
| Facilitate coverage of peacekeeping operations by the media | DPKO/DPI | |
| Develop standard operating procedures and guidelines for the public information components of peace missions, and familiarize mission information personnel with these procedures and guidelines | DPKO | DPI |
| Monitor internally and externally the effectiveness of the public information campaigns in peace operations, and propose appropriate responses for shortcomings | DPKO/DPI | |
| Liaise with United Nations agencies on overall public information strategies and advise field public information components on the ground on the coordination of messages with humanitarian agencies | DPKO/DPI | |
| Work with United Nations agencies active in the mission area on the shared use of information assets in field operations | DPKO | |
| Preparation, production and dissemination of promotional materials on peace operations and | DPI | DPKO |

| *Public information tasks in support of peacekeeping operations* | *Responsible office* | *Inputs advice* |
|---|---|---|
| Create and maintain pages on the United Nations web site about peacekeeping, as well as other peace operations (e.g., peacemaking; peace-building) | DPI | DPKO |
| Organization of promotional events, media encounters, press conferences in close collaboration with the Office of the Spokesman and substantive offices, and preparing memorial panels for United Nations peacekeepers and staff members who have lost their lives in the service of peace | DPI | DPKO |
| Handling media relations for DPKO and working with the Office of the Spokesman for the Secretary-General on peacekeeping-related issues | DPKO | DPI |
| Assist peacekeeping operations in managing media relations during crises | DPKO | DPI |